Essays on moral hazard, reputation and market structure by Toth, Aron
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2384
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Essays on Moral Hazard, Reputation and 
Market Structure 




The Department of Economics 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
ý for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in the subject of 
Economics 
University of Warwick 
September 2008 
Contents 
I On the Interaction of Reputation and Market Structure 
1 Introduction 
2 Basic concepts 2 
3 Reputation and perfect competition 3 
4 Reputation and imperfect competition 6 
5 Conclusion 9 
11 The Great Industry Gamble: Market Structure Dynamics with Moral 
Hazard 10 
1 Introduction 11 
1.1 Stylized facts and empirical evidence .............................. 12 
1.2 Related literature ......................................... 15 
2 The model 16 
2.1 The game without entry ..................................... 19 
. 
2.2 The game with entry ............. ........................... 23 
3 Discussion of results 27 
4 Conclusion 28 
Appendix A The game with consumers: an extension 30 
Appendix B Proofs 32 
III Market Structure Dynamics with Moral Hazard and Stochastic En- 
try 41 
1 Introduction 42 
1.1 Previous literature ........................................ 43 
2 The model 45 
i 






IV Testing Reputational Effects in a Natural Experiment: How did 
Arthur Andersen Clients Choose their New Auditor? 58 
1 Introduction 59 
1.1 Previous empirical literature ................................... 61 
1.2 Empirical literature on audit quality .............................. 62 
1.3 The audit industry ........................................ 63 
1.4 Background: the Enron scandal ................................. 65 
2 Data 65 
2.1 Auditor Characteristics ..................................... 66 
2.2 Client characteristics ....................................... 69 
3 Empirical strategy 71 
3.1 Estimation procedures ...................................... 72 
3.1.1 Multinomial Logit .................................... 72 
3.1.2 Nested Logit ....................................... 73 0 
3.1.3 Bootstrap ......................................... 75 
3.2 Identification ........................................... 75 
4 Results 76 
4.1 Audit fee regressions ....................................... 77 
4.2 Multinomial Logit models of Auditor Characteristics ..................... 78 
4.3 Multinomial Logit models of Auditor and Client Characteristics ............... 79 
4.4 Nested Logit ........................................... 81 
5 Discussion of the choice models 83 
6 Conclusion 84 
Appendix Nested Logit normalisation with LIML 103 
ii 
List of Tables 
1 Summary Statistics ...................................... 86 
2 Audit Fee regressions, all clients ............................. 87 
3 Audit Fee regressions, big 4 auditor clients only ................... 88 
4 Audit Fee regressions for each auditor (pricing equations) ............. 89 
5 Multinomial logit, auditor characteristics, all clients ................. 90 
6 Multinomial logit, auditor characteristics, big 4 auditor clients only ...... 90 
7 Multinomial logit, auditor and client characteristics, all clients ........ I. 91 
8 Multinomial logit, auditor and client characteristics, big 4 auditor clients only 94 
9 Multinomial logit, auditor characteristics interacted with client characteristics, 
all clients ............................................ 96 
10 Nested logit, auditor and client characteristics, all clients ............. 97 
11 Multinomial logit with Industry Dummies, auditor and client characteristics, 
all clients ............................................ 100 
List of Figures 
1 Steady State Distributions .................................... 56 
iii 
Acknowledgement 
I have been incredibly fortunate to learn from and work with my supervisors. First and foremost, I am 
greatly indebted to Margaret Slade: without her continuous academic, personal and financial support 
this thesis would have never been accomplished. I also thank Amrita Dhillon who has shown distinct 
interest in my research from early on and whose support and encouragement was important throughout 
these year s. Special thanks go to Claudio Mezzetti who took over my supervision at a difficult time. I 
am very grateful for the few but extremely insightful discussions; I learnt a lot in the short tenure of his 
supervision. 
Throughout the years, I greatly benefited from the discussions with two friends and colleagues, Nlatthew 
Dickson and Andrea Salvatori. I also thank Chuck Blackorby, Bhaskar Dutta and Jeremy Smith for their 
special attention. The financial support from the Department of Economics at the University of Warwick 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
Finally, I would also like to thank various seminar participants at the University of Warwick (2006,2008), 
the Econometric Society Meeting (2006 Chermai), the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (2007), 
the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics Annual Conferences (2007,2008) and at 
the Bank of England (2008) for helpful comments and suggestions. 
iv 
Declaration 
I hereby declare that I have not used before or published any material contained in this thesis, it is my 
own work, and it has not been submitted for a degree at another university. 
All Chapters of this thesis are single authored. 
V 
Sununary 
This thesis is comprised of three pieces of research on moral hazard, reputation and market structure. 
In particular, following an opening discussion of previous literature, I explore the dynamic interaction 
between moral hazard and market structure in two distinct game theoretic settings and empirically test 
a fundamental assumption of these models concerning consumer rationality. 
In the first Chapter, I survey the studies which shed light on some dimension of the relationship 
between asymmetric information and market structure and identify the gap in the literature that my 
research aims to fill. The mechanism of reputation has been primarily investigated in the setting of perfect 
competition; however, this setting is ill suited for uncovering the rich set of relations between asymmetric 
information and market structure. Only a handful of articles departed from the perfect competition 
framework and only few of those introduced strategic interaction among firms, a fundamental ingredient 
of my research interest. The models which do include strategic interaction have, however, ignored some 
important dynamics in the interaction of asymmetric information and market structure. 
Therefore in Chapter II, I develop a model in which market structure affects moral hazard while, 
in turn, moral hazard fuels market structure dynamics. The model is very general allowing for all 
kinds of strategic interaction among firms usually considered in the literature. I identify and analyse an 
important driving force -a survival contest - which has so far been overlooked. The main conclusion 
is that market concentration in and of itself reduces moral hazard and moral hazard drives the market 
towards concentration through the survival contest. The model is suitable to explain the puzzling market 
transformation of important industries such as banking, audit and health care. 
In Chapter III, I extend the model of Chapter 11 by introducing stochastic entry. First, I demonstrate 
that my results in the previous Chapter are robust to the entry process. Second, stochastic entry allows me 
to derive a non-degenerate steady state distribution which exhibits a very intuitive dynamics. Finally, 
although the complex nature of the dynamics prevents a detailed comparative static analysis of this 
distribution, it displays two well known empirical regularities. In particular, my model shows that the 
presence of moral hazard in and of itself produces shake-outs in the market from time to time and also 
correlated exit and entry rates. 
The reputation mechanisms in general and in the models of Chapter II and III in particular crucially 
depend on consumers' ability and willingness to develop an understanding of imperfect information on 
quality. In order to make reputation an effective disciplinary force, consumers must be strongly rational 
so that they read and understand imperfect quality indicators. In Chapter IV, this basic assumption on 
consumer rationality is tested empirically in discrete choice settings in the audit market. I find robust 
empirical evidence that if consumers are firms rather than individuals, they are strongly rational. 
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Chapter I 
On the Interaction of Reputation and 
Market Structure 
1 Introduction 
Asymmetric information is pervasive in many markets. Namely, it is often the case that one of the 
self-interested parties has more information than the other and also a natural incentive to exploit this 
informational advantage. This can jeopardise mutually beneficial cooperation between the parties. Re- 
peated interactions and the threat of losing long term gains from cooperation are often sufficient to prevent 
opportunistic behaviour. The mechanism through which the informational problem can be tackled and 
long term Cooperation can be achieved is often coined as reputation. Reputation models have been in the 
forefront of applied research for more than two decades, since they offer an effective market mechanism 
through which asymmetric information can be overcome. Reputation models are also of interest in the 
theory of repeated games in general. The predictive power of repeated games is often very limited because 
typically any mutually beneficial outcome can be sustained as an equilibrium (folk theorem). Reputation 
models provide a useful way to select among the multiplicity of equilibria in these games. (Kandori 2006) 
The aim of this Chapter is to review studies which are related to the interaction of reputation and 
market structure. The literature on reputation is vast and therefore, the review does not endeavour 
to be exhaustive in any way. Rather, I focus on the important insights of some of the seminal papers. 
Reputation has been discussed primarily in two settings: unobserved quality and labour market (principal- 
agent) applications. Here, I only discuss articles within the unobserved quality literature. The reasons are 
twofold. First, I am primarily interested in the dynamic interaction of reputation and market structure, 
and the latter is rarely incorporated in labour applications. Second, the main insights are quite similar 
in the two literatures. I will also not discuss many other interesting models of reputation (e. g. markets 
for reputation), which go beyond the well defined theme of reputation and market structure. 
First, I briefly review articles which have established fundamental concepts and uncovered the basic 
driving forces behind reputation building and maintenance. Most of this literature discusses models 
in the framework of perfect competition. The principal question of these analyses is to what extent 
perfect competition is a threat to quality in the presence of asymmetric information. These articles, 
therefore, investigate only one particular market structure and its effect on dynamic incentives. Since 
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these studies ignore the strategic interaction among firms, they cannot give a general description of the 
dynamic relations between reputation and market structure. Second, I review articles which depart from 
the perfect competition setting in one way or another and attempt to uncover some particular dimensions 
of the dynamic interaction between reputation and market structure. 
Before turning to the survey, let me briefly review some basic concepts and terminology related to 
reputation and repeated games. 
Basic concepts 
Throughout this Chapter, the problem of asymmetric information and reputation will be discussed in 
the framework of unobserved quality. In particular, there are firms wishing to produce and sell a good 
which can be of either high or low quality. While producing the good, firms can exert effort or "invest in 
quality" (action) that typically yields a high quality product (outcome). There are consumers wishing to 
buy the good and they prefer high to low quality. Consumers, however, cannot observe the investment 
(or effort) since it is private information. In addition, consumers are unable to observe product quality 
(outcome) before purchase; they only observe it ex: post, after consumption. 
Reputation models are often categorised along the nature of asymmetric information. One class of 
games is the adverse selection or hidden information models. In these games, the buyer is uncertain 
about key aspects (i. e. "the type") of the firm, which do not depend on the firm's action, but only on 
its (hidden) information. Reputation here is a result of learning: buyers may infer the type of the firm 
through her past performance. Basically, these games show how rational buyers try to weed out the bad 
types through their evolving beliefs, how they learn to overcome informational asymmetry and distinguish 
between good and bad firms. 
Another class of games is the moral hazard or hidden action models. In these models, there is only 
one type of a firm, but some firm's action is not observed by consumers. These models are not so much 
about the learning process but more about the buyer trying to find the right set of (dynamic) incentives 
which induce firms to produce the desired quality. In other words, through the aid of strategic threats 
and punishments, buyers try to effectively deter the firm to abuse her informational advantage. Lastly, 
there are mixed models that are of both moral hazard and adverse selection. 
In adverse selection models, reputation usually builds up over time as buyers learn about firms through 
past performance. In these models the game often converges to its complete information counterpart over 
time. In particular, either the buyers learn the type of the firm eventually, or the different firm types 
play identical strategies. 
In moral hazard models, however, reputation is often a result of an equilibrium in which the firm 
never chooses to cheat. In other words, in adverse selection models the focus is usually on "reputation 
build-up", reputation acquisition and evolution, whereas in moral hazard games the central issue is more 
about "reputation maintenance". Note that, as opposed to adverse selection, in moral hazard models the 
length of the horizon is often a central issue. The reason is that in equilibrium firms choose to not cheat 
as long as the discounted present value of this behaviour is bigger than the value of deviation. Therefore, 
in order to make reputation maintenance attractive enough, an infinite horizon with a sufficiently large 
discount factor is usually necessary. 
A second dimension along which the literature is differentiated is the type of monitoring (perfect 
versus imperfect and public versus private). Perfect monitoring occurs when although firms' actions 
are not observed ex ante, they are observed perfectly ex post. So, for instance, if the firm's high effort 
results in high quality with certainty, then from the quality outcome observed after consumption the 
buyers can deduce what action the firm has taken. On the contrary, if high effort leads to high quality 
only with some probability strictly less than one, than the observed outcome (quality) is only a signal 
of the firm's action, hence monitoring is imperfect. As we will see shortly, early studies of reputation 
predominantly assumed perfect monitoring, while later models were mostly cast in the framework of 
imperfect monitoring. Imperfect monitoring is more general and makes it typically more difficult to 
acquire and maintain a reputation. 
When the (perfect or imperfect) signal is publicly observed, the model is one of public monitoring; 
otherwise, it is one of private monitoring. I do not discuss models with private monitoring because they 
are not related to the theme I am interested in. However, I briefly mention that these models are usually 
quite complicated because there is no common knowledge of histories and hence punishments which are 
conditional on these commonly observed histories are not feasible. As a result strategy coordination can 
break down. (e. g. punishment is a best response if everyone else punishes, etc. ) 
. 
Reputation and perfect competition 
The unobserved quality literature is often thought to have started with the seminal work of Klein and 
Leffler (1981). In this paper, the effects of reputation is analysed in a competitive market in which firms do 
not act strategically among themselves. This article lays out the basic concept behind reputation, namely 
how the prospect of future profits can discipline opportunistic behaviour by firms. In a model of moral 
hazard and perfect public monitoring, Klein and Leffler demonstrate that when quality is unobserved 
before purchase the equilibrium price must be above average cost otherwise the firm will feel inclined to 
cheat and sell a low quality product at a high quality price. In particular, their main result was to show 
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that even in dynamic settings competitive pricing cannot be reconciled with high quality provision. The 
insight is simple: consumers' maximum punishment strategy, that is, their threat of ceasing to buy from 
the cheating firm cannot possibly induce high quality production because future profits are zero anyway 
with competitive prices. There must be a price premium in order to induce high quality provision. A price 
premium, however, would attract endless entry. Their solution is to introduce some firm-specific capital 
investment which is equal to the discounted present value of the future profit stream in equilibrium. In 
other words, the paper uses a dynamic concept of competition: the total present value of the firm is zero. 
Note that this firm specific investment would not occur if quality were observable. That is, it is strictly 
speaking unnecessary and socially wasteful: the utility consumers get from these investments does not 
justify its costs otherwise they would be undertaken anyway. Many of successor papers aim to address 
this unappealing feature of the Klein and Leffler model. (e. g. Shapiro 1983, Allen 1984) 
Shapiro (1983) provides a more formal structure for many of the insights in Klein and Leffler (1981) in 
a bit more general framework (heterogeneous consumers, range of quality levels) and supplements it with 
welfare analysis. However, the perfectly competitive environment (the absence of strategic interaction) 
and moral hazard with perfect public monitoring remain. In this model, the firm's reputation is perceived 
by consumers to be its last period quality. His analysis differs from Klein and Leffler (1981) in that the 
"fixed cost of entry" is endogenous and comes from the fact that an entrant must establish its reputation. 
That is, in the first period the entrant is able to sell only at low price due) to lack of reputation. It 
produces high quality, however, because the next period consumers will know her last period quality and 
from then on she can charge the appropriate high quality price. This investment in reputation in the 
first period, similarly to Klein and Leffler (1981), results in a zero discounted present value of profits, but 
without any socially wasteful firm-specific capital investment. The unappealing feature of this solution 
is that consumer beliefs are not rational in equilibrium, since they always expect low quality from an 
entrant while she always produces high quality. Shapiro (1983) also explores his baseline model under 
the assumption that consumers adjust their beliefs adaptively, and hence reputation evolves with some 
lag so the firm's misconduct feeds into consumer beliefs only gradually. 
Diamond (1989) investigates reputational dynamics in a model of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Although he presents his analysis in the context of debt markets, it may be instructive to discuss his 
findings in the unobserved quality framework. Diamond introduces the concept of imperfect public 
monitoring into the reputation model and this is one of the distinctive features of his model. In particular, 
while in the previous studies actions were not observed ex ante, they were observed ex post. That is, if 
a firm chose to invest little in quality (chose a low cost technology), it did produce low quality and the 
market learnt its misconduct ex post. In Diamond's model, however, a firm produces low quality only with 
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a certain probability, which is a function of its investment. In other words, the firm's actions are directly 
observed neither ex ante, nor ex post. As a result, consumers can deduce the firm's actions in equilibrium 
from the quality outcomes only over a longer period, similarly to Shapiro's extended model with adaptive 
consumer beliefs. This naturally increases the profits from deviating to low effort and hence increases the 
incentive to cheat. Consequently, despite consumers' unforgiving behaviour (maximum punishment), in 
Diamond's model the equilibrium is not stationary and hence imperfect public monitoring leads to more 
complex reputation dynamics. In particular, if the adverse selection is severe (there is a large fraction of 
firms able to produce only bad quality), then the market expects a low quality initially on average and 
therefore the price will be low. At the start, this low price is not sufficient to give the necessary incentives 
to firms who have the potential to produce high quality to do so (moral hazard). On the other hand, 
some firms will produce high quality even if their investment was low as a result of the assumption that 
quality is a stochastic function of investment, rather than deterministic. To these surviving firms, the 
market is willing to pay higher price in subsequent periods since their track record distinguishes them. 
Therefore, those firms which survive invest more and if sufficient reputation is built up (the price is high 
enough), then firms will invest in high quality from then on. 
H6rner (2002) has many similarities with some of the previous models. His study is also a model 
of both moral hazard and adverse selection with imperfect public monitoring. The main objective of 
his article is to demonstrate that the continuous exertion of high effort in equilibrium can indeed be 
compatible with perfect competition and in this sense it improves on Diamond's results. Hbrner uses 
the idea of dynamic competition introduced by Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro (1983). That is, in 
his model both inept (adverse selection) and normal firms (moral hazard) make zero profits over their 
expected lifetime. The intuition is as follows. In equilibrium, consumers abandon a firm if it has ever 
produced bad quality (maximum punishment strategy). Knowing the initial share of inept firms, the 
probability of high quality at high and low effort and their own strategy, in equilibrium consumers can 
calculate the expected number of normal firms in the market, that is, the expected quality. Since more 
inept firms than normal firms fail in each period, inept firms disappear slowly and hence the expected 
quality increases over time. Therefore, evolving consumer beliefs support a monotonically increasing price 
schedule in equilibrium. This increasing price profile is the incentive that induces normal firms to exert 
high effort throughout their life. In particular, normal firms do not cheat because then they live longer 
enjoying higher prices towards the end of their expected lifetime. Bad firms make more profit at the 
beginning since they don't exert costly effort but they also live less giving them zero expected discounted 
profit stream in total. On the contrary, normal firms exert effort and realise less profit at the beginning 
but benefit from higher prices later since they stay on longer. Both firm types realise zero expected profit 
overall. 
The spirit of the reputational dynamics in Horner (2002) is very similar to that of Shapiro (1983): in 
Shapiro's model negative profits at the initial stage were necessary to compensate for the price premium 
later on. Horner eliminates the unappealing feature of Shapiro's model; in Horner's model consumer 
expectations are rational. His article is novel in one more important respect. Reputational effects 
typically weaken over time for two reasons. First, if the horizon is finite, then approaching the end of 
the game, the continuation payoff shrinks giving less dynamic incentive to maintain reputation. Second, 
with imperfect public monitoring as beliefs evolve and consumers become convinced that the firm exerts 
high effort, producing high quality improves on customers' belief less and less, so the marginal benefit of 
maintaining high reputation decreases. In addition, if consumers are sufficiently convinced that the firm 
does not cheat and low quality is just the result of bad luck, they will not abandon the firm. But then, 
the firm has an obvious incentive to cheat. These properties together or separately typically produce 
non-monotonous reputation dynamics in the long run. (Bar-Isaac and Tadelis 2008) However, as Horner 
shows in his study unforgiving consumers can maintain high quality provision indefinitely as long as there 
is competition so they have the option to switch. 
4 Reputation and imperfect competition 
The studies so far have typically investigated to what extent high quality provision. can be reconciled 
with perfect competition. The articles discussed below depart from the perfect competition framework. 
This strand of the literature focuses more on the question that I analyse in subsequent Chapters. 
Allen (1984) recasts the model of Klein and Leffler by introducing strategic interaction among firms 
in the form of Bertrand competition. The model remains one with moral hazard and perfect public 
monitoring. The basic insight of the study is that if consumers are sophisticated enough and know the 
technology, observe prices as well as quantities, then they can pin down firms' behaviour and deter firms 
from cheating even with competitive prices. Allen observes that there is no need for wasteful firm-specific 
investments in order for a competitive high quality equilibrium to exist. First-best high quality provision 
is possible in competitive environments. However, depending on the cost structure, first-best equilibrium 
may not exist; equilibrium may be second-best, with incumbents that do not produce at the minimum of 
average costs - the situation presented by Klein and Leffler. However, even Allen's second best equilibrium 
results in lowerprices than in the Klein and Leffler model, since wasteful firm-specific investments are 
not present in his model. The basic driving force behind Allen's findings is sophisticated and super- 
rational consumers whose maximum punishment strategy have a supreme bite. His consumers are more 
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sophisticated than that of Klein and Leffler since they know the technology and observe quantities in 
addition to prices. As a result, they can pin down firm behaviour much more effectively. Allen (1984) 
argues that in fact his main results hold even if quantity is not observed, because quantity can be inferred 
from price in equilibrium. This is because Allen assumes Bertrand competition, and not, as Klein and 
Leffler, that firms are price takers. In Allen's model, due to strategic interaction, a firm cannot expand 
production unless it lowers its price, while in the model of Klein and Leffler firms can expand production 
infinitely at the going price. Thus, in Allen's model, whether the product is of high quality can be 
detected ex ante even if quantities are not directly observed, because any deviation of a profitable output 
change (unobservable) must be associated with some price move (observable). 
Kranton (2003) introduces a model of moral hazard with perfect public monitoring where firms com- 
pete for market shares via prices. She makes the important assumption that consumers do not link prices 
and quality. That is, prices do not serve as signals for quality. She proves that there are circumstances 
under which there exists no (constant) price which would support a subgame perfect equilibrium in which 
all firms produce high quality. The intuition is simply that competition can eliminate the price premium 
needed to sustain high quality production if consumers fail to link prices and quality. 
Bar-Isaac (2005) studies a model somewhat similar to Kranton (2003). His framework is of moral 
hazard with perfect public monitoring. In his analysis, the level of competition is exogenous and quantity 
(rather than prices) is the strategic device of firms in addition to effort (investment in quality). He also 
makes Kranton's crucial assumption of consumers not taking quantity as a signal of quality. That is, 
consumers evaluate only past quality performances in order to form their beliefs about current quality. He 
finds a non-monotonic effect of competition on quality. This is the result of the following effects. On the 
one hand, competition decreases the profits in high quality equilibrium in an obvious way and, hence, the 
incentive to invest in quality. On the other hand, it can also affect the cost of losing reputation. Once a 
firm produces bad quality it acquires a bad reputation forever in equilibrium. The cost of losing reputation 
is essentially the difference between the values of a firm with good and bad reputation. This cost may 
increase with competition if the value of bad reputation is not invariant to the level of competition. Note 
that in Kranton's model bad reputation always resulted in a stream of zero profits and hence the value of 
the firm with bad reputation was unaffected by the level of competition. Through instantaneous profits, 
competition, on the other hand, naturally reduces the value of the firm with good reputation so the 
difference between good and bad reputation firm values undoubtedly decreases with competition in her 
model. In Bar-Isaac (2005), the firm value of bad reputation is not zero and it is very much affected by 
competition, just like the value of the firm with good reputation. These two equilibrium firm values can 
change with competition at different rates. As a consequence, the loss of reputation may result in a bigger 
fall in market share in more competitive environments and this increases the cost of losing reputation 
and hence decreases the incentive to deviate to low effort. Therefore, while competition has a direct 
and undoubtedly negative effect on the incentive to invest in quality through the reduction of current - 
profits, it can also have an indirect positive effect through increasing the cost of losing reputation. Which 
one dominates depends on market structure: in his model highly competitive and highly concentrated 
markets could sustain high quality in equilibrium but not intermediate market structures. 
Dana and Fong (2008) address the same question, that is, under what conditions strategic interaction 
among firms is a threat to high quality equilibrium. The framework is also the same; it is a model of moral 
hazard with perfect public monitoring and the level of competition is exogenous. They also focus on the 
effects identified by Bar-Isaac, namely, how the (exogenous) level of competition changes the cost and 
benefit of deviations when cheating does not necessarily imply a stream of zero profits. In other words, 
just like in Bar-Isaac (2005), low quality good is of value to consumers and can be produced profitably. 
One of the new features is that while Kranton and Bar-Isaac assume that consumers do not take prices 
(quantity) as a signal for quality, Dana and Fong relax this assumption. This can have quite a dramatic 
effect on the results of previous papers. They find a non-monotonic relationship between market structure 
and quality too but they reach exactly the opposite conclusion to that of Bar-Isaac (2005). In their model 
it is easier to sustain high quality in oligopoly than in monopoly or competitive markets. They construct 
an equilibrium in which consumers link quality and price in a specific way. In particular, in oligopoly if 
a firm deviates from the high quality price, consumers expect low quality and, as a consequence, firms 
revert to low-quality and marginal cost pricing from then on. That is, a change in price (or quality) 
triggers a price war. This makes the punishment particularly severe and hence easier to sustain high 
quality provision in an oligopoly. In contrast, in the case of a monopoly, the firm would still be able to 
charge a (lower) monopoly price once its reputation is lost so the difference between the discounted values 
of good and bad reputation are not that big after all making it more tempting to deviate. Similarly, in a 
competitive environment the difference between the equilibrium values of the good and bad reputations 
is relatively small because although the present value of a firm with bad reputation is zero under perfect 
competition, the value of good reputation isn't very big either. In sum, by deviating the monopoly 
loses little because it can still make substantial profits without reputation. By deviation, a firm in fierce 
competition loses little too because it didn't have much to lose in the first place. A cheating oligopolist, 
on the other hand, loses much more because a firm with good reputation is relatively profitable while the 
situation of a firm with bad reputation is just as bad as under perfect competition. 
Rob and Fishman (2005) develop a model of reputation with moral hazard and imperfect public 
monitoring in a market of local monopolists. As discussed above, reputation is usually a stationary 
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phenomenon in models of moral hazard. Rob and Fishman, (2005) introduce dynamics through non- 
stationary equilibrium actions, similarly to Diamond (1989). In particular, local monopolists do not 
always exert high effort: younger firms tend to shirk while older firms are more disciplined. The basic 
idea behind this dynamics is that older monopolists have a bigger customer base, more profitable and 
hence they have more to lose. As a consequence, they invest more in quality and fail less often. Therefore, 
in equilibrium the industry is dominated by bigger firms along with smaller ones constantly trying their 
luck. The customer base expansion is a result of the assumption that information about quality flows 
among customers through word of mouth. That is, if in one period the firm produces good quality, then 
a mass of new consumers proportional to the current customer base will learn about it and patronise the 
firm in the next period. The good news of high quality has a bigger impact on future demand for bigger 
firms. A distinctive feature of this model is that while in some models like Isaac-Bar (2005) and Kranton 
(2003) consumers are assumed to not link prices with quality, Rob and Fishman construct the equilibrium 
in a way that prices are not signals for quality. In other words, in their model there is no signalling role 
for prices in equilibrium; this is essential in order to introduce dynamics in reputation models with moral 
hazard. I will follow this modelling approach in Chapter II and III. 
Conclusion 
In sum, high quality provision may be reconciled with competitive prices under very special circumstances. 
In all cases, however, consumers must be very sophisticated and have a complete knowledge of the 
technology. In addition, strate ic interaction among firms can be a threat to high quality provision with 91 
less sophisticated consumers. 
However, the effect of strategic interaction, and hence the dynamic relation between market structure 
and reputation has only been partially explored. In particular, all of the models with strategic interaction 
among firms focus only on one aspect of the relationship between moral hazard and market structure. 
That is, they consider models where competition and market structure naturally influences profits earned 
and, therefore, the incentive to invest in quality. However, these papers ignore the other equally important 
aspect of the relationship: moral hazard can affect market structure too, which in turn can affect the 
strategic behaviour of firms. In other words, market structure is not endogenous, only a parameter in 
these models. However, if consumers can force firms to fail, then it seems reasonable that firms will 
recognise that they are in a game of gambling for survival. Firms must ask themselves the question: 
what do I gain if others fail? Providing answers to this question is one of the goals of Chapter II and III. 
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Chapter 11 
The Great Industry Gamble: Market 
Structure Dynamics with Moral Hazard 
In this Chapter, I investigate the dynamic effect of moral hazard on market structure in a general 
framework. In this model the evolution of market structure determines the severity of moral hazard 
and, in turn, moral hazard fuels market structure dynamics through a survival contest. In the absence 
of scale economies I show that the presence of moral hazard results in a convergence towards market 
concentration regardless of the intensity of competition. On the other hand, the dynamics leading to 
market concentration reduces moral hazard even when prices do not increase with concentration (e. g. 
Bertrand competition). Therefore, the main policy implication is that market concentration can be 
effective against moral hazard and as such, welfare increasing. The model is suitable to explain the 
puzzling market transformation of industries such as banking, health care and audit. 
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I Introduction 
Consumers often cannot verify certain key product characteristics before consumption (experience and 
credence goods). ' The firm, therefore, has a natural incentive to exploit its informational advantage and 
cheat on consumers - this is a classical example of moral hazard. Interestingly, many markets where 
the unobserved product characteristics (quality) are crucial have a tendency towards concentration over 
time despite the fact that scale economies are often not substantial. Moreover, there is a common 
perception that concentration has a positive effect on quality in these industries even when the intensity 
of price competition does not ease with concentration. These tendencies are particularly prominent in 
previously regulated markets where competition of some sort has been introduced. For instance, in 
banking, health care and audit, concentration has been increasing steadily since market liberalization 
while price competition appears to be fiercer than ever. Traditional arguments (e. g. scale economies), 
however, often fail to offer a credible explanation for these peculiar industry dynamics. 
I aim to rationalise these market characteristics in a simple infinitely repeated oligopoly model em- 
phasising the key role of moral hazard. The dynamic relationship between moral hazard and market 
structure is explored and fully characterised in the absence of scale economies. I argue that market evolu- 
tion determines the severity of moral hazard while, in turn, moral hazard drives market structure through 
a survival contest. I show that the presence of this basic driving force does not depend on the nature of 
price competition. In particular, a firm can invest in (unobserved) quality and this investment increases 
its probability of survival through the reduction of moral hazard. The contest is a result of strategic gam- 
bling on survival: firms try to outlive rivals so that they can be among the few (or only one) to benefit 
from lucrative market structures. However, more rivals upset the prospect of this survival battle, hence 
firms care little about the future. Consequently, they invest less, thereby exacerbating the moral hazard 
problem and reducing quality. This triggers a shake-out when the market is shared by many. Failing 
firms, on the other hand, raise the stakes for survival since the market gets closer to favourable states. 
Therefore, surviving firms invest more and hence alleviate the moral hazard problem even when prices do 
not increase with concentration (e. g. Bertrand competition). Counterintuitively, this means that a firm in 
a more concentrated market can be less profitable along the equilibrium path. Increasing the chances of 
survival, remaining firms fail with smaller and smaller probability slowing down the convergence towards 
concentration and turning the contest into a ruthless struggle. Failure rates decrease with concentration 
as firms find it more and more difficult to outlast rivals. This in turn forcibly reduces the chance that 
I These key product characteristics are usually labelled as quality in the literature and hereafter I will follow this conven- 
tion. I would like to stress that what I consider quality here is the set of key characteristics in a sense that they essentially 
determine the value of the Product. Quality, therefore is different from "amenities", which are rather designed to give the 
appearance of quality. So for example, in a hospital, quality would be the effectiveness of clinical treatment (unobserved), 
whereas waiting times, complaint resolutions, etc (observed) would be less. crucial characteristics. 
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the market will ever reach the lucrative states and leads to markets along the equilibrium path which 
are shared by only a few firms and yet characterised by cut-throat price competition, very little moral 
hazard and relatively high quality. The effect of the intensity of price competition is secondary to this 
survival contest, Lax competition induces more investment reducing moral hazard and as such supports 
a less concentrated market in the long run. Intense rivalry in prices, on the other hand, speeds up the 
convergence towards concentration and results in fewer firms in equilibrium, 
Naturally, the relationship between moral hazard and market structure has important policy impli- 
cations. This paper shows that in markets where moral hazard is especially severe, market concentration 
can alleviate moral hazard. Interestingly, the more intense the competition, the more important it is not 
to block the natural evolution of market structure and to allow for mergers and restricted entry. 
1.1 Stylized facts and empirical evidence 
The industry dynamics described above can be observed in markets which were previously regulated. In 
particular, once regulatory restrictions are lifted and competition is unleashed, the market goes through 
a rapid transformation. The initial phase is characterised by poor quality and heavy shake-out in the 
form of failures, mergers and acquisitions, Yet, as the market is driven towards concentration, failure 
rates decrease while quality often improves substantially even when cut-throat price competition appears 
to remain. Conventional arguments for an industry transformation of this sort (e. g. scale economies) 
do not always seem to apply. Three industries of this kind have received particular attention in the last 
couple of decades: banking, health care and audit. 
A. The Banking Industry 
In the banking industry, I consider quality to be the risk that a bank chooses to take by the design 
of its investment portfolio. This risk (the probability of insolvency) is never directly observed by the 
depositors (moral hazard). However, once the bank's financial position is in doubt, depositors withdraw 
their money and the bank often fails. 2 
From the 80's the deregulation and liberalization process of the financial systems started to gather 
momentum worldwide. As a result, competition started to challenge banks which led to a failure, merger 
and acquisition wave of an unexpected magnitude almost all over the world. The most striking example 
2 One may ask: why would the depositor care about risk of insolvency if deposits are insured? First, deposit insurance 
is never designed to give full protection for standard moral hazard reasons. Second, it's not only the deposit that a client 
can lose in the case of bankruptcy. With time, consumers build up valuable relationship with the bank, which gets lost if 
the bank goes bankrupt. In this particular industry, failure can also be thought of as an event independent of consumer's 
attitude towards risk (quality); that is, in banking it doesn't really matter if consumers care about risk or not since banks 
can fail as a direct result of their investment decisions. 
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is the US where the number of banks has decreased by 40% since 1984 but market concentration has also 
increased steadily in almost all developed and developing countries in the last couple of decades. (Rare 
exceptions are Finland and France) This spectacular concentration process has long been a puzzle in the 
academic literature since empirical research has more often than not failed to find significant economies 
of scale. (Bikker 2004) Furthermore, it is well documented in numerous empirical studies that, as a direct 
consequence of the liberalization process, banks started to engage in riskier activities. (Keeley, 1999; Allen 
and Gale 2000; Brewer III and Jackson 1112006) However, as banking markets steadily tended towards 
a concentrated structure, less and less risk was observed to be taken. (Maudos and Guevara 2004, Beck 
et al, 2005)' Beck et al (2006), for instance, demonstrated on a sample of 69 countries over the period of 
1980-1997 that more concentrated banking markets are less prone to systemic banking crises. 4 
As a consequence, this perceived negative relationship between risk and market concentration (the 
concent rat ion-st ability" paradigm) has widely been appreciated by competition authorities: despite 
the apparent lack of efficiency gains from mergers, antitrust policy has been particularly lenient in the 
financial industry in the last couple of decades. (Boyd and Graham 1996, Boyd and Nicolo 2005)5 
B. The Health Care Industry 
Moral hazard in health care is very apparent: a patient is almost never in the position to observe 
and verify the quality of clinical treatment she receives. In fact, measuring quality of health care is 
a notoriously difficult task even for researchers. Hence, like in banking, for decades a puzzling policy 
question in health care has been whether the total welfare effect of competition is positive or negative. 
While competition undoubtedly reduces health care costs in the long run, its effect on quality is 
ambiguous. The controversies of quality measurement in health care are particularly severe since the 
quality of clinical treatment is very poorly observed. It is a difficult task to find hard empirical evidence 
on the effect of competition on quality. Not surprisingly, the empirical findings on the relationship 
between competition and quality is very mixed and largely dependent on the way quality is defined and 
measured. (Wong 2004, Pauly 2004, Romano and Mutter 2004) To my knowledge, there is only one 
article which avoids the problem of measuring quality explicitly and yet convincingly succeeds in giving 
'Risk taken by financial institutions is of utmost importance because bank failures could easily lead to systemic banking 
crises, which usually have tremendous social costs. In the USA, for example, between 1984 and 1991 more than 1400 savings 
and loans company and 1300 banks failed, resulting in clean up costs of 3.2% of the GDP. In many cases the direct cost of 
systemic crises have been around 10-20% of the GDP, with occassional magnitude of 40-55% of GDP (Chile, Argentina). 
(Caprio et al, 1996) 
4 In their article, a systemic banking crisis is defined by emergency measures taken to assist the banking system, and/or 
non-performing assets that reached 1017. of the total assets, and/or fiscal rescue operations that exceeded 2% of the GDP. 
It may also be worthwhile noting that in their sample 47 crises are included. 
'I should emphasize that the theoretical and empirical evidence on the negative relationship between risk and con- 
centration is best described as mixed. (e. g. Beck ct al 2006) This is largely due to the fact that financial risk is very 
complex and can be measured in numerous ways. However, the very fact that merger policy appears to have adopted the 
" concent rat ion-st ability" view suggest that this relationship may indeed be prevalent. 
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some important insight into the relationship of market concentration and quality. Jin (2005) investigates 
health maintenance organizations' (HMO) voluntary disclosure of quality. The market of HMOs is highly 
competitive. Since the early 1990s, these organizations have been widely criticized for the presumed low 
service quality, and the market observed many failures as well as mergers and acquisitions. (Jin 2005) As a 
response, an independent and non-profit agency, the National Committee of Quality Assurance (NCQA) 
started to accredit these institutions on a voluntary basis. By 1998 around half of the HMOs were 
accredited. Jin (2005) finds that the proportion of HMOs which chose to voluntarily disclose information 
on quality via accreditation is significantly higher in more concentrated markets. This certainly appears 
to be at odds with theory as well as common sense unless less concentrated markets indeed provide lower 
quality. 6 
Similarly to banking, recent empirical studies provide only minimal evidence of scale economies in 
managed care: such economies have been found to exist only at relatively low levels. (Glied 2000) The 
findings from these articles are in line with merger studies because mergers have minor effects on health 
care costs. (Glied 2000) As a consequence of an ongoing consolidation in the HMO market, 79% of MSAs 
were highly concentrated (HHI>3000) by 2004. (AMA 2005)' 
C. The Audit Industry 
The market for audit services is another typical example of credence goods. The certification of the 
accuracy of financial statements by a third party is based on a credence claim: the integrity (quality) 
of an audit is never directly observed. The independent auditor faces a dilemma. On the one hand, if 
it is more lenient about the accounting standards, more willing to bend the truth, more companies will 
want to subscribe to its audit services. On the other hand, the more false the picture the auditor agrees 
to certify (that is, the more corrupt the auditor), the more probable it is that the actual performance 
of its clients reveals the auditor's misconduct (for example, one of the audited firms unexpectedly fails), 
and hence the higher the threat of litigation and reputational damages and, as a consequence, of failure. 
Audits are primarily produced for shareholders and potential investors who rely on the credibility of the 
audit and ultimately, the credibility of the auditor. Once credibility is seriously questioned, the product 
(audit) is worthless and the auditor quite possibly goes bankrupt. Essentially, this is the stylised story of 
Arthur Andersen's failure in 2002. By the time of its indictment for misconduct, Arthur Andersen had 
already lost nearly all of its clients. 
6In theory, in competitive markets informational asymmetries can be overcome by certain market mechanisms such as 
voluntary quality disclosure via independent quality verification agencies. A high quality producer has a natural incentive 
to disclose information on its quality through these agencies, distinguishing itself from other firms which produce inferior 
quality. For further details see the references in Jin (2005). 7For broader (product) market definition of combined IIINIO and Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) market, the 
corresponding percentage would be 67%. 
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Despite fierce rivalry, we observe an extremely concentrated audit market today although this was 
not always the case. In the USA, for instance, the audit industry came into existence as a result of the 
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. At the beginning, competition among auditors was severely impaired: 
advertising, competitive bidding and'soliciting clients were all strictly prohibited. As a result, hundreds 
of audit firms were operating undisturbed for three decades. Beginning from the 70s, however, rules 
restricting auditors from advertising and competitive bidding were loosened unleashing fierce competition. 
Ever since, the industry has been going through a remarkable concentration process. By the 1980s, eight 
firms dominated the American audit market and by 1998, this was down to five as a result of a series of 
mergers in 1980s and 1990s among the big 8. Then, the collapse of Arthur Andersen further reduced the 
number of dominant firms to four. Whereas only 22% of the smaller companies (revenue less than $100 
million) were audited by the big 4, the large company market is very concentrated: 96% of the companies 
with revenues over S500 million were big 4 clients in 2006. (GAO-08-163) Unfortunately, unlike in the 
banking and health care markets, data on audit costs are not publicly available, therefore, direct tests 
for economies of scale in the industry are simply hard to come by. However, after a careful inspection of 
the predominantly labour intensive audit technology, it's difficult to imagine why substantial economies 
of scale should exist in this industry that could credibly determine such a high level of concentration. 
Recent events such as the bankruptcy of Arthur Andersen raise similar policy issues to banking and 
health care: is concentration good or bad, does a concentrated market promote quality or, on the contrary, 
does it actually harm the integrity of audit? (Bar-Yosef and Sarath 2005) 
In this paper, I build a model which aims to rationalise the following stylized facts: i) Steady con- 
vergence towards concentration in the absence of scale economies, ii) High failure rates in fragmented 
markets, and iii) Product quality increasing with market concentration. The model shows that instead 
of technological reasons, the presence of moral hazard can be the key driving force behind the puzzling 
market evolution observed in banking, health care and audit industries. 
1.2 Related literature 
In the context of unobserved quality, asymmetric information has been investigated extensively under 
static competitive conditions. For instance, Allen (1984) presents a model of moral hazard where highly 
sophisticated consumers infer quality from prices and an equilibrium exists where firms always produce 
high quality in Bertrand competition. H15rner (2002) shows that high quality can be sustained in perfect 
competition under adverse selection and moral hazard. More recently, Rob and Fishman (2005) argue 
that local monopolists provide higher quality as their size grows when information about quality flows 
among consumers by word of mouth. However, only Allen (1984) introduces strategic interaction among 
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firms and none of these articles addresses market structure dynamics explicitly. In addition, Kranton 
(2003), Bar-Isaac (2005) and Dana and Fong (2008) consider models where competition and market 
structure influence profits earned and, therefore, the incentive to invest in quality. Their main concern is 
how and to what extent different competitive conditions can undermine the incentive to invest in quality. 
In these papers the dynamics of market structure is not analysed since they focus on one direction of the 
relationship between market structure and moral hazard: market structure affects moral hazard. These 
papers ignore the other important aspect of the relationship: moral hazard can affect market structure 
and, in turn, the strategic behaviour of firms. In particular, if consumers can prompt failure, then it 
seems reasonable to think that firms recognise that they are in a gambling game for survival and hence 
they must ask: what do I gain if others fail? This is the driving force that the current study focuses on. 
In sum, my paper differs from previous studies because it explicitly models the full extent of the 
dynamic relationship between market structure and investment in quality (moral hazard) while allowing 
for all of the possible forms of strategic interactions among firms considered in the literature. The paper 
identifies a key driving force that has been overlooked so far: a survival contest. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,1 discuss the main assumptions and outline the 
basic model with and without entry. I discuss the main results in Section 3 and conclude in Section 4. 
Appendix A contains an extension of the model, which explicitly incorporates consumers into the game 
discussed in the main body. Finally, lengthy proofs are contained in Appendix B. 
The model 
Denote the number of firms in the market by nE {O, 1,2,... }. Each individual firm in produces 
a (homogenous or heterogenous) good, the quality of which can be of two types, high or low. Neither 
consumers nor firms observe quality before consumption; it is commonly observed after consumption. 
Consumers obtain zero (positive) utility from a low (high) quality good. 8 Firms can invest in quality (or 
exert effort) in every period and this investment is private information (moral hazard). The probability 
of producing high quality in a given period depends only on how much the firm invests in that period. 
There is no knowledge accumulation or increase in efficiency as a result of past investments which could 
potentially introduce scale economies. Firm i can invest in quality xi E [0,11 at the cost of g(xi) each 
period and produces high quality at the end of that period with probability xi (i. e. imperfect public 
monitoring). I assume that a firm that produces low quality fails and leaves the market. 
Assumption 1. If a firm produces low quality, it fails. 
8The good, therefore, can be heterogenous only along observable characteristics. 
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Assumption 1 is purely technical and can be relaxed by incorporating consumers explicitly into the 
game and showing that if they ever experience low quality, consumers rationally stop buying from that 
firm in equilibrium. The details of this extended game can be found in Appendix A. This is very 
standard consumer behaviour in the unobserved quality literature (e. g. Allen 1984, Hbrner 2002). There 
is, however, one crucial difference between the optimal consumer strategy in the models of Allen (1984) 
and Hurner (2002) and the consumer strategy in the current game. In their models, the equilibrium 
configuration is such that either consumers are aware of industry specifics so they can calculate the price 
that ensures high quality (Allen 1984) or they simply hold the "right beliefs" about the lowest price 
necessary for high quality (Hbrner 2002). In other words, price has a signalling role in these models. This 
requires high level of consumer sophistication so in my modelling approach I follow Rob and Fishman 
(2005) and construct an equilibrium in which consumers' conduct does not link quality and price. 
As a consequence of Assumption 1, a firm fails with probability 1- xi at the end of the period and 
hence in any given period firms that have produced only good quality are in the market. Therefore, 
including firm i, the number of firms (the market structure) at the beginning of the next period will be 
n-k with probability xi Pr(klx-i), where x-i = [xjjjOj and k=0,..., n-1 is the number of firms other 
than firm i failing at the end of the period. Pr(klx-i) is the probability mass function of the convolution 
of n-I Bernoulli distributions with "success" probabilities x-j. 
At the beginning of each period, firms engage in price competition. For simplicity, I do not explicitly 
model this price game. Denote the symmetric equilibrium profit for a firm from the price game by 7r(n), 
when n firms are in the market. 
Assumption 2.7r(n):! ý 7r(n - 1), for n>2 and 7r(2) < 7r(l) with 7r(. ) ý! 0. 
The per period gross profit is weakly decreasing in the number of firms, non-negative for oligopoly 
and the per period gross monopoly profit is strictly positive. Importantly, note that Assumption 2 
does not impose any restriction on the nature of price competition. It is general enough to account 
for homogeneo us-pro duct as well as differentiated Bertrand or Cournot competition. This specification 
essentially captures all the cases typically considered in the literature. 
Having realised per period gross profits, firms invest in quality. Hence, the per period net profit for 
firm i is -7r(n) - g(xi). I make the following assumptions on the cost of investment: 
Assumption 3. g(xi), g'(xi), g"(xi) >0 for xi >0 and g(O) = g'(0) = 0, g(l) < 00. 
The cost of investment is a strictly increasing convex function. The assumption of bounded investment 
costs is not essential, the main results are unaffected if I relax it. Its only purpose is to ensure that a 
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corner solution ("high quality equilibrium") may exist so that I can compare my results to the findings 
of previous studies in a straightforward manner. As we will see, without entry, this can also be a way 
to ensure that the market structure converges to a steady state. Were the cost to tend to infinity, 
lim, _1 g(xi) = oo, then not even a monopoly would find it optimal to invest the maximum amount 
(xi = 1) with finite gross profits. As a consequence, even a monopoly would fail sooner or later and the 
market would vanish in the long run. With entry, however, we do not need the assumption of bounded 
costs in order for the market structure to converge to a steady state, as we will see in Section 2.2. 
In most markets g(xi) has a natural interpretation. In the banking industry g(xi) can be understood as 
an opportunity cost: the lower risk (higher quality) the bank takes, the more potential profit it sacrifices. 
The price game in banking, therefore, could be thought of as competition for deposits. Suppose there are 
investment opportunities for banks in every period ranked by their risk, Having acquired deposits at the 
equilibrium interest rate in the stage game, the bank can invest in the riskiest project available and can 
ensure a profit of ir(n) in that period. However, investing in less risky assets, the bank willingly decreases 
its potential profit in order to increase the probability of survival into the next period and acquires a per 
period net payoff -, 7(n) - g(xi). This net profit can even be negative if the bank offers loans at a lower 
rate than it acquires deposits. 9 - 
Assumption 4. There is no entry. 
This assumption is maintained in Section 2.1 for expositional purposes. However, I will relax it in 
Section 2.2. 
Time is discrete and infinite. The common discount factor is 6E (0,1]. 1 consider the quality game 
in the framework of an infinitely repeated game. " The summary of timing in this (reduced) game is as 
follows: 
1. Given n, gross profits, 7r(n), are realised. 
2. Firms simultaneously choose investment in quality, x. 
3. Failures and exits occur. 
The strategies are assumed to be Alarkov and I focus on symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
(MPE) throughout the analysis.. That is, strategies depend only on payoff relevant information, The 
913ounded costs in Assumption 3, therefore, are not unreasonable. In the banking industry, for instance, if the risk of 
the available investment opportunities is bounded, there is certainly a maximum amount that a bank can sacrifice in order 
to secure survival unless one is willing to entertain the idea of negative credit rates. 
IoSince the results on moral hazard in the reputation literature are often sensitive to the length of the horizon, perhaps I 
should emphasise that the findings of the current model readily go through with finite horizon as well; in fact, two periods 
would be sufficient. 
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payoff relevant information can be conveniently "condensed" into a state variable, which is the number 
of firms n. For expositional purposes, I first present the model without entry. 
2.1 The game without entry 
Assumption 1-4. are maintained throughout this section. With n firms in the market, the dynamic 
programme of firm i is simply 
n-1 
v(n; x-j) = 7r(n) + max I 
ý-Xxi) 




where n is the current state and V(n - k) is the value of the firm in a symmetric equilibrium at state 
n-k. Specifying the (endogenous) transition probabilities explicitly, we get 
v(n; x-j) = 7r(n) +0 max, -g (xi) + j6xi 





XI) X-j ++ V(l) X-j) 
, 1=1, 
rL ji 
After differentiating and imposing symmetry, the first order conditions (FOC) of this programme are 
n-1 n-1 kXn-k-1 
_ '(x) +A -, a = 0, Ax = 0, p(x - 1) =0 V(n - k) k 
(1 - X) 
k=O 
where A, 1z are Lagrange multipliers. The simple nature of the first order conditions is the result of 
two facts. First, the convolution of Bernoulli trials is simply the binomial distribution due to symmetry. 
Second, the Bernoulli probabilities are linear. The latter may appear overly simplistic. However, given 
the non-linear costs, it is not. In other words, it is not more restrictive than assuming non-linear sur- 
vival probabilities but constant marginal costs, a commonly applied modelling structure (e. g. Rob and 
Fisherman 2007, Ericson and Pakes 1995). In the current model the marginal benefit is constant (given 
rivals' strategy) and the marginal cost is not, whilst in the other models it's exactly the opposite. In 
both cases the trade off between a unit cost and a unit benefit is non-linear and the first order conditions 
yield non-linear strategies in the state variable. 
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Denote the solution to the first order conditions (2) by x(n). Given Assumption 2 and 3, it is easy 
to see that x(n) : 54 0. There are two possible solutions: one corner and one interior. That is, x(n) =1 as 
long as 
-7r(n) g'(1) + g(l) (3) 
Alternatively, 0< x(n) <1 where x(n) solves (2) with A= it = 0. Before we proceed, let's have 
a closer look at the corner solution which represents the high quality equilibrium, the traditional focus 
of the literature on reputation. If (3) holds, then firms will invest the maximum amount in quality and 
there will be no failures at the end of the period and the market structure will not change. The necessary 
condition for this to happen is that firms generate enough revenue from the price game to cover the cost 
of producing the highest quality. If they don't discount the future, that is, if they are infinitely patient 
1), then non-negative net profits (-, r(n) - g(l) ý! 0) are sufficient for the market structure being at a 
standstill. HoNvever, the more impatient the firms, the higher the net profit they must make, the higher 
the price premium the consumers must pay for the highest quality. In the limit, as 0 --+ 0, in the static 
game, no firm would ever produce high quality, regardless of profits. In other words, as impatience of the 
firms grows, the incentive is bigger to cheat on consumers since firms care less about survival. Inequality 
(3) is consistent with many of the previous findings in the literature on reputation. (e. g. Allen 1984) 
1 first establish the existence of a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. 
Proposition 1 In the game without entry, there exists a symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure 
strategies. 
Proof. See Appendix B. m 
The next Proposition follows from the first order conditions directly: 
Proposition 2 In a symmetric equilibrium of the game without entry, in the long run the number of 
firms, n*, is no bigger than fi (n* < il), where 
0 if 7r(l) < gl(l) 10 ý3 + g(l) 
maxin : 7r(n) ý: g'(1) 15A + g(l)) otherwise 
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It is immediate from (3) that the higher the cost of investment in quality, the smaller the number 
of firms viable in the long run. Also, perhaps paradoxically, more intense competition leads to more 
concentrated markets since depressed gross profits discourage investment in quality. Greater patience, 
however, as captured by the discount factor, supports the existence of more firms in a long run equilibrium. 
The following Proposition states the main result. It shows that equilibrium investment rises with 
concentration even if gross profits -, r(n) don't. As a consequence, paradoxically a firm with only a few 
rivals may realise less profit along the equilibrium path than a firm with many competitors. 
Proposition 3 In a symmetric equilibrium without entry, more firms in the market implies strictly less 
investment in quality, that is, x(n + 1) < x(n) < 1, unless n+1<A, in which case x(n + 1) = x(n) = 1. 
Proof. See Appendix B. m 
Proposition 3 states that, unless gross profits are sufficiently high, n+1 firms will always invest 
strictly less than n firms. However, if gross profits in a market with n+I firms are big enough (inequality 
(3) holds), then firms in this market (and any other market with fewer firms) will invest the maximum 
amount. In the "high quality equilibrium" therefore, no firm fails and the market never gets more 
concentrated. In other words, if the market structure is such that n> fi, then firms will fail with positive 
probability (x(n) < 1) and the market steadily converges towards il. Therefore, n* < fi are the only 
viable market structures in the long run without entry. 
Importantly, note that it is sufficient for the result in Proposition 3 if gross profits are only weakly 
decreasing with the number of firms. That is, even if 7r(n + 1) = 7r(n) for n>1, the strict inequality 
between equilibrium investments holds if n> fi. The intuition for this is a survival contest, the drivers of 
which are independent of current profits. To see this, consider a simple homogeneous-pro duct Bertrand 
competition, where 7r(n + 1) = 7r(n) =0 for all n>1. In this case, the investment in quality (moral 
hazard) is driven by future expectations on market structure, namely by the possibility that the firm 
may become a monopolist. However, the further away the current market structure from the monopoly 
state (the bigger n), the less likely the firm will be the lucky one to become a monopolist since too many 
firms compete for the "prize". Therefore the expected value of the continuation payoff is smaller, leading 
to less investment. As the market becomes concentrated, the stakes rise since the probability that the 
firm will be the one which survives into the monopoly stage increases. As a consequence, firms care 
more about future and invest more. Thus, as the market is driven towards concentration, the survival 
contest becomes more intense, firms grow more desperate to survive and as a result will fail with smaller 
probability. In general a firm in a more concentrated market will invest more, even if current gross profits 
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are no more than that of less concentrated markets (-, r(n + 1) = -, r(n)) resulting paradoxically in firms in 
more concentrated markets being less profitable. 
Competition has two conflicting effects on the investment in quality. On the one hand, through 
price competition, it depresses profits and undermines the incentive to invest. On the other hand, it 
allows consumers to switch and hence to inflict maximum punishment on firms. Maximum punishment 
in and of itself, however, fails to give firms sufficient incentives to invest in quality if the market is too 
fragmented. Interestingly, as market concentration increases, the consequences of maximum punishment 
become more severe even if prices do not increase with concentration. This leads to firms investing more 
and, consequently, less moral hazard. 
In the banking industry, for instance, numerous studies have found a negative relationship between 
concentration and deposit rates (see Brewer III and Jackson 111 (2006) and references therein). Carrying 
on interpreting the price game as a competition for deposits, this observation is equivalent to a decreas- 
ing -7r(n). However, Brewer III and Jackson 111 (2006) find empirical evidence that although banks in 
concentrated markets pay lower deposit rates, they also take less risk. In other words, deposit rates are 
lower in more concentrated markets and these depressed deposit rates allow banks to invest in less risky 
assets (i. e. assets with smaller returns). In the present framework, this "sacrifice of potential profits" is 
&), the opportunity cost of investing in less risky assets. Proposition 3, therefore, confirms the rationale 
behind the recent empirical findings of Brewer III and Jackson 111 (2006). In sum, while market power 
may increase gross profits, these profits are (partly) used to finance investment in quality (i. e. less risky 
assets). 
The simple structure of the model allows me to fully characterise the equilibria by comparative static 
analysis. The following Proposition summarizes these results. 
Proposition 4 (Comparative statics) In a symmetric equilibrium without entry, the higher the per period 
gross profit 7r(n), the monopoly profit 7r(l), or the discount factor 6, the higher amount fir7ns invest in 
quality, the lower the moral hazard. That is, 
dx(n) 




>0 d7r(n) d7r(1) dß 
Proof. See Appendix B. 0 
The effects of the parameters are very intuitive. Higher current profits increase the value of being 
in the game so firms care more about survival and invest more in quality. In addition, more patient 
firms are more concerned with the future and this also leads to more investment. Surprisingly, higher 
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monopoly profit increases the amount of investment and, consequently, reduces the moral hazard in all 
market structures. As a result, it is possible to discipline oligopolies with the mere potential that they 
can become a monopoly. That is, the higher the value of monopoly, the more oligopolists will invest in 
quality, reducing the chance that the market actually ever becomes a monopoly. Regardless of how low 
the value of gross profit 7r(n) is, as the value of monopoly tends to infinity, the oligopolists' investment will 
approach the maximum investment in quality and the market turns into a monopoly with probability 
approaching zero. In other words, as the monopoly profit tends to infinity (7r(l) -ý oo), any market 
structure can be sustained almost surely, regardless of the intensity of price competition. That is, firms 
engage in fierce competition to survive and as a consequence, none will fail with probability approaching 
one, preserving current market structure almost surely. Note that if the monopoly profit is sufficiently 
large, then firms are willing to endure severe losses in the oligopoly phase, even if there is little hope 
that the monopoly stage will ever be reached. The following Corollary which is a direct consequence of 
Proposition 4 summarises this observation. 
Corollary I In a symmetric equilibrium of the game without entry, as the value of the monopoly firm ap- 
proaches infinity, the optimal investment in quality tends to the maximum value. That is, x(n) 
1. As a consequence, for any n, the expected number of failures tends to zero: n(l - x(n)) = 0. 
The survival contest interpretation of the game, the "contest for a prize" has some features in common 
with patent races. In both models, the higher the prize, the more firms invest. However, there is at least 
one crucial difference between the current model and a standard patent race. The survival contest 
identified in the current model is not a race, in fact it's quite the opposite. In a simple symmetric patent 
race more investment in the probability of discovery would imply a quicker end of the game since the 
probability that one of the firms wins is increasing with investments. In the current model, however, 
higher level of investment increases the probability of firm survivals and as such reduces the probability 
that any of the firms succeeds in winning the prize (e. g. becomes a monopolist in the Bertrand case). In 
other words, the probability that the "game ends" and the prize will be won is decreasing with the value 
of the prize, which is quite the opposite to what we observe in patent race models. This implies that the 
survival contest is a much more ruthless struggle since firms have to endure investment costs for a much 
longer period. 
2.2 The game with entry 
In this section, I explore industry dynamics in a more realistic setting incorporating the possibility of 
entry. I introduce entry in the simplest possible way modelling it as free and deterministic. The main 
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insights of the previous section readily carry through so I omit rigorous proofs for the sake of brevity. 
There is an infinite number of potential entrants who have access to the same technology and they are 
completely aware of the industry dynamics. The fixed cost of entry, F>0, is commonly known. There 
is free and non-stochastic entry: a potential entrant will enter the market as long as the expected value 
of the firm is higher than the cost of entry. Assumption 1-3. are maintained throughout this section. 
Timing within a period is modified as follows: 
1. Entry decisions and (sequential) entry. 
2. Given the number of firms present in the market (i. e. incumbents plus entrants) n, profits, 7r(n), 
are realised. 
3. Firms simultaneously choose investment in quality, x. 
4. Failures and exits occur. 
Consider the following simple dynamic programme of potential entrants: 
V'(n) = 7r(n) + max -g(x) +, 6xV'(n) O<X<l 
where the e superscript stands for entry. Ve(n) are equilibrium firm values for which entrants entertain 
the idea of entry. To see the rationale behind this programmei consider the subgame when the number of 
incumbents is n', and a potential entrant is contemplating entry. Note the stationarity of the problem: if 
it is profitable to enter today for a market structure n'+ 1 (incumbents plus the entrant), then it will be 
profitable for other entrants to enter tomorrow for market structures n< n'+ 1. Hence, the continuation 
value in (4) is not a function of market structures n< n' + 1. Define fi such that 
0 if P'(1) <F 
n: P'(n) ý! F> jpe (n + 1) otherwise 
By Assumption 2, it is immediate from the envelope theorem that P'(. ) is decreasing everywhere, 
therefore f! is uniquely defined, It also follows from (5) that entry will never challenge incumbents if and 
only if F> P'(2), regardless of the value of monopoly. 
First consider the subgame, when the market structure is fi. At this point, no entrant will enter 
because the newcomer in the market Nvith f! +I firms (incumbents plus the entrant) will make a loss. 
However, if firms failed at the end of the last period so that the current period starts with n< fi 
incumbents, then (sequential) entry immediately follows until the number of firms (i. e. incumbents plus 
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entrants) is fl again. Note that, therefore, (4) is not a function of rivals' investments any more in contrast 
to the dynamic programme (1). When the number of firms is fi, it doesn't matter how many firms will 
fail at the end of the period since at the beginning of the next period entry immediately fills in the 
gap brought along by failures: this is the result of free entry. This effectively creates an upper bound 
on concentration. That is, if x(fi) < 1, then firms will fail with positive probability but in equilibrium 
exactly as many firms enter as fail leaving the market structure unchanged. " Therefore, in the subgame 
with n< ii firms in the market, the following strategies constitute an equilibrium: 
Equilibrium Strategy of Potential Entrants: if the number of firms is n< fi, then enter, otherwise stay 
out 
Equilibrium Strategy of Incumbents and Entrants: choose x so as to maximise the programme (4). 
Now consider the subgame n> fi. For this, the dynamic programme is as follows: 
[n-n-1 n-I 
v'(n; x-j) = 7r(n) + max Xxi) +, axi 
ý: V'(n - k) Pr(klx-i) +7E Pr(klx-i) (6) 0: 5-i ýj k=O k=n-ft 
where again Pr(klx-i) is the probability mass function of the convolution of n-1 Bernoulli trials 
and Vc(n - k) is the equilibrium value of the firm when there are n-k firms in the market. Now the 
continuation payoff consists of two parts. The second sum accounts for the expected value of the states 
n< ii. As discussed above, in this case free entry ensures that n= fi at the beginning of each period, that 
is, if the previous period ended with n-k< fi firms in the market, the next period price game will start 
with -h firms. The first sum accounts for the expected value of continuation payoffs for market structures 
n-k> fi, where entry is not profitable, hence does not occur. The programme is straightforward to 
solve recursively as before. Let the solution to the programme (6) in a symmetric equilibrium be x'(n). 
The next Proposition is the analogue of Proposition 3. 
Proposition 5 In a symmetric equilibrium of the game with entry, more firms in the market implies 
strictly less investment in quality, that is, x'(n + 1) < x6 (n), unless n+1< fi, in which case x'(n + 1) = 
xe(n) 
Proof. See Appendix B. a 
II Note that this essentially results in a degenerate steady state distribution. However, the distribution of failures (or 
entries) is not degenerate in this steady state. 
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Observe that if ft is such that the equilibrium investment in quality is xe(n) =1 for some n> fi (that 
is, fi > fi), then the equilibrium market structure with entry is ný E [fi, fij, at which no firm fails and 
no firm enters. In other words, in this case all states fi <n< ft are absorbing. However, if x'(n) <1 
for all n>f! >0 (that is, fi < il), then the market is in the state of continuous turbulence in the steady 
state, ný = fi. In this case, exactly as many firms enter as fail in each period and the expected number 
of failures (entrants) in the steady state is equal to R(l - x'(fi)). This can be readily summarised in the 
following Proposition. 
Proposition 6 In a symmetric equilibrium of the game with entry, the long run market structure is 
ný E [fi, fil if fi >K and n* = fi if h< fi. The expected number of failures in the steady state is equal to 
x'ý (n* )). E 
Note that if the nature of price competition is homogeneous-product Bertrand, that is 7r(n) =0 for 
all n>1, then entry is profitable if and only if there is no firm in the market, regardless of how large the 
monopoly profit and entry cost, are.. In this case, once competition is introduced, the market will steadily 
converge towards monopoly and remains a monopoly forever. However, the higher the monopoly profit, 
the slower the convergence is as it is highlighted in Corollary 1. Perhaps paradoxically, cut-throat rivalry, 
therefore, leads to monopoly even with free entry, regardless of entry costs and how big the monopoly 
profit is. 
It is easy to see that entry makes everything worse in terms of expected quality. Entrants make it 
impossible for the market to reach the most valuable states, therefore they forcibly reduce the expected 
continuation payoff and, as a result, the value of the firm at all market structures. As a result, entry 
further depresses the level of investment in quality since firms care less about the future. 
Corollary 2 In a symmetric equilibrium, the value of the firm and investment in quality is smaller with 
entry than without entry. That is, V'(n) < V(n) and xe(n) < x(n) if A>1. 
Proof. It is easy to see that the programmes (1) and (6) are identical if f! = 1. From this and Assumption 
2 it follows that Pe(fi) < V(l) for fi > 1. Then a straightforward inductional argument implies that 
V'(Ti) < V(n) for ft > n, which in turn implies V'(n) < V(n) for all n. But then, as in Proposition 3, 
the FOCs imply x'(n) < x(n). o 
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Discussion of results 
In this paper, market structure dynamics plays the key role in the determination of investment in quality, 
which, in turn, fuels the evolution of market dynamics. Competition and unforgiving consumers can 
depress prices to the level where investment is insufficient to prevent failure (x < 1). This mechanism 
triggers failures setting the market in motion. Market dynamics are driven by firms' expectations of 
future market structure, regardless of price dynamics. Firms want to make it into some profitable market 
structure but the further they are from this state, the less probable they will ever reach it. As a result, 
they have little to gain from survival, consequently care less about the future and invest too little. The 
closer the "winners" get to a profitable stage, however, the more desperate they become to survive because 
their stake in survival is much higher: it is more likely they will be among the few, who actually arrive at 
the lucrative phase. In other words, some win, others lose and failing firms indirectly raise the stakes for 
the survivors. Surviving firms, therefore, end up in a fierce contest to stay on and invest more in quality. 
Paradoxically, this reduces the chance that the desired stage will ever be reached. As a result, fragmented 
markets display heavy shake-out and fewer and fewer failures occur as the market gets concentrated. 
Intense competition evolves into market concentration. Circumstances that make competition tougher 
have the effect of blocking the natural evolution of market dynamics. Entry, for instance, has the potential 
to prevent high quality and exacerbate moral hazard even in the long run. With entry, incumbents may 
never reach sufficiently profitable stages, therefore, they always underinvest keeping the market in ongoing 
turbulence. 
The main result of this study is therefore quite different from previous findings in the literature of 
reputation and competition: for example in Allen (1984) and H6rner (2002), high quality is sustainable in 
competitive markets when quality is imperfectly observed. The main driving force behind their result is 
the sophisticated consumer whose behaviour consists of two fundamental building blocks. First, as in my 
model, switching consumers rationally inflict maximum punishment on firms in equilibrium, should they 
ever experience bad quality. Second, crucially, sophisticated consumers know the technology in addition 
and hence they can pin down firms through an incentive compatibility constraint that leads consumers 
to deducing unobserved quality from observable prices. Thus the maximum punishment strategy of 
unforgiving consumers has supreme bite in their models due to the signalling role of prices. I construct an 
equilibrium in which price does not have this signalling role and consumers form their expectations based 
only on firms' past quality performance. Note that this simple consumer behaviour is consistent with 
unsophisticated consumers who don't know the technology but it is also consistent with sophisticated 
consumers in a pooling equilibrium when firms' prices convey no information to consumers, I show 
that consumers' maximum punishment strategy (Assumption 1) in and of itself fails to give the right 
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incentives for firms to produce high quality in general. Market evolution, however, will lead to high 
quality equilibrium in the long run if it exists. Observe that the very nature of strategic gambling for 
survival (i. e. firms optimally choose x< 1) ensures steady convergence towards high quality. It is probably 
instructive to replicate Allen's results in the present framework. Should consumers be completely aware 
of industry dynamics, they could calculate the threshold in (3). If the value of high quality is sufficiently 
high (and/or utility from bad quality is sufficiently low), then consumers would be willing to pay a price 
at any given market structure which is just high enough to get firms' gross profit above this threshold. In 
this case, we end up in a stationary equilibrium, just like in Allen's study: each firm invests the maximum 
amount (x 1), no firm fails and price is above marginal cost. Lastly, my model shows some similarity 
to that of Rob and Fishman (2005). In their model, firms are local monopolists and therefore there is no 
strategic interaction among them. Reputation about firms spreads among consumers by word of mouth, 
securing a continuous customer base expansion for surviving firms. This expanding demand boosts period 
monopoly profits, which results in an investment pattern increasing with firm age. Therefore in their 
article, similarly to my result, high quality is a product of some sort of evolution. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have developed a model in which strategic rivalry leads firms to underinvest in imperfectly 
observed quality (moral hazard). Consumers follow a strategy by which they inflict maximum punishment 
abandoning the firm should it deliver low quality. This is the standard reputational mechanism through 
which asymmetric information problems are supposed to get rectified. In my model, however, this very 
mechanism in and of itself is not sufficient in general to give firms the necessary incentives to produce 
high quality. Rivalry triggers a survival contest and failing firms drive the market towards a concentrated 
structure. I show that the moral hazard problem is effectively eased along this dynamics even when price 
does not increase with concentration. In particular, since market concentration increases the prospects 
for firms to reach profitable states, the evolution of industry dynamics induces higher investments in 
quality reducing moral hazard. However, perhaps paradoxically because higher concentration leads to a 
more intense contest to survive, it also reduces the probability that these much wanted future profitable 
states will ever be reached. 
The model explains why, even in the absence of scale economies, we may observe massive failure rates 
and steýdy convergence towards concentration in fragmented markets of some experience and credence 
goods. It also explains why more concentrated markets produce higher qualities in general, regardless 
of the intensity of price competition. The study, therefore, hopes to contribute to our understanding 
of the peculiar market transformation and dynamics in industries of such a particular importance as 
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banking, health care and audit. A notable policy implication is that in some markets concentration 
seems to be necessary to alleviate moral hazard. As a consequence, promoting competition in markets 
where imperfectly observed product characteristics are of utmost importance to society may well be 
counterproductive. 
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Appendix A The game with consumers: an extension 
In this appendix, I discuss a straightforward way to include consumers into the game analysed in the-body 
of the paper. The main objective is to show that consumers' maximum punishment strategy is rational 
and can emerge as an equilibrium outcome of an extended game, similarly to Allen (1984), Horner (2002) 
and Rob and Fishman (2005). Assumption 1 and 2 are satisfied in the equilibrium of the game. 
As in Salop (1979), there is a continuum of consumers, whose measure is normalised to one, located 
uniformly along a circle. Each consumer buys one product each period. The product can be of two 
qualities, high or low. Quality is not observed before purchase but after consumption. The value of 
this unobserved quality to each consumer is identical, u>0 if quality is high and zero if quality is 
low. Products are horizontally differentiated. Denote the distance between a consumer and firm i by 
Si G (0,1). 
The ex post net benefit for a buyer to consume the good from firm i at time t and price pit G R+ 
is Ujf =u- pi' - csi' if quality is high, and Uil = -pit - csit if quality is low. The parameter c0 
measures the travel cost, and is an index of the degree of product differentiation. If c=0, then goods are 
homogeneous, whereas if c>0 products are differentiated. This utility function implies identical consumer 
attitudes towards (unobserved) quality, since every consumer gets negative utility from consuming a low 
quality product at a positive price, regardless of her distance from firms. Were the quality known before 
purchase, no consumer would buy low quality products and high quality producers would face a downward 
sloping demand schedule. The ex ante net benefit to consume the good produced by firm i at time t is 
EUit = qitu - pit - csit, where qf is the consumer's belief of buying a high quality product from firm i. 
Suppose in addition that u is sufficiently high so that consumers always buy if q! > 0. 
At time t there are nt firms symmetrically located on the circle. 12 Let Nt = fl,..., nt} be the set of 
firms in period t. The cost of production is zero. In each period, firm i can invest xit in quality at a cost 
of g(x'j). After investing xit firm i produces low quality with probability 1- xi'. The per period profit 
net of investment for firm i is -, -r(pý; pti, lit), where pti = [, r4 and ut is a vector of consumers' actions 
defined below. 
Thning 
In each period, decisions and actions take place in the following order: 
1. Firms decide to quit or stay. Incumbents relocate symmetrically. 
2. Firms choose prices simultaneously. 
"It is possible to extend the model to allow firms to choose their location. Economides (1984) shows that with free 
location choice, there exists a symmetric equilibrium in locations and prices. 
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3. Consumers choose firms on the basis of last period quality, travel distance and prices. 
4. Firms choose investment in quality simultaneously. 
5. Consumers and firms observe current period quality. 
Markov Strategies 
I will look at Markov strategies that only depend on last period qualities. Define the (last period) 
history of, qualities as: Ht = XiEN1-1 W-1101. A consumer chooses which firm to buy from, as a function 
of the history of qualities, her distance from firms and current prices. Her strategy is described by the 
mappingy H' X [XiENI(O; IA X [XiENtR+] --+ Nt. Having observed last period qualities, firms decide 
to quit or stay, then incumbents choose prices. After having observed its own gross profits from the price 
game, a firm sets the level of investment in quality. Thus, a firm i's strategy consists of three mappings: 
, ri : Ht --+ {Quit, Stay}, pi : H' R+ and xi : Ht x R+ --+ [0,1]. 
Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
The following strategies and beliefs constitute a Symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in 
Markov strategies: 
Equilibrium Strategy of Consumers: 
- Do not buy from a firm, which has produced bad quality. 13 
- Buy from a firm which minimizes total costs, pf + cs,!. 
Equilibrium Beliefs of Consumers: 
- If a firm has produced bad quality, it will always produce bad quality with probability one. 
- At period t, firms produce good quality with probability qý = qt = x., if they haven't produced 9 
bad quality before. 
Equilibrium Strategy of Finns: 
- Quit if you produced bad quality last period. 
-If you produced good quality last period, choose pt such that pt = r(p' j, /1') E arg max -I- P! 'r(A; P, i""'). 
13This is Assumption 1 in the main text. 
31 
- If you produced good quality last period, choose xt which maximises the dynamic programme of 
(1), where 7r(n) -= *(r(pt.,, ut. 
), pt.,, ut. ) - 
It is simple to see why pt,, xt. are optimal for firm i, and also why firm i is no better off staying in the 
market if it has produced bad quality last period, given consumers' and other firms' strategy. Looking 
at (1) and Proposition 4, observe that there is no dynamic link between price and investment in quality: 
given other firms' and consumers' strategy (i. e. that they do not trade off price and quality), posting 
a price other than pt, would just reduce gross profit, which would in turn induce lower investment in 
quality, lowering the overall value of the firm. 
On the other band, given firms' strategy, consumers can clearly do no better by switching to another 
firm because, by the symmetric nature of the equilibrium, consumers would be no better off if c=0, 
and would be worse off if c>0. Also, consumer can do no better by deviating to staying loyal rather 
than switching from the firm which has produced bad quality. Finally, note that a Nash equilibrium in 
Alarkov strategies is necessarily subgame perfect. 
Appendix B Proofs 
The following Lemmas will be useful in what follows. 
Lemma B. 1 xg'(x) > g(x) for x>0. 
Proof. Recall that g"(-) >0 by Assumption 3. Hence, the following holds for any two distinct points v, x 
in the domain: g(v) > g(x) + g'(x)(v - x). Letting v=0 and recalling that g(O) =0 gives the inequality 
result. a 
Lemma B. 2 In a syrnmetric equilibrium, the value function is strictly decreasing: V(n) < V(n -. 1). 
Proof. The proof is by induction. First, I show that V(2) < V(1). Then supposing V(n) < ... < V(1), 
I'll show that V(n + 1) < V(n) which proves the claim. To prove V(2) < V(1) observe that 
V(2) - V(l) = 7r(2) - g(x(2)) +, 8x(2)[V(2)x(2) + V(1)(1 - x(2))] - V(l) 
7r(2)-g(x(2))+, 6x(2)V(1)+Px(2)2 [V(2) - V(I)] - V(I) 
r(2) - 9(x(2)) +, 6x(2)V(I) - V(l) < -, r(l) - 
g(x(2)) +, 6x(2)V(l) - V(l) <0 
1 -, 6x(2)2 1 -, 6x(2)2 
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where the first inequality follows from Assumption 2 and the second from the fact that , r(l)-g(x(2))+ 
, 
3x(2)V(l) :5 V(l) since x(2) is the maximiser of the duopoly's dynamic programme, rather than the 
monopoly's. 
Next, suppose V(n) < ... < V(1). Then, I'll show that V(n + 1) < V(n). Let x =- x(n + 1) 
be the 
value which maximises the firm's dynamic program in a symmetric equilibrium when there are n+1 firms 
in the market. Then, 
(n) 
(I )kXn+l-k V(n + 1) = 7r(n + 1) - g(x) +, 6 V(n +I- k) k-x 
k=O 
Therefore, 
n-1 n-1 kn-k V(n+1) :5-, T(n)-g(x)+ßLýV(n-k) k 













Lý k k=O 
where the inequality follows from Assumption 2 again. Now, observe that 
n-1 1 
, 7r(n) - 9(x) +ßE V(n - k) k 
(1 _ X)kXn-k < V(n) 
k=O 
since x maximises the value function when there are n+1 firms, rather than n. Thus, from (B. 1) we 
get 
n-1 





Z V(n - i) 
ni1 (1 - X) 
i. n-i 
i=O 
where I switched indexes setting k=i+I in the first term and k=i in the second. I use the 
convention 0 for I<0 and I>n throughout the derivations. Next, using Pascal's identity 







the inequality can be rearranged as 





(1 _ x)i+lxn-i 
n-1 
-ß 
Z V(n - i) 
ni1 (1 - X) 
iXn-i . 
i=O () 





E V(n - i) 
ni1 (1 - X) 
ixn+l-i 
i=O 
The last element in the first sum after equality can be dropped since it's zero. Then, switching the 
index back again, set i=k-I in the first sum and i=k in the second. This yields: 
n-1 n-1 kxn+l-k V(n+1)-V(n) :5 ßEV(n+l-k) k 





(1 - x) 
k=O 
n-1 




ß En-1 k n+I-k 
k=I 
[V(n +1- k) - V(n - k» 
('k 1) (1 - x) x V(n + 1) - V(n): 5 .1- ßXn+l -<0 
where the last inequality holds by the induction hypothesis. m 
Corollary B. 1 Suppose x(n) < 1. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, the value of the firm when there 
are n firms in the market is V(n) = 7r(n) - g(x(n)) + x(n)g'(x(n)) > 7, (n). Furthermore, 0< V(n) < oo. 
Proof. The first part of the claim is the result of the first order condition (2) being substituted into the 
value function; the inequality follows from Lemma B. 1. The second part of the Corollary, 0< V(n) holds 
because 0< 7r(n) by Assumption 2 and the strictly increasing function -g(x) + xg(x) >0 for all x>0 
by Lemma B. 1. V(n) < oo since V(n) < V(1) for all n>1 by Lemma B. 2 and V(1) :ý 7r(l)/(l -, 6) < oo. 
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 
By inspection of (1), it is immediate that Blackwell's sufficiency conditions, namely monotonicity and 
discounting, hold. Therefore, the value function is unique. Also, the second order condition is simply 
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-g"(x) < 0, which holds by Assumption 3. This implies that the reaction functions are unique. It remains 
to show that these reaction functions define a symmetric equilibrium of the game in pure strategies. This 
follows from the the symmetric reaction functions being continuous and downward sloping. Let's write 
the first order condition to the programme (1) in the following way 
n-2 n-2 
fj(xj; xj, xj, n) =-, 6xj T V(n - 
k)Ck +, 6(1 
- xj) E V(n -I - 
k)Ck 
- 91(Xi) =0 
k=O k=O 
where x, = 
[Xhlhýljj 
and Ck = Pr(kjxj) is the probability mass function of the convolution of n-2 
rn-2 Bernoulli trials so k=O Ck = 1. Continuity is obvious. Furthermore, the reaction functions are downward 
sloping because, by the Implicit Function Theorem, 
p En-2 Oxi i9fi (xi; xj, xj, n) / 
Ofj(xj; xj, xj, n) k=O[V(n - k) - V(n -I- k)]Ck <0 Oxj Oxi Oxi g"(Xi) 
where the inequality follows from Lemma B. 2. Note that the reactions functions are linear (C)X, 1,92Xj 
0), hence the symmetric equilibrium is unique if laxilaxjl r/- 1. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3 
The proof consists of two parts. In the first part I show that the left hand side of the first order 
condition decreases with x. In the second, I prove that it also decreases stochastically with n. As a 
result, higher n must imply lower x in equilibrium.. 
Let's define the left hand side of the FOC (2) as follows: 
(n - X)kXn-k-1 V(n - k) (B. 3) f (x; n, ß) =ßg, (x) k 
k=O 
First, I show that Of (x; n, P)li9x < 0. To see this, differentiate (B. 3) 
Of (x; n, 0) a n-1 V(n - k) 
n-1 (1 - X) 
kXn-l-k 
_ g"(X) ax Yx- Ek k=O 
The last term is negative by Assumption 3. The first term is proportional to 
n-1 
- k) 




E V(n (n -1- k)(1 1: V(n - k) 
k=O k k=O k) 
n-I In- 
)k-lXn-l-k 
-E V(n - k) k(l -x 
k=O 
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Dropping the (n - 1)th element in the first sum and the first element in the second sum, which are 
both zero, we obtain 
nl 
n- kXn-l-k 1) 
n-2 (n - 2)! X)kXn-2-k (n- EV(n-k) 
xE 
V(n - k) 
(k 
(i - X) (n -2- k)l k=O k=O 
1) 
n-1 (n - 2)! X)k-lXn-l-k -(n -E V(n - k) (k - 1)! (n -1- k)t(l k=l 
Substitute i=k in the first sum and i=k-1 in the second sum. Then 
0 n-1 n-1 1) 
n-2 (n - 2) iXn-2-i V(n - k) 
(1 
_ X)kX, -l-k = (n- EV(n-i)- (1 x) äx- 
r, (ki! 
(n -2- i)! k=O i=O 
1) 
n-2 (n - 2)! iXn-2-i V(n - i)7- (1 - X) ! (n -2- i)i i=O 
n-2 
E[V(n 
- i) - V(n -1- i)1 i 
(1 - X) 
<0 
because from Lemma B. 2 V(n - i) < V(n -I- i) for all i=0,.. n - 2. Therefore, we've established 
that 
Of (x; n, ß) <0 ex 
(B. 4) 
Next, I'll show that f (. ) is (stochastically) decreasing in n. In particular, for any xE (0,1), f (x; n+ 
1,0) <f (x; n,, 8). For this, it is sufficient to show that 
(n) 
(I _ X)kXn-k n-1 iXn-l-i I: V(n+ 1- k) kE 
V(n - i) 
(i) 
(i - X) 
k=O i=O 
n 




where the equality follows from setting i=k-1. In other words, the expected value of V(n + 1) < 
< V(1) with CDF B(v; n, 1- x) is smaller than the expected value of V(n) < -... < V(1) with CDF 
B(v; n-1,1 - x), where: 
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vv 
B(v; n, l-x) b(k; n, 1- x) 
n 
X) kXn-k k) 
k=O k=O 
n 
X)k-lXn-k B(v; n-1,1-x) 
Eb(k; n-l, l - x) k-1) 
k=l k=l 
Now, since V(. ) is strictly increasing in k (Lemma B. 2), by the First Order Stochastic Dominance 
Theorem (FOSD), (B. 5) holds if and only if B(v; n-1,1 - x) with support vn (first order) 
stochastically dominates B(v; n, I- x) with support v=0, ... ' n; that is, 
B(v; n, 1 -x) ý: B(v; n- 1,1 -x) (B. 6) 
for v=0,..., n and with strict inequality for some v. Inequality (B. 6) is shown to hold by induction. 
It can be easily seen that 
B(O; n, 1 -x) -B(O; n- 1,1 -x) = Xn 
(n- 1)(1 _ X)xn-I 
Therefore, the inductional hypothesis is 
B(v; n, 1 -x) -B(v; n- 1,1 -x)= 
n1 (1 - . )v, n-v (B. 7) (V) 
Observe that 
B(v+I; n, 1 -x) =B(v; n, 1 -x)+ b(v+ l; n, 1 -x) 
Therefore, 
B(v+l; n, l-x)-B(v+l; n-1,1-x) = B(v; n, l-x)-B(v; n-I, I-x) 
+b(v+ l; n, 1 -x) - b(v+ l; n - 1,1 -x) 
Thus, using the inductional hypothesis (B. 7), equation above can be written as 
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B(v+l; n, 1-x)-B(v+l; n-1,1-x) 
nv1) (1 - )v, n-t, 
+(vn, 
)(1-X)v+lXn-v-l_ n-1 (1 - X)Vxn-v-i +(v) 
n1 (1 - XY, n-u-1 (X - 11 +n 1) 
(1 - X) t, 
+1, n-v-1 (V) (v 
n 
1) 




where in the last line I used Pascal's identity (B. 2). Therefore, the inductional hypothesis is proven, 
and Nve can conclude that for all v 
B(v; n, 1-x)-B(v; n-1,1-x)= 
ý-')(1-x)vx--->0 
v 
The inequality is strict for all v<n. Therefore, by the theorem of FOSD, inequality (B. 5) holds, 
and we can conclude that since f (x; n, fl) is decreasing in both x and n. The first order condition (B. 3), 
therefore, implies that in a symmetric equilibrium the more firms are in the market, the less they invest; 
in other words, x(n + 1) < x(n) as required. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 
Recall the first order condition (B. 3) 
n-1 
1 n-1 kXn-k-1 _ f(x; n, ß) =ß 





Of (x; n, ß) 
= ßx-, d9V(n) = 
ßx'-l 
>0 
g9ir(n) -, 6. n 
n-1 Of (x; n. ß) 
=ßz 
OV(n - k) n-1 (1 _ X)kXn-h-1 >0 
k=O 
The second inequality follows from a simple induction argument. Clearly, 
OV(I) 
07, -(l) 1 




7'-' OV(n - k) n-1 (1 _ )k, n-k >0 
d9-, F(l) 1- ßXn 
E 
i97r(1) k k=l 
where the inequality holds by the induction hypothesis. So 
n-1 
(9V(n - k) n-1 (1 _ X)kXn-k : ý. 0 1: k k=O 
A very similar argument shows that 
Of (x; n, ß) > 0, Oß 
Then, using the Implicit Function Theorem, (B. 4) and the inequalities derived above, we have 
dx(n) Of (x; n, ß) Of (x; n, ß) > 0, 
dx(n) Of (x; n, ß) / 
Of (x; n, ß) > 0, d-, r(n) g9-7, (n) ex dr(l) 0-, r(1) ex 
dx(n) Of (x; n, ß) Of (x; n, ß) >0 dß äß ex 
as required. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5 
The case of the corner solution with n+1< fi is obvious. The rest of the proof is identical to that of 
Proposition 3 after proving the monotonicity of the value function. The proof of the value function's strict 
monotonicity is very similar to that of Lemma B. 2, therefore I only show the first step of the induction 
argument applied there. Rewriting (6) in a symmetric equilibrium for fl +1 and letting x =- x'(fi + 1) 
A 
V'(5 + 1) - V'(fi) 7r(fi + 1) - g(x) +, 6xV'(fi + 1) Pr(Olx) +, 6xf7(5) 
E Pr(klx) - 
, r(ii + 1) - g(x) 
k=l 
, +J)x +&Vý(fi)(j 11 - XR) - 
-, T(fi + 1) - g(x) + 
OXP-(fi + 1) -, 
3x[9-(fi + 1) - 
pe(fi)] 




Ve(fi+l)-Ve(fi)-, 6X[Ve(fi+l)_Ve(fi)]+, 8Xn [Ve(fi+, )_Ve(fi)l 
[qe(fj + 1) _ 
f7e(fi)l <0 
The first inequality follows from the fact that x is a maximiser of ve(. ), rather than The last 
inequality follows from the definition of i! since it implies V'(fi) > fle(ii + 1). Then, substitute P'(fi) 
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for V(n - k) for n-k< ff and V'(n - k) for V(n - k) for n-k> fi in the derivations of Lemma B. 2 
and the result is immediate. But then the strict monotonicity of x'(n) readily follows from an argument 
identical to the one in the proof of Proposition 3. 
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Chapter III 
Market Structure Dynamics with Moral 
Hazard and Stochastic Entry 
The stage game is defined among n incumbents and N (ex ante heterogeneous) potential entrants in 
an infinitely repeated framework and the dynamics of market structure is investigated. The equilibrium 
is a Markov chain where transition probabilities are functions of incumbents' and entrants' strategies 
yielding a completely endogenous stochastic structure. Incumbents can invest in their survival while 
facing competition within and outside the market. Regardless of the intensity of competition, moral 
hazard drives the market towards concentration, while concentration effectively eases the moral hazard 
problem. However, the increasing threat of entry upsets future prospects, dampening the effect of the 
survival contest at work. As a result, concentration can never fully resolve the problem of moral hazard 
resulting in a steady state market structure of ongoing turbulence. The model exhibits entry and exit, 
shake-outs from time to time, and correlated exit and entry rates in the limit. 
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I Introduction 
In this paper, I introduce stochastic entry in the model studied in Chapter II. The presence of stochastic 
entry serves two purposes. First, stochastic entry is a natural robustness check; it permits me to show 
that the main results of the model with deterministic entry are not fragile. Second, stochastic entry 
allows the study pf more complex steady state dynamics. 
In Chapter II, the presence of moral hazard coupled with strategic interaction among firms results in 
firms gambling on their survival. Since quality is unobservable before consumption, firms have an incentive 
to cheat on consumers (moral hazard). In equilibrium, firms invest too little in high quality provision 
when market concentration is low. Consumers, on the other hand, abandon firms which produce low 
quality, setting the market in motion. As failing firms drive the market towards concentration, survivors 
invest more along the equilibrium path, even when prices do not increase with concentration. This results 
in a monotonic convergence towards concentration, although at an ever decreasing speed. Entry, of course, 
can potentially block this monotonic market evolution. In Chapter II, I introduced entry into the game 
in the simplest possible way, modelling it as free and deterministic. As a consequence, the stochastic 
structure was particularly simple, due to the one way stochastic process. The deterministic nature of 
entry defined an entry point above which entry was profitable and therefore free entry would effectively 
block any further concentration. This coupled with the monotonic convergence towards concentration 
naturally led to a degenerate steady state distribution of the market structure. In each period, as many 
firms enter as they have failed, resulting in a market structure at a standstill in the long-run equilibrium. 
Therefore, although the distribution of the number of failures (entry) in the steady state is not degenerate, 
the steady state distribution of the number of firms in the market is degenerate in that model. 
It is natural to extend the results and introduce stochastic entry in the model. The reason for this 
extension is essentially threefold. First, it is important to investigate whether the strong monotonicity 
of the equilibrium investment profile is sensitive to the assumption of an extremely simple entry process. 
Thus, one may conjecture that the results of Chapter II are not robust, since the monotonicity of the 
continuation value may break down depending on the distribution of entry. In this Chapter, I demonstrate 
that this is not the case; even with stochastic entry, the equilibrium investment schedule remains strongly 
monotone. Second, as discussed above, a rather unappealing feature of deterministic entry is that it 
results in a degenerate steady state. In this Chapter, I show that with stochastic entry there exists a non- 
degenerate steady state distribution, which yields a more complex and interesting steady state dynamics. 
Finally, in this Chapter, the stochastic entry process is endogenous; that is, the probabilities of entry 
are determined in equilibrium. The game therefore yields a Markov chain with a completely endogenous 
stochastic structure. This is a realistic feature of the model which differentiates it from most of the 
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literature on industry dynamics. Even though many of the properties of the steady state distribution of 
market structure cannot be explored analytically, important insights can be gained. The model displays 
shake-outs from time to time and correlated exit and entry rates. These two empirical regularities are 0 
often rationalised using technological arguments, whereas in my model they are simply the results of 
moral hazard. 
1.1 Previous literature 
Surprisingly, there are only a handful of studies which fully investigate market structure dynamics with 
stochastic entry, Most game theoretic studies only address stochastic industry dynamics in a duopoly- 
monopoly framework. The few papers that go beyond this simplification and assume an arbitrary number 
of firms often abstract from some important dimensions of the strategic interaction among firms. For 
instance, it is often the case that incumbents do not act strategically, or that the stochastic nature of 
entry is exogenous. Finally, articles which analyse industry dynamics in the framework of a fully fledged 
stochastic game are almost never tractable analytically. I will now briefly discuss the seminal articles of 
the literature on stochastic entry. My review is not meant to be exhaustive; I will focus on studies which 
have an arbitrary (finite or infinite) number of firms. 
Deshmukh and Chikte (1976) develop a simple model where incumbents do not act strategically, there 
is no exit, and entry is governed by a Poisson'process. The intensity parameter of the Poisson process 
is a function of the current market price. In their model incumbents simply share the industry profit 
symmetrically, and hence have a natural incentive to increase price. A high price increases the intensity 
parameter of the Poisson process; that is, it attracts more entry. The lack of strategic interaction among 
incumbents leads to surprising results. When only few firms share the industry profit, the marginal effect 
of entry on the incumbent's profit is relatively big and hence firms have more of an incentive to deter 
entry and decrease price. In contrast, when the market is shared by many, one additional firm would 
not lower an individual firm's profit much and so entry deterrence is less important. As a result, the 
number of firms steadily converges to infinity, while the price tends to the monopoly price. Despite the 
lack of strategic product market interaction, in this model entry is truly stochastic in the sense that 
it is a random process governed by market fundamentals and the entrant has a direct effect on these 
fundamentals in equilibrium. 
Jovanovic (1982) introduces a model of industry dynamics with heterogeneous firms. He too abstracts 
from strategic interaction among firms; he casts his analysis in a perfectly competitive environment. Due 
to aggregate certainty, the price follows a deterministic path in equilibrium. The costs on the other 
hand are random. There is no technological progress, costs are a function of a random shock and of the 
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efficiency of the firm ("type"). The firm, however, does not know its efficiency level but infers it over time 
through the sequence of realised costs. In other words, some firms are (stochastically) more efficient than 
others and they learn their efficiency rank ("type") over time. Based on the stochastic technology and 
the deterministic price sequence, firms make decisions on entry, exit and production. The equilibrium 
leads to selection: efficient (low cost) firms grow and survive while inefficient ones disappear. As a result, 
the average profit typically increases as the industry matures. In the limit, the model exhibits no entry 
and exit, a somewhat unappealifig feature. 
Hopenhayn (1992) focuses on stationary equilibrium in a model of a competitive industry with pro- 
ductivity shocks and heterogeneous firms. Similarly to Jovanovic (1982), prices follow a deterministic 
path in equilibrium, so the only source of uncertainty is productivity. Hopenhayn simplifies Jovanovic's 
structure by discarding the idea of efficiency types. Hence, there is no firm level learning and selection 
process which would lead to a degenerate steady state distribution as in Jovanovic (1982). Instead, 
Hopenhayn introduces idiosyncratic productivity shocks that evolve as a Markov process. As a conse- 
quence, his model yields a stationary long-run equilibrium with entry and exit, and hence a proper steady 
state distribution of market structure that he fully characterizes with comparative static analysis. 
In Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), stochastic entry doesn't really add much to the stochastic 
structure of the models, due to the absence of strategic interaction among firms. Entrants do not learn 
their productivity shocks before entering and, as a result, in both models entry is a deterministic function 
of the state in equilibrium. In addition to prices (which follow a deterministic - hence completely foreseen 
- path in both models), the state is defined as the firm's belief over its efficiency level in Jovanovic (1982), 
and the firm's current productivity shock in Hop enhayn (1992). In equilibrium, therefore, entry does 
not affect the state of the individual decision maker. In sum, given the state of the industry, entry is 
deterministic and doesn't affect incumbents' decisions, due to the perfectly competitive environment. 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) are the first to address market structure dynamics with heterogeneous firms 
and stochastic entry in a full (i. e. non duopoly) game theoretic framework. A firm's payoff and its value are 
a function of its own and its rivals' efficiency levels. Hence the state of the game is the vector of efficiency 
levels. The efficiency levels, in turn, depend on the incremental investments as well as idiosyncratic and 
aggregate random shocks. Idiosyncratic shocks lead to gradual decay in firm efficiency in the absence 
of investment, whereas aggregate shocks induce correlation in profits (an empirical regularity). In every 
period, firms decide to enter, stay on/exit and how much to invest, the latter being private information. 
The results can be summarized as follows. There is a closed set of states which is absorbing: the market 
evolves into this set of states over time and never leaves it. Within this set, typically all sorts of individual 
firm and industry dynamics are possible in the steady state. Furthermore, the investment schedule is 
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usually not monotonic in the state. Indeed, if a firm is highly efficient it optimally chooses not to invest, 
since the marginal benefit is outweighed by the marginal cost of investment. Similarly, at low efficiency 
levels firms do not invest, again because their instantaneous profits are too low. In this model, entry is 
truly stochastic; although the number of entrants is a deterministic function of the state in equilibrium, 
entry does affect the state of the game, namely the distribution of firm efficiencies. 
Amir and Lambson (2003) develop a model of a market with strategic interaction but simplify the rich 
stochastic structure of Ericson and Pakes (1995) in many ways. The stochastic structure of the game is 
completely exogenous; the market conditions evolve according to an exogenous (although not necessarily 
Markovian) random process. To these market conditions, firms react by taking actions which are simply 
whether to be active in a period. Firms play a symmetric game and exit is governed by a last-in-first-out 
rule. In this model, similarly to Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992), entry is only stochastic because 
the state of the game evolves stochastically. In equilibrium, entry is a deterministic function of the state 
of the game, and hence affects the state of the game (the number of active firms) deterministically. 
In this Chapter, I develop a model where entry is completely stochastic. In particular, the number of 
entrants in a given period is a stochastic function of the state of the game and therefore entry affects the 
state stochastically. The stochastic entry process is the result of ex ante heterogenous entrants. Before 
entry, entrants observe their own fixed entry cost which is random and private information. This generates 
a non-degenerate distribution of the number of entrants at each state, as opposed to a degenerate one as 
in previous studies. As a result, the entry process stochastically affects the state of the game which is 
the number of firms or market structure. 
The model 
Time is discrete and the common discount factor is, 6 E (0,1). The infinitely repeated stage game consists 
of two types of rounds: in each period there are N entry followed by one production rounds. That is, 
in every period there are N+1 rounds. In each entry round one entrant is allowed to enter, in other 
words there are N potential entrants who enter sequentially. Time "stops" within the period, there is 
discounting only across periods. 
Let the fixed cost of entry be F+e, where P>0 and e is iid with E(E) =0 and CDF p(. ) with 
support [-P, ool. Each entrant knows her own fixed cost of entry before entering. An entrant's fixed cost 
is private information, but all entrants know the distribution of fixed costs. In other words, entrants are 
heterogenous. This property complicates the space of strategic interactions since, in addition to the game 
between incumbents and entrants, it allows for a non-trivial game among the entrants themselves. In 
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particular, entrants are not symmetric, so despite the sequential structure, they are unable to foresee the 
entry process with certainty within a period. As a result, upon entry an entrant must contemplate the 
fact that further entry in that period can make her entry unprofitable ex post. In previous studies, the 
symmetry of entrants (before entering) and the sequential structure often led to entry being a deterministic 
function of the state of the game in equilibrium. In this model, on the contrary, the n firms in the market 
in round I (that is, the incumbents and the entrants who have entered before round I+ 1) will expect an 
entrant to enter in the next round with probability pl+,,,,, which is to be determined endogenously. In 
sum, heterogeneity before entry induces a non-degenerate distribution of the number of entrants at each 
state. 
Assumption 1. In each period there are N potential entrants, which enter sequentially at the begin- 
ning of the period. The I-th entrant enters with probability pl,,, when there are n firms in the market at 
the end of the previous (production or entry) round. 
After the N entry rounds, the production round starts. At the beginning of each production round, 
firms engage in price (or quantity) competition. I denote the symmetric equilibrium profit for a firm from 
the price game by -, r(n), when n firms are in the market. 
Assumption 2.7r(n) :5 7r(n-1), for n>2 and 7r(2) < 7, (1), where 7r(. ) ý! 0. Also, IiMn-oo 7r(n) = 0. 
Note that Assumption 2 is general enough to account for virtually all forms of imperfect competitions 
usually considered in the literature. 
Next, having realised the gross profits from the price game, firms invest in quality the amount of which 
is private information (moral hazard). The probability of producing high quality in a given production 
round depends on how much firms invest in that round. In particular, firm i can invest in quality 
xi E [0,1) at a cost of g(xi) in a production round and produces high quality at the end of that round 
with probability xi. 
Assumption 3. If a firm produces low quality, it fails. 
Assumption 3 reflects that consumers stop patronising a firm if a firm has cheated on them. In the 
literature on reputation, this is a common consumer behaviour in equilibrium. It is often considered to 
be the very minimum requirement for consumer rationality and most models demand more sophisticated 
consumers. However, I exclude consumers from the current game for the sake of simplicity, hence the 
(minimal) assumption on their behaviour. As a consequence of Assumption 3, a firm fails with probability 
1- xi at the end of the production round. Therefore, including firm i, the number of firms (the market 
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structure) at the end of the production round will be n-k with probability xi Pr(klx-i), where x-j = 
[xjjjOj and k=0, ..., n-1 is the number of firms other than firm i failing at the end of the production 
round. Pr(klx-i) is the probability mass function of the convolution of n-1 Bernoulli distributions with 
"success" probabilities x-j. 
Therefore, the net profit is 7r(n) - g(xi) in a period. I make the following assumptions on the cost 
function: 
Assumption 4. q(xj), g'(xj), g"(xj) >0 for xi >0 and g(O) =g'(0) =0, lim..,, -lg(x) = oo. 
The assumptions on the cost function are very standard: the costs are strictly increasing and convex. 
The limit on the cost function is just to rule out corner solutions for the sake of simplicity. 
The summary of timing within a period is as follows: 
1. The first entrant observes the number of firms in the market after failures occurred in the last 
period and enters with probability Pl, n-k- 
Subsequently, the next entrants observe the number of firms 
in the last entry round and enter sequentially. The 1th entrant, therefore, enters with probability pl,,, if 
there are n firms in the I- 1th entry round. 
2. After the last entry round, the production round starts. Given the number n of active firms 
(entrants plus incumbents), gross profits, ir(n), are realised. 
3. Firms simultaneously choose investment in quality, x. 
4. Failures, exits occur. 
The strategies are assumed to be Alarkov and I focus on symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium 
(NIPE). Let the equilibrium value function at the end of the Ith entry round be IVI(n). (That is, n 
includes the Ith entrant if it has entered the market) Then, 
IVI(n) = TVj+j(n + 1)pi+,,,, + IVI+l(n)(1 - pl+,,,, ) 
where pi+,,,, is the probability that in the next entry round the I+ 1th entrant will enter when there 
are n firms in the market. Note that at the end of the last entry round, since there is no further entry 
during that period, IVN(n) = V(n) where V(n) is the equilibrium value function of the firms at the 
beginning of the production round. The incumbents' value function in symmetric equilibrium then is 
defined by 
n-I n-1 kXn-l-k V(n) = 7-, (n)-g(xn)+PXn 








where x,, is the optimal level of investment, i. e. the solution to the dynamic program (2) when there 
are n firms in the market. 
Proposition 1 V(n) and TVI(n) are strictly decreasing in n. 
Proof. The proof is as follows. First, I consider the finite version of the dynamic programme and by a 
straightforward inductional argument I establish that Vt (n - 1) - Vt (n) ý: 0 and IVI, t (n - 1) - IVI, t (n) ý: 0 
for all t, I and n, where Vt (-) and IVI, t (-) are value functions when there are t periods remaining. Then, by 
standard dynamic 
_programming argument 
limt-,, Vt (n) =V (n) so it is proven that V (n - 1) - V(n) ý! 0. 
Similarly IVI(n - 1) - IV, (n) > 0. Lastly, I will show that these inequalities must be strict. 
In what follows I drop the index of xn in order to ease notation so F -= x,,. By 
Assumption 2, it is 
trivial to see that Vo(n - 1) - Vo(n) >0 for all n since Vo(n) = 7r(n). Now noting that Vo(n) = IVN, O(n), 
from (1) a straightforward backwards induction shows that IVI, o(n - 1) - IVI, o(n) ý: 0 for all I and n. So 
suppose Vt-, (n - 1) - Vt-, (n) ý! 0 and TVI, t-, (n - 1) - IVI, t-, (n) ý! 0 for all I and n. Then, from (2) and 
Assumption 2 again 
Vt(n) :5 7r(n-l)-g(x) 
+, X 
n-1 n kXn-l-k T[IV,, 
t-, (n -k+ ')Pl, n-k 
+ IVI, t-, (n - k)(1 - Pl, n-k)] 
(k 
(I - X) (3) 
k=O 
Now observe that if x is the maximiser of Vt(n), then 
7-, (n - g(x) 
n-2 
-2 +OX n X) kXn-2-k 
k=O 
[1Vj, t-j(n - k)pl,,, -k-1 
+ TVI, t-, (n -k- 1)(1 - Pl, n-k-1)] 
(k 
< Vt(n - 1) 
Therefore, (3) can be rearranged easily as 
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[Vt(n) - Vt(n - 1)110x 
n-1 (n - 1) (1 kXn-l-k 1: [IVI, t-, (n -k+ 1)Pl, n-k + 





1: [IV,, t-, (n - 
k)pl, 
n-k-1 + IVI, t-, (n -k- 1)(I - pl,,, k 1)] 
(k) 
(i - X) 
k=D 
n-2 n 
X)i+lXn-2-i [IV,, t-, (n - ')Pl, n-i-I 
+ IVI, t-, (n -i- 1)(1 - Pl, n-i-1)) + 
n-2 n 2) 
X)iXn-2-i 
1: [IV,, t-l(n - i)pl, n-i-l 
+ IV,, t-, (n -i- 1)(1 Pl, n-i-1)] 
i=O 
( 
where after the last equality sign in the first sum I substituted k=i+I and in the second k=i. Using 
Pascal's identity 
n-I n-2 n-2 
i+1) -(i)= 
(i+1) 
and noting that by convention ('j) =0 for i<0 and i>n, the inequality can be rearranged again as 
[Vt(n) - Vt(n - 1)11,6x 
n-2 2 
[IVI, t-, (n - i)pl,,, -i-l 
+ IV,, t-, (n -i- 1)(1 
2) 
] (1 _ X)i+lXn-2-i 
n-2 
E[IVt-, (n - i)pl, -i-, 
+ IVt-, (n -i- 1)(1 Pl, n-i-1» 
n-2 2 
_i(n + 




E[IVt-, (n - i)Pl, n-i-1 + 
IVt-, (n -i- 1)(1 - pl, n-i-, 
)] (1 - X) 
i=O (i) 
Switching the indices back again, this leads us to 
n-2 
Vt(n)-Vt(n-1) ! ý- PE(ilVi, t-l(n-k+')Pl, n-k+IVI, t-, (n-k)(1-Pl, n-k)I k=O 
-IIVt-, (n - k)p1. n-k-1 + 
IVI, t-, (n -k- 1)(1 -ýk 
') 
(1 - X) 
kXn-k 
(4) 
where the last inequality follows from the induction hypothesis: since IV,, t-, (n-k+1) :5 IVI, t-, (n-k) 5 
IV,, t-, (n -k- 1) for all 0 :5k<n-2, all the elements of the sum on the right hand side of (4) 
are non-positive. Noting that Vt(n) = IVN, t(n), from (1) a straightforward application of backwards 
induction shows that IVI, t (n - 1) - IVI, t (n) ý: 0. Therefore, for all t, I and n, Vt (n - 1) - Vt (n) ý: 0 and 
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IV,, t(n - 1) - IVI, t(n) ý! 0. Taking the limit limt-,,. Vt(n) = V(n), it follows that V(n - 1) - V(n) ý! 0 
and similarly, TV, (n - 1) - TV, (n) >0 for all n and 1. Weak monotonicity, therefore is established. In what 
follows, I show that these two weak inequalities are actually strict and hence the strong monotonicity of 
V(n) and TVI(n). 
Observe that inequality (4) holds at the limit too, that is, we can consider it without the time 
subscripts. Furthermore, from Assumption 2 for n=2 inequality (3) is actually strict, therefore, (4) can 
be written as 
V(2) - V(l) <, 6X2 [IV, (3)pl, 2+ TVI(2) (I -Pl, 2)] - [IV, (2)pl, l +IV, (1) (1 -pl, I)I:! ý 0 
The second inequality follows from what we have established earlier, that is IV, (n - 1) - TV, (n) >0 for 
all 1. But then IVN-1(1) = V(2)PN, l + V(1)(1 - PN, I) > WN-1(2) = V(3)PN, 2 + V(2)(1 - PN, 2) Since 
IVN(n) = V(n). Noting again IV, (2) - IV, (3) ý: 0 for all 1, this implies through backwards induction that 
IV1(1) > TV1(2). As a consequence, there is at least one negative element on the right hand side of (4), 
which just means the second inequality in (4) is strict. Therefore, V(n) < V(n - 1) for all n. Following 
the logic of the argument above it immediately follows that IVI(n) < TVI(n - 1) for all I and n. n 
Having established the strong monotonicity of the value function now I can prove the strong monotonic- 
ity of the equilibrium investments. 
Proposition 2 Firms' investment level is a strictly increasing function of market concentration, that is 
Xn+I < Xn- 
Proof. I'll show that the first order condition decreases in both x and n (stochastically). This implies 
that whenever n increases x must decrease. Consider the first order condition of the dynamic programme 
(2) in symmetric equilibrium: 
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where after the last equality I substituted k=i in the first and k=i+1 in the second sum. Thus, 
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where the last inequality follows from Proposition 1. It is not difficult to see that f (x; n, P) is decreasing 
in n too (Rill proof as in Proposition 3 in Chapter II). This implies the claim. n 
It is important to note that the results in Proposition 1 and 2 do not depend on the distribution of 
entry probabilities p(. ). Therefore, the strong monotonicity of the value functions and the investment 
schedule is completely invariant to the stochastic structure of the entry process. 
I am now in the position to fully characterise the entry process. The 1th entrant enters if Wj (n+ 1) > P, 
that is, it enters with probability pl,,, = p(TVI(n + 1) - P) when there are n firms in the market at 
the end of the previous (production or entry) round. It is not difficult to see that 0< IVI(n) < oo, 
therefore 0< pi,,, < 1. Consequently, entry is a continuous (stochastic) threat at all states. Since 
IV, (n) < IV, +, (n), from (1) and Proposition 1 it is also simple to see that P1, n < P1+1, n and P1, n ý' P1, n+1- 
In other words, within a period, cete7is paHbus entrants enter with greater probability if closer to the 
production round and when the market is more concentrated. Both results are very intuitive. An entrant 
closer to the production round enters with bigger probability because the uncertainty regarding the 
remaining potential entries of that period is smaller. Also, more concentrated markets naturally attract 
more entry. There seems to be two countervailing effects. However, from (1) and Proposition 1 it is 
immediate that PI, n ý'* Pl+l, n+l, 
Therefore, if entry occurs in a given entry round, it will unambiguously 
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lower the probability of further entry. These observations can be summarised in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 3 pl,,, < p1+1, n) Am : "Pl, n+l) Pl, n : ý'Pl+l, n+ll 
0< Pl, n < 1) 
IiMn-oo Pl, n ý 0- 
Proof. The inequalities follow from Proposition 1 and the claim on the limit from Proposition 1 and 
Assumption 2. u 
The model describes a very intuitive industry dynamics. When there are many firms in the market, 
the equilibrium value of the firm is low. Thus, firms will invest very little and hence will fail with 
considerable probability. At the same time, the low value of the incumbent firms will attract little entry. 
As a result, the market is driven towards concentration. However, as the market gets concentrated, 
firms invest more and fail with smaller probability. In addition, since the value of being in the market 
increases, entry will occur with a greater probability preventing the market to become too concentrated. 
As a result, concentration can never fully resolve the moral hazard problem, since while concentration 
eases the problem of moral hazard, entry prevents the market to become too concentrated. Consequently, 
the model exhibits continuous turbulence in the form of failures and entry even in the limit. 
Now I turn to the analysis of the long run behaviour of the model. 
3 Steady State dynamics 
The idea behind the analysis of the steady state dynamics is to use the equilibrium properties of the 
discrete time game above to derive transition probabilities when the period of the game is infinitely 
small. In essence, I am going to transform the discrete time Markov transition kernel into a continuous 
time analogue and will prove that the game produces a birth and death process. 
Let's introduce explicitly the length of a period dt. Note that the results in the previous section were 
obtained in the special case when dt = 1. Since I am going to relate the dynamics to birth and death 
processes, it seems convenient to redefine the probability of failure as 1-x,, = 0,,. Therefore, in a period 
a firm will fail with probability 0,, dt and will survive with probability 1-0,, dt. Also, the Ith entrant 
enters with probability pl,,, dt when there are n firms in the market. There are two facts that I am going 
to use extensively in what follows: 
(dt)' = o(dt) for i>2 and (5) 
(I - adt)k = 
(k) 
(-adt)' =I- kadt + o(dt) (6) Ei 
i=O 
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where o(dt) is a term vanishing (in probability) at the rate of at least second order. Formally, 
liMdt-0 o(dt)ldt = 0. Denote the random variable of the number of failures w(t). Using (5) and (6) we 
can show that the transition probabilities in the production round are 
Pr(w(t + dt) = k1n) = 
(n) 
(0,, dt) k (1 - 0,, dt) 
n-k= 
(n) 
(Ondt)k(l - (n - k)Ondt + o(dt)) kk 
I- nO,, dt + o(dt) if k=0 
nO,, dt + o(dt) if k=1 
o (dt) if k>1 
Similarly, letting the random variable ? P(t) denote the number of entering firms, the transition prob- 
abilities in the entry process are 
N 
rl (1 - pi,,, -kdt) =1- 
El pi,,, -kdt 
+ o(dt) if 0 
1=1 
N 
Pr(O(t+dt) = jln-k) = rpl,,, 
-kdtll('-Pi,,, -kdt)ll('-Pi, n-k+ldt)=Elpi, n-kdt+o(dt) 
ifj=l 
1=1 i<i i>l 
o(dt) ifj>l 
Let the random variable Z(t) denote the number of firms in the market at time t. Then the change 
in Z(t) is simply the convolution of w(t) and ? P(t). In particular, dZ(t)ldt = V/ (t) - w(t). The transition 
probabilities in a period when there are n firms in the market are as follows 
Pr(Z(t+dt) = n+1jZ(t)=n)=[1-? 10ndt+o(dt)][jý dt + o(dt)] + o(dt) 
,, 
Pl, n 
= EI plýdt + o(dt) 
Pr(Z(t+dt) = n-lIZ(t)=n)=[nOndt+o(dt)][1-E, pldt+o(dt)]+o(dt)=nOndt+o(dt) 
Pr(Z(t+dt) = nIZ(t)=n)=[1-nOndt+o(dt)][1-Eplýdt+o(dt)1 (7) 
+ [nOndt + o(dt)] [Z, pl, dt + o(dt)] + o(dt) 
=1- n0dt - 
EI pl, dt + o(dt) 
Pr(Z(t + dt) =n+ mIZ(t) = n) = o(dt) if m: ý- -1,0,1 
with initial conditions Pr(Z(t + dt) = OIZ(t) = 0) =1-E, pj, Odt + o(dt) and Pr(Z(t + dt) = 
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lIZ(t) 0) = E, pl, odt + o(dt). Denote the intensity parameters of the Markov process as U,, = nO,, 
and \,, E, pl,,,. These parameterý are essentially the average number of failures ("death") an d entry 
("birth"), respectively. Although the entry process is sequential (a series of Bernoulli trials), it can be 
thought of as a binomial process with parameters N and T; where E, pj,, jN. Then it is easy to 
see that the process is essentially a birth-death process. 
Proposition 4 There exists a unique stationary steady state distribution P, with probability mass func- 
tion P,, = Po and E(n) < co. 111 P2 "'I. 
Proof. The process has a transition matrix 
(1- A0 \O 0 
0 
t12 1- A2 - P2 
X2 
Stationarity implies that the average flow into a state is equal to the average flow out of that state. The 
stationary distribution, therefore, satisfies PG =P where P= [Po, Pj,... ]. Thus 
(I - AO)PO + flipi = Po 
An-lPn-I + (1 - An - /lyt)pn + Pn+lPn+l = Pn for n>1 
and solving this system of equations recursively yields 
Pn 
AOAl ... Al-i Po for n>0 
, 41112 *** lln 
For existence the probability mass function must sum up to one, that is 
00 00 00 n-1 Ai 
Pn =PO+ 
Z Pn =PO+POr_ rj 
n=O n=l n=I i=O 
Therefore, for the above to hold it is necessary and sufficient to show that 
oo n-1 Ai E ri < 00 
n=l i=o 
From Proposition 3 A, =0 and from Proposition 2 limyl-co Yn = oo. Applying, for instance, the 
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ratio test it is immediate that the sequence converges (very rapidly, in fact). Then, 
PO I +, 
ý n-1 Ai -1 11 
lli+i n=l i=O 
Uniqueness follows from the facts that the transition probability matrix is standard and the chain is 
irreducible. (Crimmett and Stirzaker 2001, Theorem 6.9.21) The chain is standard (although not uniform) 
because liMdt-0 Pr(Z(t+dt) = ilZ(t) = j) =I if i and zero otherwise as it is clear from the definition 
of the transition probabilities in (7). The chain is clearly irreducible since any state can be visited from 
any state with strictly positive probability. 
Furthermore, 
E(n) nP,, < oo 
n=1 
since applying for example the ratio test again 
lim 
(n + I)Pn+l 
= lim 
(n + 1)An 
= lim 
A,, 
n oo nPn n-co niln+l n-oo n n+l 
a 
Proposition 5 The most frequently visited state in steady state, that is, the mode of the steady state 
dishibution isa* = argmax[P,,, P,, -l : minn 
11 - An-l/P, 11- 
Proof. This result is the direct consequence of the strong monotonicity of A,, and it,,. Observe that 
and lim,, -. A,, =0 and lim,, -c ,. p,, = oo so 
the probability mass function is 
increasing while A,, -, ý: ji,, and 
decreasing afterwards. As a result, the probability mass function reaches 
it's maximum when the ratio A, -I/p, 
is closest to one. n 
Discussion 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to derive closed form solutions for the statistics of the steady state 
distribution, such as the expected value or variance. Moreover, obtaining clear-cut comparative static 
analysis appears an impossible task. The reason is that parameters have an opposing effect on incumbents' 
and entrants' strategies. In particular, if for instance the instantaneous payoff -, r(n) is higher for given n, 
then it has a positive direct effect on the continuation value in the obvious way, but it also increases the 
probability of entry, which lowers the continuation value. The sign is therefore ambiguous. Similarly for 
other parameters of the model. 
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Figure 1: Steady State Distributions 
for all n 
n 
However, some properties of the distribution can be readily deduced. For instance, as a consequence 
of the strong monotonicity of the entry and failure parameters, the shape of the distribution can be of two 
types. If there exists no n such that A,, -, > lin, then the probability mass 
function is strictly decreasing 
and will look like an exponential distribution. In this case, the mode of the distribution, that is, the 
most frequently visited state is state zero (no firm in the market). However, if An-1 > Pn for some n, 
then the probability mass function is strictly increasing for small n, and strictly decreasing afterwards. 
In other words, it will look like an F distribution. These two observations could be nicely described by 
the lognormal distribution: a high variance case will yield a shape similar to the exponential distribution, 
whereas a lower variance would result in a shape similar to the F distribution as depicted in Figure 1. 
Using the recursive nature of the steady state probabilities P,, IP,, -l = or 
P, ' - P"-1 = 
On-1 - /In)/Pn, we can say something about the variance too. The distribution is tight (variance is 
small) if the ratio An-1/Pn is steep around n*. In other words, if there is a big jump in the willingness to 
enter or in the failure rates around the most frequently visited state, then the variance will most probably 
be low. This may occur if the variance of the distribution of the fixed cost is relatively small or the cost 
function 
-q(. 
) is relatively convex around n*. 
While the symmetric framework prohibits the model to address many interesting empirical phenomena 
(e. g. variance of firm growth rates, size distribution, etc. ), it is still able to rationalise two important 
stylized facts, namely the presence of shake-out and the strong correlation between entry and exit rates. 
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Both are well known empirical regularities. 
It has long been observed that most industries are characterised by shake-outs, In particular, in the 
period immediately after the birth of an industry there are only few firms. This is followed by a period of 
a steady increase in the number of incumbents. After a while, a wave of failures, mergers and acquisitions 
occurs. So far the theoretical literature explained shake-outs through the introduction of some innovation 
process (Sutton 2006). In the current model, a shake-out is simply the result of the presence of moral 
hazard, while the technology is constant over time. The model exhibits shake-outs from time to time: 
the market can end up with many firms with positive probability and then firms fail in a great number 
(high p. ). 
Entry and exit rates tend to be highly correlated in many industries. So far the literature has focused 
on the following possible driving forces: demand fluctuations, displacement of existing technologies, 
displacement of existing products, fluctuations in relative efficiency (Sutton 2006). The present model 
shows that correlation between entry and exit rates can also be just a direct consequence of moral hazard. 
This is immediate from Proposition 5 after obser ving that the most frequently visited state, the mode 
of the steady state distribution, is the market structure where entry and failure rates are approximately 
equal. 
Conclusion 
I have generalised the model in Chapter II by introducing stochastic entry. I have shown that the main 
result of that Chapter, the strong monotonicity of the equilibrium investment profile, is robust to the 
introduction of a stochastic entry process. In addition, I have proven the existence and uniqueness of 
a non-degenerate steady state distribution. In the most frequently visited state, the model exhibits 
continuous entry and failure in the limit, While it is not possible to fully characterise the steady state 
distribution with comparative static analysis in its general form, the model is capable to explain some 
important empirical regularities. In particular, moral hazard in and of itself is sufficient to produce 
shake-outs and correlated exit and entry rates. 
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Chapter IV 
Testing Reputational Effects in a Natural 
Experiment: How did Arthur Andersen 
Clients Choose their New Auditor? 
Reputation is the market mechanism which is widely believed to effectively resolve problems of asym- 
metric information. It relies, however, on consumers taking into account any available information on 
unobserved product characteristics (quality). Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's 
demise, I investigate to what extent if at all former Andersen clients took into consideration information 
on unobserved audit quality when they chose their new public accountant. In particular, the effect of 
auditors' financial restatement history on firms' auditor choice is examined in discrete choice settings. 
After controlling for auditor and client characteristics and for the endogeneity of audit fees, I find that 
although financial restatements are thought to be very noisy and often uninformative indicators of quality, 
former Andersen clients appear to have based their succeeding auditor decisions on them. 
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I Introduction 
In many markets, consumers are unable to ascertain before (and often after) consumption important 
product characteristics. " The firm, therefore, has a natural incentive to exploit its informational ad- 
vantage and cheat on consumers, This is a classical problem of asymmetric information, a basic feature 
of numerous markets. A conventional solution to this problem is based on the recognition that market 
interactions are dynamic. In particular, if consumers suspect that they have been cheated, they will ra- 
tionally abandon the firm: a dubious track record, i. e. "bad reputation" of the firm today can jeopardise 
its business tomorrow. Therefore, consumers' valuation of quality and informational asymmetry is at the 
heart of all reputational mechanism. This mechanism is effective as long as consumers are willing and 
able to read and correctly deduce information on quality from observables. In other words, reputation as 
a disciplinary force critically hinges on the assumption of consumer rationality. 
Previous empirical studies have found mixed results regarding rationality of consumer behaviour call- 
ing into question the effectiveness of reputation as a disciplinary force in many markets. While it is clear 
that consumers value and act upon previously unavailable information on quality, it is less obvious if 
they are able and willing to decipher more complex quality signals. In other words, it appears unam- 
biguous that consumers are not fools, but their strong rationality has not yet been decidedly confirmed 
in the empirical literature. This is a very important research area since in many markets only imperfect 
indicators are available for consumers to rely on in order to make r eputation an effective solution to the 
widespread problem of asymmetric information. 
In this paper, I analyse reputational effects in a market where customers are firms rather than individ- 
uals. Exploiting the natural experiment of Arthur Andersen's demise, I find that a noisy quality signal, 
the auditors' financial restatement history, is one of the most important driving forces in companies' 
auditor choice. This suggests that the reputational mechanism is indeed effective in the audit industry 
and clients are strongly rational. 
In this study I investigate how former clients of Arthur Andersen chose their new auditor after 
Andersen's demise. In particular, I am interested in whether Andersen clients rationally took into account 
imperfect signals on quality when making their choice. The audit industry appears to be a particularly 
well suited laboratory to test buyer rationality for several reasons. First, moral hazard in this market 
is exceptionally severe: the existence of the whole industry hinges on the mechanism of reputation. 
Second, customers in this market are firms rather than individuals, therefore in general the strong notion 
of rationality should be found at work with a much better chance. Third, the reputation of the audit 
market as a whole had just suffered severe damage at the time of Andersen's failure and Andersen clients 
141 will term these essential product characteristics as quality hereafter. 
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bore most of the consequences of the debacle. Therefore, they were probably much more sensitive to audit 
quality than other public companies: for them re-establishing the integrity of their financial statements 
by choosing auditor quality vigilantly was undoubtedly of utmost importance. Moreover, note that at 
the time simply choosing a big 4 auditor" could have appeared insufficient to signal integrity to investors 
since one of the big 5 had just failed. Perhaps not surprisingly there were widespread rumours at the 
time that Andersen's failure was not the only but merely the first one. (Economist, 2003) Therefore, it 
seems reasonable that former Andersen clients paid distinct attention to quality indicators that could 
potentially differentiate among auditors in general and within the exclusive group of big 4 in particular. 
Finally, Andersen's failure set the stage for a natural experiment. In many empirical works endogenous 
sample selection is a fundamental problem. That is, factors that induce selection into the sample may 
be correlated with variables which also drive the relationship of interest. In the current context, the 
analyst of auditor changes must be careful because (possibly unobserved) circumstances which trigger 
auditor switch may also affect the choice of the succeeding auditor. Focusing on a forced auditor change, 
however, sample selection that often confounds previous analyses is not an issue in the current empirical 
investigation. 
The basic quality indicator in this study is auditors' financial restatement history. In particular, I 
investigate if former Andersen clients considered the proportion of an auditor's clients restating financial 
statements ("restatement history") as a quality signal while choosing among public accountants. Restate- 
ments are material corrections of financial reports which cannot be relied upon any more and, therefore, 
have to be reissued. Since the very role of the independent -auditor is to review financial statements and 
ensure that they represent a fair account of the company's financial position, it appears natural to think 
that if a financial statement has to be restated, then the auditor has not done its job properly. A central 
question is, however, whether financial restatements can indeed be regarded as a genuine quality signal; 
that is, if they are correlated with audit quality at all. Since audit quality is never observed it is difficult 
to say anything explicit about this question. However, there are a number of reasons why it should 
be a valid quality indicator for companies. Firstly, and most importantly, capital markets do seem to 
perceive restatements as an important indicator of the authenticity of a company's financials. Financial 
statements are primarily produced and verified for shareholders. Consequently, public companies are 
concerned with the shareholders' perception of audit quality. And indeed, there is ample evidence that 
capital markets do receive restatements badly. Before Andersen's collapse, restatements hit the restating 
company hard: on average, they triggered a 10% fall in the company's market value between 1997 - 2002 
(GAO -03-138). Therefore, companies should care about auditors' restatement profiles if only because 
"The big 4 auditors are PricowaterhouseCoopers (PWC), Ernst&Young (EY), Deloitte&Touche (DT) and KPINIG. These 
four auditors and Arthur Andersen constituted the big 5 before 31 August 2002. 
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capital markets do. Secondly, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers every restatement 
outright audit failure (GAO-03-138). Similarly, public bodies such as Financial Executives International 
(FEI) or Panel on Audit Effectiveness (O'Malley Panel) perceive restatements as an important indicator 
of audit quality (Palmrose and Scholz 2004), Consequently, there seem to be compelling reasons why 
financial restatement history should forcibly feed into companies' auditor choices. On the other hand, 
it is not quite clear to what extent the auditor is responsible for a restatement and as a consequence 
in the academic literature financial restatements are often thought to be very noisy (if at all) indicators 
of audit quality (Francis 2004). For instance, Eisenberg and Macey (2004) show that prior to Enron, 
there was no statistically significant difference across the big 5 auditors in terms of restatement history. 
In fact, Andersen outperformed, albeit marginally, some of the big 4 auditors on this measure. Also, 
between 1995 and 1999 only 13% of financial restatements led to auditor litigation. (Palmrose and Scholz 
2004) Thus, it's not clear if and t6 what extent firms should take into account information on financial 
restatements when choosing an auditor. In this study I find that companies' auditor choices are robustly 
determined by auditors' financial restatement history and industry experience, whereas audit fees and 
company specifies have a very limited, often not detectable effect. 
The research on the effectiveness of reputational mechanisms has very important policy implications. 
In the event of a major debacle, policy makers are often quick to declare market failure and step in 
by offering "effective regulations". For instance, Arthur Andersen's collapse was swiftly followed by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was supposed to rectify the audit market. However, in my view these debacles 
are more often than not part of a learning process and as such ultimately an efficient reputational 
mechanism. Indeed, these market crises draw the attention of agents at both sides of the market to the 
impact, the importance and ultimately the effectiveness of quality signals. Therefore, if a reputational 
mechanism is at work, then indirect measures based on strengthening existing market mechanisms (e. g. 
information disclosure) are probably much more beneficial than the costly and almost always handicapped 
direct regulation. 
1.1 Previous empirical literature 
Two strands of the empirical literature on unobserved quality can be distinguished. In one, consumer 
rationality is tested in a very obvious way: do consumers react and to what extent when previously 
unobserved quality becomes observable due to some information disclosure? In the other strand, a much 
stronger notion of rationality is analysed: are consumers able to and do they read potentially noisy and 
complex quality indicators? 
The fundamental prediction has been readily confirmed on information disclosure: if consumers care 
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about quality and quality gets revealed, then they should and indeed do take this information into 
consideration. Jin and Leslie (2003) find that once restaurant hygiene became easily observable as a 
result of a regulatory change, consumers started to make their choice on the basis of this information 
and by doing so, exerted effective discipline on restaurants leading to an increase in average hygiene. 
Also, there is an extensive literature on (voluntary or mandatory) product labelling. Again, empirical 
studies tend to find a clear relationship between a change in consumer attitudes and the introduction 
of labelling on nutrition (e. g. Frazao and Allshouse 1996, Mathios 2000 or Loureiro et al 2006). Also, 
Howard (2005) shows that once the difference between expected and actual graft failure rates (quality) 
of transplant centres was published, patients waiting for kidney transplantation started to base their 
transplant centre choice on this information. " Similarly, Foreman and Shea (1999) finds that as statistics 
on on-time performance of US domestic airlines went public, consumers re-adjusted their demand and 
exerted effective discipline on firms leading to an improvement of average quality. 
On the other hand, there has been less work on imperfect quality indicators and how consumers rpact 
to them. The results of this literature are mixed, which can perhaps be taken as evidence that consumers 
find it difficult to understand quality indicators. Hodgkin (1996) finds no evidence that patients in general 
take the availability of specialised cardiac services as a signal of quality when they choose hospitals. Mocan 
(2007) cannot confirm that parents are strongly rational when making choices among child care services: 
they often give importance to uninformative quality signals while ignoring informative ones. Reinstein 
(2005) finds ý very small but detectable effect of movie reviews on film choices. 
1.2 Empirical literature on audit quality 
Audit quality is unobserved and, perhaps not surprisingly, very little empirical Nvork has been done to 
uncover its role in the audit industry. Empirical studies often assume quality differences across auditors 
but do not test their hypotheses. For instance, it is quite common in the literature to assume that 
the big 4 (6,8) offer superior quality to non-big 4 (6,8) audit firms (e. g. Farber 2005, I<hurana and 
Raman 2004, Gul et al 2002, Reed et al 2000). 17 In another study, Jiraporn (2006) shows that firms 
with weaker shareholder rights have a tendency to select Arthur Andersen (which is assumed to represent 
lower quality) over the other big six. Other articles focus on measuring the adverse effects of reputation 
16A detailed discussion on why it is relatively easy to measure quality in transplantation can be found in Howard (2006). 
In short, kidneys are too precious goods to experiment with: a kidney gets transplanted into a patient if and only if the 
probability of success is almost certain as described by a set of well defined criteria beyond the discretion of the hospital. 
So patient and kidney characteristics have only a minor influence on the actual probability of transplantation success. 
17Note that the fact that there are significant fee differences (on average around 207c) between the big 4 (6,8) and smaller 
accountant firms is by no means evidence for different audit quality. For instance, according to the 'insurance hypothesis' 
(Francis 2004), investors and shareholders prefer and, as a consequence, firms may want tochoose a big auditor because of 
its deep pocket: in the case of a lawsuit, big auditors will more probably stand for financial damages. Also, other obvious 
differences between the two groups of auditors such as industry experience can explain the substantial gap between big 4 
and non-big 4 fees. 
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damage on the market value of client companies due to auditor failure of some sort (e. g. Krishnamurthy 
et al 2006, Pacini and Hillison 2003, Chaney and Philipich 2002). 
However, there are very few studies investigating auditor quality directly. Fuerman (2003) tests if 
there is significant difference in quality (proxied by auditor litigation history) between big 5 auditors 
individually and finds that all big 5 auditors but Arthur Andersen offered superior quality compared 
to boutique (non-big 5) auditors. However, Tilis (2005) investigates along a longer period and finds no 
quality differences among big 5 (6,8) and across big 5 (6,8) and boutique auditors. Her quality measure is 
built on the idea that if the standard deviation of a company's abnormal accruals is high, then it should 
be associated with large errors in its financial reports, and therefore should indicate low audit quality. 
To my knowledge, however, audit quality perception among clients and how these differences in per- 
ceived quality actually affect clients' auditor choices has not been analysed. As a result, we don't know 
how potential clients perceive quality and whether they act upon their perceptions. In other words, 
we seem to know little about how effective and disciplinary the reputational mechanism is in the audit 
industry. In particular, it seems to be well documented how capital markets react to quality signals but 
there appears to be no empirical work on how this capital market reaction feeds into companies' auditor 
choice. This is the scope of the current study, 
This study is, therefore, not concerned with measuring actual quality differences. Rather, it tries 
to understand quality perceptions across potential audit clients. In particular, I am interested in how 
readily available market information affects auditor choice, that is, whether the reputational mechanism 
is effectively at work or not. Companies usually keep a close eye on competitors so it is reasonable to 
assume that they are aware of a restatement announcement of their peers and its market effect. Since 
restatements have a direct effect on companies' market value, it should be an important indicator for 
them and as such should influence their choice to a detectable extent, 
In the current framework it is possible to test for differences in quality perceptions among big 4 as 
well as between big 4 and non-big 4 public accountants. The results suggest that there exist significant 
differences in perceived quality within the big 4 and also between the big 4 and non-big 4 auditors. 
Therefore, the conventional quality classification in the audit literature (big 4- high, non-big 4- low) 
appears overly simplistic. 
1.3 The audit industry 
The audit industry came into existence in the USA as a result of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934. 
Establishing the principle of full disclosure, these federal -securities laws obliged public companies to 
provide investors with full and accurate information and required them to have their financial statements 
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audited by independent accountants. The public company must secure an independent audit opinion on a 
yearly basis in order to be listed on a national stock exchange and to comply with reporting requirements 
of the securities laws. Bringing integrity, objectivity and professional competence, the external auditor is, 
therefore, to ensure that a company's financial statements are fairly presented and reliable in all material 
respects. In other words, the public accountant serves as an independent link between the management 
and the investing community. 
At the beginning, competition among auditors was severely impaired: advertising, competitive bidding 
and soliciting clients were all strictly prohibited. As a result, hundreds of audit firms operated undisturbed 
for three decades. Beginning from the 70s, however, rules restricting auditors from advertising and 
competitive bidding were loosened unleashing fierce competition. (GAO-03-864) Ever since, the industry 
has been going through a remarkable concentration process. By the 1980s, eight firms dominated the 
American audit market and by 1998, this was down to five as a result of a series of mergers among the 
big 8. Then, the collapse of Arthur Andersen further reduced the number of dominant firms to four. 
Whereas only 22% of the smaller companies (revenue less than S100 million) were audited by the big 4, 
the large company market is very concentrated: 96% of the companies with revenues over $500 million 
were big 4 clients in 2006.18 (GAO-08-163) 
Public accountants used to offer a wide range of services. In addition to audit, they developed 
substantial non-audit, typically consulting arms. These included but were not limited to tax, information 
technology and management consulting. Non-audit business lines grew into a substantial source of income 
over the years: by 1998, management consultancy alone on average constituted 45% of the revenues of 
the big 5. (GAO-08-163) These services, however, seriously called into question auditor independence and 
therefore public accountants started to divest or sell these business lines from 2000. In 2002 the provision 
of a wide range of non-audit services to audit clients was explicitly prohibited in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
The market for audit services is typical of an industry where moral hazard plays a major role. Auditors 
verify financial statements every year to ensure that investors get a true picture of the company. Potential 
investors and shareholders must rely on a credence claim: the veracity and authenticity (quality) of an 
audit is never directly observed. Public companies, however, have a strong incentive to misreport their 
financials and, as a result, so do auditors who are paid by them. On the other hand, investors are well 
aware of this incentive and therefore, they want to learn about auditor conduct in every possible way. If 
an auditor's reputation suffers serious damage, investors cease to rely on the financial statements it has 
audited and the market confidence in the value of its clients evaporates. Therefore, although the company 
has a quite natural driver to misreport its financials, it also has a strong incentive "to appear" to report 
truthfully. As a result, potential audit clients should care about auditor quality. Although audit quality 
"Market shares based on audit fees as of 2006: PWC 30.37c, EY 23.5%, DT 21.2%, KPMG 19.4%. 
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is not observed, there is information available that market participants may regard as quality indicators. 
Thq auditors' financial restatement history could well be such an indicator. " 
1.4 Background: the Enron scandal 
Arthur Andersen audited the Texas based energy company from its birth in 1986. In 15 years, Enron 
grew into the US's seventh largest firm. Through the years, Enron became one of Andersen's biggest 
clients worldwide paying tens of millions of dollars year after year for audit as well as consulting ser- 
vices. Although the fraudulent accounting practices are thought to have started as early as 1996, market 
confidence in the company began to fade only in 2001. 
On October 17,2001 the Enron scandal started to unfold: the chairman, Kenneth Lay announced that 
the third quarter results were negative - something that had been unheard of before. This reinforced 
fears about the inadequacy of Enron's financial records, which first had seriously emerged on the 15 
August, when Jeffery Skilling, CEO, the main architect of the company's success, unexpectedly resigned 
for personal reasons. On October 23rd, the SEC announced that it was investigating the company. 
Enron filed for bankruptcy on December 2,2001. Arthur Andersen admitted shredding documents on 
January 10,2002 and its criminal indictment was announced on March 14,2002. On 15 June, 2002 Arthur 
Andersen was convicted of obstruction of justice and the firm surrendered its licenses on August 31,2002. 
As a result, approximately 1600 companies were forced to choose a new auditor between October 2001 
and August 2002.87% of these companies chose big 4 auditors. Although auditors had gone bankrupt 
before Andersen's demise, " Arthur Andersen' failure was the single most important event which seriously 
called into question audit quality and ultimately the very existence of the industry. 
It's hard to pin down when Arthur Andersen's conduct started to be seriously called into question 
and, as a result, companies started to dismiss it. I take October 1,2001 as the start date of the accounting 
(Enron) scandal, similarly to the study of the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) on Public 
Accounting Firms (GAO-03-864). 
2 Data 
The sample consists of a cross section of 1262 US public companies which switched from Arthur Andersen 
between October 1,2001 and August 31,2002. The data come from several sources. Audit fees and 
information on the new engagements of former Arthur Andersen clients come from AuditAnalytics. Since 
"Financial restatements are, of course, not the only indicators. For instance, litigation history of an auditor could also 
be a straightforward and natural measure. However, primarily for data availability, this paper analyses only the effect of 
financial restatements on auditor choice. 
20For instance, one of the leading cases was Laventhol & Ilowarth, the seventh biggest auditor at the time, which in 1990 
filed bankruptcy as a result of a row of accounting scandals. 
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this source has very limited information on company financials, I also gathered balance sheet and income 
statement items from Compustat to supplement AuditAnalytics data. Unfortunately, the vital financial 
information on companies is deficient even after supplementing AuditAnalytics with other sources as is 
clear from the Summary Statistics in Table 1.1 use several variables to control for auditor and client 
characteristics that are described in details in the following sections. 
2.1 Auditor Characteristics 
I control for auditor characteristics along three dimensions: auditors' restatement history (quality), in- 
dustry experience and audit fees. 
Financial Restatements 
The key variable of interest is financial restatement frequency. Although SEC and policy makers in 
general consider them as audit errors, the extent to which financial restatements can be taken as audit 
failures is debatable. Firstly, capital market reactions seem to differentiate among restatements that vary 
along numerous dimensions, For instance, restatements can be initiated by the SEC, the company, the 
auditor or investors. Also, the report to be restated can be quarterly or annual. In addition, the reasons 
for restating can be several. 21 Timing can also be important: as the restatement period increases, audit 
quality is growing more and more questionable. The stock market reaction to restatements appears to vary 
along these characteristics as well as time. For instance, before Andersen's collapse, on average revenue 
recognitions triggered the most severe and prolonged fall in share prices of the restating companies, 22 
whereas post-Enron cost/expense restatements had the most adverse effect (GAO-03-138, GAO-06-678). 
Secondly, it is not clear to what extent the auditor is responsible for a restatement. For example, 
quarterly reports, though reviewed and signed off by the auditor, are not audited so the auditor has 
less responsibility for possible misstatements. On the other hand, between 1995-1999 auditors were sued 
for quarterly restatements (4% of restatements), although much less often than for annual ones (23%). 
(Palmrose and Scholz 2004) 
Even though restatements differ a great deal, in this paper I do not differentiate among them. The 
reasons are twofold. Firstly, the data I have do not allow me to classify restatements along many inter- 
esting features. And even if they did, there is no common agreement as to how to classify restatements. 
Probably though, it would be beneficial to differentiate am ong restatements at least in one important 
respect: the auditor's responsibility clearly differs if the restated report is annual (audited) or quarterly 
"GAO classified restatements into nine groups: IM&A, Cost or Expense, R&D, Reclassification, Related Party transac- 
tions, Restructuring & Inventory, Revenue Recognition, Securities Related, Other (GAO-03-138) 
22Though accounting only for 397c of the restatements, revenue recognition resulted in 56% of the total capital loss. 
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(non-audited). Unfortunately, none of the datasets recorded this (or other relevant) feature. Secondly, 
although there has been no common way to classify restatements in the literature, the trends and con- 
clusions are very similar so there seems to be little gain from a tedious classification. (GAO-03-138) This 
is confirmed by my data. I have two data sources for restatements which were collected in very different 
ways (see below for details). The restatement variables created from the two different data sources are 
strongly correlated (0.97) and performed very similarly in the choice models as we will see shortly. 
As mentioned above there are two possible sources for variables of financial restatement frequency. In 
its study of Financial Statement Restatements (GAO-03-138), GAO identified 919 restatements between 
January 1,1997 and June 31,2002, which were the results of erroneous and/or fraudulent accounting 
practises and therefore can be safely taken as audit errors. Unfortunately, the GAO database was not 
sufficiently detailed to identify the industries of restating companies, moreover, they didn't record any 
suitable company identifier (e. g. CIK code) by which I could identify companies' industries in other 
databases. Therefore I compiled an alternative dataset on restatements from AuditAnalytics. The Au- 
ditAnalytics restatement data, however, are only for 2001 and 2002. It differs from the GAO data in 
another respect too: it contains all financial restatements rather than only those when erroneous and/or 
fraudulent accounting is believed to be behind the restatement. 
Therefore, I will construct different measures for restatement frequency using two different datasets. 
First, with the aid of Who Audits America (1997-2001), 1 identified the auditors of the restating companies 
in the GAO database and then for each auditor I calculated the percentage of audit clients which restated 
their financial statements in this period and so created Rest. (A., GAO). I also calculated the very same 
variable from-the AuditAnalytics database, Rest. (A., AA), However, these measures will not be sufficient 
in the choice models of both audit and client characteristics because these two restatement variables vary 
only with auditors and, as a result, they would be perfectly collinear with auditor fixed effects. Therefore, I 
had to calculate alternative restatement variables which vary along other dimensions. In principle, there 
could be two possible sources of additional variation: perceived restatement frequencies can also vary 
across industry and time. 
Variation across industries comes from clients' different industrial background. It is hypothesised that 
clients are not particularly concerned with the overall restatement history of the auditor but they rather 
focus on the restatements which occurred within their own industry since it is the events of their peers that 
they follow most closely. So a bank, for instance, knows and cares mostly about an auditor's restatement 
history in the financial sector as opposed to its overall restatement performance. Therefore, I calculated 
restatement frequencies by auditor and industry: Rest, (A. L) will be my main quality variable. Note 
again this variable can only be computed from AuditAnalytics since GAO didn't identify the industries 
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of the restating companies. 
Time variation of perceived restatement frequencies comes from the fact that clients broke ties with 
Arthur Andersen at different points of time. Depending on which month a client dismissed Andersen 
and chose a new auditor, each client would have different information on the proportion of an auditor's 
restating companies resulting in differing perceived restatement histories across clients. This source of 
variation doesn't seem to be of much promise, however, because the vast majority of clients left Arthur 
Andersen between March and July 2002, offering little hope for sufficient variation in restatement histories 
across time. Also, one may object that it's difficult to pin down when an actual decision of the company 
is made on the engagement of the new auditor. Nevertheless, Rest. (A. L T. ) varies with auditor, industry 
and time and is calculated from AuditAnalytics again, 
Industry Experience 
Auditors' industry experience can be measured in different ways. A crude measure could be the 
number of clients of an auditor in a given industry. I obtained this data using AuditAnalytics' Audit 
Opinion. According to this dataset, in 2001 the big 4 audited 7774 and the non-big 4 auditors 1674 
publi c companies. The Ind. Exp. (N) variable is the total number of companies in the potential client's 
industry audited in 2001 for each auditor. 
A more sophisticated measure is the variable Ind. Exp., (MS). Here, I calculated what percent of 
the market (total assets) of a given industry is audited by each auditor. Then I matched the results 
again with the client's industry. So, for instance, for a bank, I calculated the total market share of the 
companies in the financial sector each auditor audited in 2001. In the choice models this measure will be 
my main industry experience variable. 
Audit Fees 
Audit fees are paid for audit related services and are reported annually. Companies had to disclose 
this information only from 2000 in the USA and these data have been collected from SEC files by 
AuditAnalytics. A potential problem is that I have data only on fees actually paid so I don't observe a 
company's virtual fee that it would have paid, had it engaged an alternative auditor. I will, therefore, 
need to estimate audit fees for each company (for more details see below). 
Non-audit fees are payments that a company incurs for other than audit, typically consulting services. 
Non-audit fees are excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the introduction 
these fees played a limited role by 2002 because from 2000 public accountants started to divest and sell 
off these business lines as a response to the growing general perception of the auditors' impaired inde- 
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pendence. 23 In 2002, however, with the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, public accountants '. Vere 
explicitly banned from providing a wide range of non-audit services to their audit clients. Furthermore, 
it is not clear to what extent audit and non-audit services were linked in 2002 (if they ever were at all). 
Perhaps a good example for this is the fact that Arthur Andersen did not fail as a whole: its consulting 
division was reorganised under the name of Accenture and has been extremely successful ever since. This 
alone suggests that consulting services were most probably perceived as separate businesses. Second, 
AuditAnalytics non-audit fee data does not contain important items: it includes tax and IT but excludes 
management consulting fees. Since I couldn't properly account for the entire range of non-audit service 
fees, they didn't seem to play an important role anyway and their link to the audit market is questionable, 
I therefore excluded them in what follows. 
A summary of the variables with expected signs (effect on auditor choice) in brackets is as follows: 
- Rest. (A. I. ) (-): restatement frequency by industry calculated over January 1,2001 - August 31, 
2002 using AuditAnalytics database. This variable varies with auditor and industry. 
- Rest. (A. I. T. ) (-): restatement frequency by industry and time calculated over January 1,2001 - 
August 31,2002 using AuditAnalytics database. This variable varies with auditor, industry and 
time. 
- Rest. (A., AA) (-): total restatement frequency calculated over January 1,2001 - August 31,2002 
using AuditAnalytics database. This variable varies only with auditor. 
- Rest. (A., GAO) (-): total restatement frequency calculated over January 1,1997 - December 31, 
2001 using GAO and Who Audits America datasets. This i-ariable varies onlY with auditor. 
- Ind. Exp. (NIS) (+): the market share (total assets) in a given industry an auditor audited in 2001 
- Ind. Exp. (N) (+): number of clients in a given industry an auditor audited in 2001 
- Audit Fee (-): estimated as a function of client characteristics (for more details see below) 
The summary statistics of the variables can be found in Table 1. 
2.2 Client characteristics 
Client characteristics include variables which capture the client's financial profile (size, profitability, risk), 
its industry background and several other dimensions. Most of the client characteristics will enter both 
23This is confirmed by my data: the correlation between audit and total (audit plus non-audit) fees is 0.986. 
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the audit fee regressions and the choice models. In the audit fee regression, the sign of the effect of risk 
is positive a priori since a riskier client increases the probability of litigation against the auditor. Also, 
the bigger the company, the more complex the audit is, so size and complexity are expected to have 
positive effects too on audit fees. Lastly, profitability is thought to have negative effect, since a profitable 
company is less likely to go bankrupt and again means smaller litigation risk. Also, a successful company 
has less incentive to deceive the auditor, which implies an easier audit process. However, the a priori 
sign of these client characteristics is more ambiguous in the choice models. Most of these measures are 
calculated from the companies' financial statements and come from both AuditAnalytics and Cornpustat. 
I also have data on SEC investigation, internal control problems, etc., which are potentially very 
useful risk measures. These essential data were disclosed in SEC files at the time of the auditor change 
and can be found in the AuditAnalytics database again. However, for most of the variables there were 
only very few observations available and, consequently, in the regressions they performed very poorly. 
Therefore, in what follows I will exclude these variables with one exception. If the auditor thinks that 
the company is on the verge of bankruptcy, then it qualifies its audit opinion as 'going concern'. The 
variable Goingconcern, therefore, is a classical risk measure of the client company: it takes the value one 
if the company received a qualified audit opinion previously and zero otherwise. 
The variables are listed below with the expected signs on audit fee in brackets, followed by the 
definition and the effect they are to capture: 
Size and Complexity 
- Assets (+): in 1000 million dollars 
- Revenue (+): in 1000 million dollars 
- Market Value (+): total shares outstanding multiplied by stock price in 1000 million dollars, com- 
pany value 
Inventory (+): in million dollars 
Business segments (+): number of business segments (corresponds roughly to product lines/di visions), 
measure for company complexity 
Profitability 
- Loss (+): a dummy taking the value I. if the company produced a loss in the previous year 
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- ROA (-): net income / total assets 
Risk 
- CATA (+): current assets / total assets, a liquidity measure 
- Inventory/Revenue (+): audit risk 
- Quick Ratio (-): current assets (less inventories) / current liabilities, liquidity measure 
- Coingconcern (+): I if the company previously received an audit opinion qualified with going 
concern 
- Leverage (+): total liabilities / total assets, leverage 
Other variables 
Dec (+): a dummy taking the value 1 if the company's financial year ends in December 
Industry dummies (+/-): agriculture, natural resources, utilities, manufacturing/construction, 
trade (retail, wholesale), services, information technology, financial sector; all based on NAICS 
codes 
- Dummy Zero (+/-): dummies for zero values of variables 
For the summary statistics, please see Table 1. Most of the variables are self-explanatory. Inven- 
tory/Revenue is included because inventory is notoriously difficult area to audit and often subject of 
restatements. Therefore they increase the risk of an audit client. Dec dummy is an instrument (see for 
details below). I also included dummies for zero values whenever I took the log of a variable. In order to 
avoid missing values, I rescaled the variables by adding 1 to each observation. However, this method is 
sensitive to the rescaling value, so I decided to include a dummy for the observations when the original 
variable takes the value of zero. 
3 Empirical strategy 
First, I will estimate simple multinomial logit models in which only auditor characteristics explain auditor 
choice. Next, I will present results of multinomial models where the choice is a function of both auditor 
and client characteristics to see if client specifics play a role in determining choice. Of course, these models 
are very restrictive in terms of the substitution patterns that they allow for. To relax these restrictions 
at least to some extent, I will also estimate nested logit models. 
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3.1 Estimation procedures 
In order to estimate the auditor choice models first I need to estimate audit fees. In discrete choice 
models, it is imperative to observe characteristics for each alternative. However, in my data only those 
audit fees are available that the client did pay to its newly engaged auditor. The audit fees that it would 
have paid to other auditors, the virtual price of alternative audit services, are not observed; therefore 
they need to be estimated. Moreover, audit fees are considered to be endogenous and I use instruments 
to correct for this. 
Thus, first I regress audit fees on different client characteristics including instruments over the whole 
sample. Once the best model is identified (see below), I estimate that model for each auditor separately. 
These regressions will be my auditor specific "pricing equations". Then I use the fitted values of these 
regressions to generate audit fees for each alternative for each client. These audit fees along with other 
variables enter the second stage choice models as a regressor, which results in consistent estimates (Rivers 
and Vuong 1988, Wooldridge 2007). 
In what follows I briefly review the choice models to be estimated and outline the bootstrap procedure 
I use to correct for the standard errors. 
3.1.1 Multinomial Logit 
By choosing auditor j, company i gets utility 
uij = Tvij + cij (1) 
where TVjj is observable up to some parameters and cij is unobserved by the econometrician. Then, 
company i chooses auditor j with probability 
Pij = Pr (lVij + Eij > Wil + Eil, VI 0 j) 





The multinomial logit models are based on the assumption that the error terms in equation (1) are 
identically and independently distributed (IID). This assumption has a behavioural association with the 
well known property of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). The IIA assumption may hold as a 
result of correct specification: if all characteristics and attributes are controlled for in the estimation, then 
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only white noise is left in the error (Train 2002). The IID (IIA) assumption in most applications, however, 
are too strong since there might be factors affecting the choice that are not specified in the model. If these 
unobserved characteristics share some common components across observations, it will induce correlation 
in the error terms of those observations. Therefore, a logit model which allows correlation within a subset 
of choices (nest) relaxes the IIA assumption to some extent. This is the nested logit model. 
3.1.2 Nested Logit 
In the nested logit specification, the components in (1) can be broken down into nest and alternative 0 
specific parts. In particular, 
Uij ý ViB + VijIB + ViB + VijjB 
Tvil 
where ViB depends only on variables which describe nest B and the variables in Vijlj3 describe alter- 
native j in nest B. Similarly, the random component in (1) can be decomposed into two parts: ViB is the 
unobserved (stochastic) variation across the nests and VijjB is the random variation within the nest. Note 
that the presence Of ViB induces correlation across the errors within the nest relaxing the assumption of 
III) errors in (1) to some extent. However, across the nests errors are assumed to be independent. Then 
the choice probabilities can be expressed as 









IViB In X: 
jEB 
e-\BV'JIB 
NB is the Inclusive Value or Lo. -Sum, the expected utility of choosing an alternative in nest B. In 
other words, it is a weighted average of the utilities associated with the alternatives within the nest, 
where the weights are probabilities of choosing each alternative. As it is clear from (2), the probability of 
an alternative being chosen can be broken down into two parts in a nested framework: it is the product 
of the probability of choosing the nest and the conditional probability of choosing an alternative within 
the nest. These two probabilities correspond to two logit models, one for the upper ("choice between 
nests") and one for the lower level ("choice within nest"). The two logit models can be estimated 
separately (sequentially) or jointly. The former is the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LBIL) 
and the latter is the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FINIL) approach. Both approaches have 
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advantages and disadvantages. Although FINIL is more efficient, the numerical maximisation is much 
more complicated due to the fact that the joint maximum likelihood function is not globally concave. 
This may result in an abundance of local maxima and in some applications this can severely affect the 
results. Convergence may not be achieved and even when achieved the convergence point might be of 
dubious value. For instance, Koppelman and Bhat (2006) report models when two very similar sets of 
initial values resulted in the algorithm converging to two very different parameter vectors. 
Although the computational problems of FINIL do not emerge in many applications, they turned out 
to be quite an issue in the present analysis for the following reasons. The industry structure clearly 
partitions the choice set into the groups of big 4 and non-big 4 accountants, therefore, the nested logit 
models are estimated with two (Big, NonBig) nests. However, the NonBig nest is degenerate since non- 
big 4 accountants are represented as one single choice as a result of insufficient number of observations. 
Furthermore, this degenerate nest has very few observations compared to the Big nest but even compared 
to an alternative within the Big nest. As a result the models often failed to converge. Moreover, even if 
they did, they converged only after couple of thousands of iterations and usually returned meaningless 
results in the sense that nothing was (individually or jointly) significant. 2' To make sure, it is indeed the 
degenerate nest which gives me the grief, I re-estimated the models with different nesting structures where 
both nests contained at least two alternatives. That is, I put one or two big 4 auditors in addition to the 
non-big alternative in the NonBig nest. Perhaps not surprisingly, the convergence problems disappeared 
and the models converged after around a hundred iterations, which is as expected given the number of 
observations and coefficients estimated. While the results clearly suggested that the nesting structures 
were wrong (the inclusive value (IV) parameters were outside the unit interval in all cases, although often 
not significantly), yet the estimated parameters of interest often confirmed the previous results: in most 
of the models the restatement and industry experience variables were significant at least at the 5% level 
with the expected signs. The significance of the audit fee variable varied from model to model but its 
sign was robustly negative. 25 
For these reasons, the nested logit models are estimated sequentially. Although it's less efficient, the 
numerical maximisation in the sequential estimation is straightforward since the likelihood function of 
the multinomial logit is globally concave. As a result, this estimation procedure can be conveniently 
bootstrapped. There is a delicate issue, however, of normalising the sequential estimator for consistency 
with random utility maximisation. This problem is discussed at length in the Appendix. 
24Note that regardless of convergence, the number of iterations in and of itself renders FIML computationally infeasible 
in the current context given that I need to bootstrap the results. 
2'The estimations are not reported for two reasons. Firstly, and most importantly the main results are very similar to the 
results reported. Secondly, if I take the estimations seriously, then the IV parameters are not statistically distinguishable 
from one (especially after bootstrapping), therefore the IIA assumption holds and the simple multinomial logit specifications 
in the previous sections are appropriate. 
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3.1.3 Bootstrap 
Since I have generated regressors and I also correct for the endogeneity of audit fees, the standard errors 
are, of course, incorrect in the second stage. Instead of deriving and calculating the correct asymptotic 
variances, however, it is convenient to bootstrap and therefore in all choice models where audit fees appear 
as a regressor I use nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. The bootstrap 
procedure applied is as follows. In each simulation, I take a bootstrap sample from each client set that 
chose a particular auditor and using this sample I estimate the audit fee regressions for each auditor 
("pricing equations"). Then, using these regressions I generate audit fees for all clients in the whole 
sample. Then I take a bootstrap sample again and run the choice model. This procedure is repeated 
1000 times. Since audit fees get regenerated in each simulation step, the first stage variation feeds into 
the second stage resulting in asymptotically correct standard errors. 
3.2 Identification 
In all choice models estimated in the current study identification relies on exclusion restrictions which 
take the form of instruments affecting audit fees but not auditor choice. Dec dummy which takes the value 
one if the company's financial year ends in December is my primary instrument. The month the financial 
year ends in supposedly affccts audit fees because of the auditor's uneven workload during the year. In 
particular, for the vast majority of companies the financial year ends in December putting auditors under 
strong pressure in the period of January - March, while other months of the year are usually relatively 
quiet. Therefore, if a company requires audit out of "rush months", it is supposed to get a discount. 
However, the end of financial year is clearly exogenous to the choice. In other words, when exactly 
during the year the company requires an audit does not affect directly which auditor the company chooses, 
only through audit fees. It is hard to imagine a casual relationship between choice and the end of the 
company's financial year which would render the instrument invalid. The only way I can possibly think 
of may come about through capacity constraints. Under the circumstance of severe capacity constraint, 
an auditor might be unable to take on a client which would further strain its busy period, while it could 
easily accommodate the company with financial year ending, say, in June. 'G However, two important 
observations work against this argument. First, in any case this argument would be valid only in the 
short run. Furthermore, the "audit technology" is predominantly labour intensive and as such capacity 
is easily adjusted even in the short run. Second, most of the clients switched from Andersen in the first 
half of the year leaving ample amount of time for auditors to adjust their capacity for the coming "audit 
"Note that this argument would also defeat the whole modelling concept since it is assumed that companies choose 
auditors and not vica versa. 
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peak" at the beginning of the next year had they needed to. 27 As a consequence, we can safely assume 
that factor (labour) demand was not completely inelastic, that is, there existed a price (audit fee) for 
which any auditor would have been willing and able to increase its capacity. In addition, it is clear 
from Table 4 that each big 4 auditor and also non-big 4 auditors engaged companies of both types (i. e. 
companies with financial year ending in December and in other months) which again suggests against 
the idea of binding capacity constraints. But this just means that the end of financial year affects choice 
only through audit fees. Therefore, I regard my instrument as strongly exogenous. 
I also create another instrument interacting Dec dummy with Assets. This in principle opens the door 
to overidentification tests. However, overidentification tests rely on the assumption that at least one of the 
instruments is exogenous. In my case, exogeneity comes from the same source: if one of the instruments 
is endogenous so is the other. Nevertheless, I used a commonly applied overidentification test for the sake 
of completeness (Murray 2006). 1 used'one instrument to instrument Audit Fees and'then included the 
other instrument as an explanatory variable in the choice model. If both instruments are truly exogenous, 
then the instrument as an explanatory variable in the choice model should be insignificant. This is indeed 
the case: the resulting p-value is 0.71. 
The joint F statistic of the instruments in the regressions that I eventually use to generate the audit 
fees is 9.23. It is possible to include further (insignificant) variables in the audit fee regression and push 
the F statistic slightly above 10, the commonly used cut off value of weak instruments. However, as 
discussed below the final results are very robust to the specification of audit fee regressions. Moreover, 
it is not obvious how relevant the threshold of 10 is in non-linear settings. But in any case, there is 
little doubt about the strong exogeneity of the instruments which effectively eases the problem of weak 
instruments. 
Results 
Throughout the analysis I will have 4 choices (big 4 auditors) plus one, the non-big 4 auditors together 
as the fifth alternative. Unfortunately, I am unable to further refine the choice set. In the multinomial 
models, I report results on two sets of choices. In the first one, the models are run on-the whole 
sample where the five alternatives are PWC, EY, DT, KPAIG and NonBig, the latter being non-big 4 
public accountants as a fifth single alternative. In the second, I only include the choices of the big 4 
accountants. As we'll see shortly, in terms of the final results, the two sets of estimations arrive at very 
similar conclusions. Later in the nested Iogit framework I explicitly make the distinction between the two 
270ne may object saying trying to re-establish the integrity of their financials, some companies required an immediate 
audit on previous years' financial statements. Note that, however, since most of the auditor changes took place in the first 
half of the year, an immediate audit meant for the auditor "work out of rush months" implying unlikely capacity problems. 
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groups of big 4 and non-big 4 auditors. 
However, before discussing the results of the choice models, let me review briefly the estimations of 
the audit fee regressions. 
4.1 Audit fee regressions 
In the first stage I estimate audit fees in several regressions of the following generic form: 
11 Iog(Audit Feesi) ýa +ßl log(S'Zei) +ß2Complexityi +ß3Profttabilityi +ßRiski +0'Instrumentsi +ei 4 
The audit fee regressions for all (big 4 and non-big 4) clients can be found in Table 2, whereas the 
same regressions for big 4 clients only are in Table 3. As it is obvious from the tables of both sets of 
observations, client characteristics seem to robustly predict auditor fees. 74% of the variation in the 
dependent variable is explained by the final models, which is quite standard in the audit fee literature. 
In addition, all the variables have the right signs and most of them are significant at the 1% level 
consistently across all models reported. Perhaps surprisingly, both the significance and the magnitude 
of the parameters appear very similar in the two tables. Note that around 10% of the observations are 
non-big 4 clients, which would be a sufficient fraction to change parameter values should pricing differ a 
great deal across big 4 and non-big 4 auditors. 
I will use the results from these regressions to generate audit fees for all auditors. " Some notes on 
these regressions are in order. Since the predictive regressions are often run on a small sample (auditor by 
auditor), it appeared important to save degrees of freedom. As a consequence, I only included variables 
which have fairly accurate predictive power. In particular, I included a couple of measures for size, 
company complexity, risk and profitability and then I dropped variables in each category which were 
insignificant at the five percent level, In other words, one can find more than one variable within a 
category (e. g. size) only if they are all strongly significant. The final results are robust to this modelling 
decision: including different sets of insignificant variables (p > 0.05) in the first stage changes only the 
significance of the audit fee variable in the second stage, while other second stage coefficients are basically 
unaffected. For instance, leaving insignificant industry dummies in the audit fee regressions leads to a 
significant reduction in the variation of the predicted audit fees. The reason for this is that (insignificant) 
industry dummies mop up within industry variation so the regressions will predict very similar audit 
"One may argue that audit and non-audit fees are related in a way that high audit fees may be accompanied by lower 
non-audit fees or vice versa. So I reran the estimations with total (audit plus non-audit) fees. The results didn't change 
which is no wonder since the correlation between audit fees and total fees is 0.986 in my sample. 
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fees within an industry removing a significant source of variation. The list of variables used for audit fee 
predictions as well as the estimation results can be found in Table 4.1 estimated the "pricing equations" 
separately for the five alternatives and calculated the fitted values of these regressions for each client. In 
this way, for each company I obtained the estimated audit fees for all alternatives. The summary result 
of these estimations can be found in the summary statistics in Table 1 under the heading of Auditor 
Characteristics. 
Furthermore, note that in the audit fee regressions in Table 2 and 3 and also in the choice models 
later, I include inventory as a size (Inventory (log)) and also as a risk measure (Inventory/Revenue). 
This may make little sense since I already use quite a few variables to control for size so the variable 
Inventory (log) seems unnecessary. However, note that Inventory (log) is strongly significant in the audit 
fee regressions, therefore, I did not want to carelessly discard it. In addition, since it's strongly significant 
in the audit fee regressions, I see no compelling reasons why I should exclude it in the choice models a 
priori. Since the correlation between Inventory (log) and Inventory/Revenue is quite low (0.11), 1 see no 
harm in the inclusion of both for the sake of complete transparency. However, I have experimented with 
three different specifications: a) only Inventory/Revenue in all (audit fee and choice) models, b) only 
Inventory (log) in all models, c) Inventory (log) in audit fee and Inventory/Revenue in choice models. 
The main results were completely invariant. 
4.2 Multinomial Logit models of Auditor Characteristics 
In this section, the specification of (1) is of the general form: 
lVij =, q, Restatementsij +772 Industry Experienceij +773Audit Feesij 
where, Restatements and Industry Experience is one of the restatements and industry experience 
variables respectively, defined in section 2.2 and Audit Fees is a linear projection from the first stage 
estimations. Again, I report two sets of results: in Table 5 big 4 auditors separately and non-big 4 
auditors as a fifth single alternative are the available choices, whereas in Table 6 only big 4 accountants 
are included in the choice set. As mentioned earlier, the standard errors have to be corrected, therefore 
all standard errors in the tables are (nonparametric) bootstrapped with 1000 repetition. The results 
differ a great deal along the two sets of specifications in some respects so I discuss them separately. 
In the estimations with only big 4 auditors, the results show a fairly consistent picture: all variables 
are strongly significant with the expected signs. It can easily be seen that the restatement variables have 
a robust effect: across all specifications they are significant at the 1% level with the expected negative 
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sign. That is, more financial restatements decrease the probability of being chosen. Note that this, along 
with the results in Table 8 (see below), means that there are significant differences in perceived quality 
within the exclusive group of big 4 auditors. This finding is in sharp contrast to the commonly held view 
of quality in the audit literature (e. g. Francis 2004) and suggests that the usual quality classification in 
the audit literature (big 4- high, non-big 4- low) is overly simplistic. In this sample the results are 
robust to the definition and construction of the restatement variables. 
Also, both industry experience variables have a positive and (mostly) significant effect on the prob- 
ability of engagement. In addition, audit fee negatively and significantly affects the choice probability, 
as expected. As mentioned before, this result is somewhat sensitive to the specification of the first stage 
regression: the inclusion of non- (or weakly) significant variables in the first stage often renders audit fees 
insignificant in the second stage. However, its negative sign is robustly preserved in all cases and other 
variables are unaffected. 
The estimation results for the whole sample (big 4 as well as non-big 4) are less clear cut (Table 5). 
Here, the restatement variables are insignificant at conventional levels, although they have the right sign 
in the first four models. Industry experience, however, seems to have a fairly robust effect in six out of 
eight models. Audit fees are not significant at all, moreover they have the wrong sign. However, most 
probably these estimations are seriously misspecified. The reason is that there is a clear difference in the 
characteristics of big 4 and non-big 4 clients (e. g. size). These models, however, fall to take into account 
these effects explicitly since client characteristics are not included. As we will see shortly when client 
characteristics are properly controlled for we will get a very different picture. 
. In what follows, I will present models only with Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (MS) variables. The 
reasons are as follows. Two variables do not vary with industry (Rest. (A., AA) and Rest. (A., GAO)), 
therefore they cannot be included in multinomial models of auditor and client characteristics since they 
would be perfectly collinear with auditor fixed effects. The other restatement variable which varies with 
industry as well as time (Rest. (A. I. T. )) is also excluded because the results of the models estimated with 
this variable were essentially the same as the ones reported. The auditor's number of clients within an 
industry (Ind. Exp. (N)) as an industry experience variable didn't perform very convincingly statistically 
and also it is a very crude measure intuitively. Hence, I report estimations of models with the Ind. Exp. 
(MS) variable only, which is based on market shares. 
4.3 Multinomial Logit models of Auditor and Client Characteristics 
As the results in the previous section suggest it is probably important to control for client characteristics. 
Therefore, the following models are estimated with both auditor and client characteristics in order to see 
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if client specifics play a role in the choice models. In this section, the specification of (1) is of the general 
form: 
lVij = lij + 77, Rest. (A. L)ij + 7721nd. Exp. (A'S)ij + 773Audit Feesij 
+if ', jProfitabilityi + 6', jRiski Ij SiZei + 62, j Complexityi + 63 4 
For the results see Table 7,8 and 9. The estimated parameters differ somewhat across the two sets 
of choices in Tables 7 and 8. The interesting thing to observe, however, is that after controlling for client 
attributes, auditor characteristics have almost identical effects in both sets of specifications in contrast 
to the finding of the previous section. The Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. Q%1S) variables are both strongly 
significant (mostly at the one percent level) across all models. Note that the magnitudes of the coefficients 
are very similar too. The significance of Audit Fees, on the other hand, seems to fade away as we introduce 
more and more control variables, which is natural since the identification of the parameter relies on less 
and less variation and ultimately only on the instruments. However, an important observation is that 
while the standard errors of the Audit Fee coefficients increase with the inclusion of client characteristics 
the point estimates appear to be very similar across all specifications. An interesting finding in column 
7 of Table 7 is that the effect of the Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (MS) variables do not differ across the 
big 4 and non-big 4 dimension. This is not true for the audit fees: there is evidence at the 10% level that 
non-big clients are more price sensitive. 
Comparing client characteristics between the two sets of estimation results in Tables 7 and 8 is a bit 
more problematic. 29 However, we can safely draw the conclusion that client specifics do not seem to play 
a major role in explaining auditor choice. Perhaps surprisingly, the classical size measures like Assets, 
Revenue, Market Value do not seem to matter much although the variable Assets showed much more 
potential before bootstrapping. Insignificant size effects might be the consequence of the fact that the 
analysis focuses on a big 5 auditor's clientele. Moreover, the risk profile and more generally the financial 
position of companies do not appear to affect choice. As we have seen in the audit fee regressions, company 
specifics strongly determine the level of. audit fees. However, they do not influence auditor choice much. 
Although in Tables 7 there is some evidence that unprofitable businesses did not favour EY and DT, 
and more complex firms (Business Segments) were less likely to choose PWC and KPMG, it is clear 
from the estimation results of Table 8 that these are probably auditor rather than big 4 specific findings. 
29Choice characteristics are completely invariant to the base category, whereas individual characteristics are, of course, 
not. 
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Therefore, after controlling for auditor characteristics, we can reject the commonly held hypothesis that 
riskier firms chose non-big 4 auditors. 
Next, let's investigate if the sensitivity to quality varies with size, risk or profitability. In Table 9 
we can see how the effects of auditor characteristics vary with client attributes. Basically, with the 
aid of interaction terms we can break down the effect of the variables into a client-invariant and client- 
varying components. The main message from Table 9 is that restatements seem to be evaluated very 
similarly across clients: none of the restatement interaction terms is significant at any conventional 
level. " Moreover, surprisingly the effects of auditor characteristics in general do not seem to vary 
significantly along observable client dimensions at all. Almost all the interaction terms are insignificant 
at conventional levels suggesting auditor attributes are evaluated very similarly among potential clients 
regardless of the many distinctive client features. One exception is CATA, hence there is some evidence 
that riskier clients prefer auditors with less industry experience. As we saw earlier the effects of the Rest. 
(A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (MS) variables are strongly and robustly significant. However, in some cases, the 
introduction of the interaction term leads to both the client-invariant and the interaction term being 
insignificant. This simply means that although the total effect of the variable is strongly signifiýcant, the 
two components individually are not distinguishable from zero at any conventional significance level. (For 
instance, interacting Rest. (A. I. ) with Assets) On the other hand, when they are distinguishable, then in 
most cases we can conveniently reject the null of any client-varying effect. (e. g. interacting Rest. (A. I. ) 
with ROA) Nevertheless, perhaps in some cases the sign of the interaction terms can be interpreted in a 
meaningful way: for instance, bigger firms may care more about quality, though it is rather suggestive 
speculation than statistical evidence. Similarly, more profitable firms might give a greater importance to 
industry experience. In the case of Audit Fees the presence of size-varying effect is perhaps a bit more 
compelling: bigger firms seem somewhat less price sensitive. 
4.4 Nested Logit 
In order to relax the IIA assumption to some extent and allow for more general substitution patterns, I 
estimate the auditor choice models in nested logit specifications. In many empirical analyses, the nests 
are not obvious a priori and, therefore, an elaborate range of experiments is often necessary to identify the 
nest structure that best describes the data. (Koppelman and Bhat 2006) However, in the current context 
the industry configuration of big 4 versus non-big 4 auditors clearly lends itself to a natural partition of 
the choice set. Therefore, I will not dwell on exploring different nesting structures. The models reported 
30Perhaps I should mention that before bootstrapping some of the interaction terms between Rest. (A. I. ) and size 
measures (Assets and Market Value) were weakly significant (10%). Therefore, one may want to blame the inefficient 
estimation procedure for the lack of cuent-varying effects. In addition, as a robustness check all models were also estimated 
with only Rest. (A. I. ) interaction terms and the results are identical to the ones in Table 9. 
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below are of two levels and two nests: in the big 4 nest, gig, are the big four accountants as separate 
choices and in the non-big 4 nest, NonBig, there are the non-big 4 accountants as a single choice. Note 
that given the small number of companies which chose non-big 4 auditors, unfortunately I am unable to 
define distinct alternatives within the NonBig nest. The non-big 4 nest, therefore, is degenerate. From 
(2), the general specification of the nested logit models is the following: 
ViB 
= -y, Assetsi +72Leveragei + WIViBiq + 
IViNonBig 
VijjB = 11j + 771, BRest. (A. L)ij + 712, Blnd* EýT, 
(A'S)ij + 713, BAudit Feesij 
+6'1, jSizei + 62, jComplexityi + 6, jRiski + d', jProfitabili' 34 
tyi 
Note that since the NonBig nest is degenerate its coefficient is one and it's not identified (see the 
Appendix for more details). As discussed earlier, the models are estimated sequentially. 
It is often not obvious which variables should enter the lower and which ones the upper level. The 
way I proceeded is as follows. First, I estimated a model with all client characteristics entering at the 
lower level and having a big 4 accountant as a base category. In this way, I could identify those variables 
that did not vary within the big 4 nest, but their corresponding NonBig parameters were significantly 
different to the base category. This suggested variables which had potential variation across nests but 
not within the Big nest, I added then these variables to the upper level step-wise. In this way, I identified 
Assets and Leverage as nest-specific variables. 
The estimation results can be found in Table 10. As can be seen in the table, the IV parameters are 
between zero and one in the last 3 models, therefore the nesting structure appears to be, by and large, 
appropriate. These IV parameters suggest some correlation within the Big nest although none of the IV 
parameters can be statistically distinguished from zero or one. Moreover, based on the likelihood values, 
the fit of the nested logit models is very similar to that of the multinomial logits; neither of them seems 
to be superior to the other. 31 
The key variables of interest, the auditor characteristics variables are very similar to the findings in 
the multinomial models both in terms of significance and magnitude . 
32 In particular, the Rest. (A. I. ) 
31 Note that all models are estimated with only partially generic variables. That is, the auditor characteristics variables 
are allowed to vary across partitions. The reason for this is that in the presence of a degenerate nest, it's impossible to 
impose the restriction of generic variables. To be more precise, it is possible to estimate models with completely generic 
variables (i. e. parameters which do not vary across alternatives and partitions) but then the IV parameter of the degenerate 
nest will relax this restriction giving the false impression that the restriction was properly imposed. In other words, the IV 
parameter of a degenerate nest is not identified in general. However, in the presence of generic variables, technically it is 
identified but has little to do with the true, underlying IV parameter. See for the details for instance Hunt (2000), Heiss 
(2002) and Hansher and Greene (2002). 
321n Table 10, the parameters of the auditor characteristics corresponding to the Big nest are not rescaled by the IV 
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and Ind. Exp. (10) variables are strongly significant with the expected signs. Perhaps interestingly, the 
Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (NIS) seem to have no variation across the big and non-big partitions, just 
like in the multinomial models. In contrast, audit fees yet again seem to have a significantly different 
impact on the probability of choice between nests suggesting more price sensitivity for non-big 4 auditor 
clients. 
Interestingly, client characteristics do not show much potential in explaining auditor choices in the 
nested framework, similarly to the simple multinomial models. Curiously, size again did not seem to 
matter even at the upper level although it might be noteworthy that the variables at the upper level 
in general and Assets in particular had a much more robust effect before bootstrapping implying there 
is significant variation at the preceding stages feeding into the final stage. 33 Risk measures were not 
very successful predictors of choice between nests as well as within the big 4 nest. The former finding is 
perhaps a bit more surprising and goes against the commonly held hypothesis that riskier firms tend to 
choose non-big 4 auditors. 
Discussion of the choice models 
So far it seems that choice is basically driven by auditor characteristics. Among these characteristics 
financial restatement history appears to be an important quality indicator for potential clients. However, 
some caveats are in order. 
Note that a big problem is that the Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (MS) variables vary essentially only 
with industry rendering it impossible to control for unobserved industry effects with industry dummies. 
In principle, there should potentially be some time variation in the restatement history variable due to 
the fact that Andersen clients dismissed their former auditor at different points of times. However, this 
variation proved insufficient for identification since the vast majority of companies dismissed Andersen 
between March and June 2002. Consequently, one may argue that the Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (NIS) 
variables are merely picking up unobserved industry effects. It appears impossible to disprove this argu- 
ment statistically since as it seems the information in the data has been fully exhausted. Unfortunately, 
there is no significant within industry variation that can be exploited to unambiguously establish the 
effects of these two variables. 
However, bold statement as it may sound, it is difficult to imagine what industry effects I haven't 
already accounted for in the models of audit and client characteristics. It is very reasonable to argue 
that unobserved industry effects play a role in the audit fee regressions (hence, their inclusion) but it's 
parameter in order to facilitate direct comparison with the multinomial results. See the Appendix for discussion on rescaling. 
33Note that the estimation procedure actually consists of three stages here: audit fee regressions and the two levels of the 
nested model. Therefore, no wonder that the correct standard errors are very high. 
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more difficult to see what sort of industry effects which are not accounted for by the Ind. Exp. (NIS) 
and Rest. (A. I. ) variables could potentially affect auditor choice. In other words, for what reasons other 
than industry experience and audit quality would, say, a utility choose PWC? If there are time invariant 
reasons why utilities should be attracted to a particular auditor, then that effect should be picked up 
by the auditor's industry experience. However, in principle it is not impossible to imagine that some 
auditor targeted certain industries by, say, a big marketing campaign to attract clients at the time of 
Andersen's collapse. This effect wouldn't be picked up by the Ind. Exp. (NIS) variable since that cannot 
potentially reflect contemporary events. Time-varying industry effects, however, are not very probable. 
Firstly, Andersen's sudden collapse took the whole audit market by surprise and the vast majority of 
clients switched auditor within two months. This short time period makes it very unlikely that any 
auditor could have potentially predesigned an industry tailored marketing campaign. Secondly, the audit 
and financial literature does not mention anything which would suggest some industry effects specifically 
present at the time. 
One, way to account for unobserved industry effects is to recreate the variables which vary only 
with industry using a finer industry classification than the industry dummies. As a result, the industry 
dummies are no longer collinear with Rest. (A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (NIS). Therefore, I recalculated Rest. 
(A. I. ) and Ind. Exp. (NIS) using a finer industry classification by splitting, for instance, Trade into 
Retail and Wholesales Trade. Then, I reran the models of Table 7 adding the full set of (coarser) 
industry dummies. The results are in Table 11. Although controlling for unobserved industry effects 
causes the significance of the key variable of interest, Rest. (A. I. ), to fade slightly, the point estimates are 
strikingly similar and robustly significant at the Ave percent level across all models. This just reinforces 
the argument in the previous paragraph and suggests that unobserved industry effects do not appear to 
confound the results of this paper. 
Conclusion 
In many markets with severe asymmetric information problems, the mechanism of reputation is supposed 
to discipline firms. However, this mechanism critically hinges on the supposition of strong consumer 
rationality. That is, reputation is an effective disciplinary force only if consumers are able and willing 
to decipher complex quality signals. The empirical literature failed to confirm decisively the assumption 
of strong rationality when consumers are individuals. In this paper, I investigate rationality in a market 
where clients are companies rather than people and find that they are strongly rational. Therefore, this 
study finds evidence to support the idea of an effective reputational mechanism in markets where buyers 
of the good are firms. 
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In particular, I analyse if former Andersen clients took auditors' financial restatement history into 
consideration when choosing their new public accountants. The estimation results suggest that, in sharp 
contrast to the common perception in the audit literature (e. g. Francis 2004), restatement performance 
is a very relevant and robust indicator of audit quality for companies. Therefore, the well documented 
adverse capital market reactions to financial restatements seem to feed into the auditor choice of clients 
suggesting the reputation mechanism is indeed at work in the audit market. However, this result may 
not apply easily to consumer choice in general. Individuals, as opposed to firms, may have more difficulty 
developing an understanding of complex quality signals and this could call into question the effectiveness 
of reputation as a disciplinary force in other markets. In addition to financial restatements, the auditor's 
industry experience had a robust effect, However, other variables like the price of audit (audit fees) and 
client characteristics in general appear to have played a very limited role in choosing auditors. 
These findings have important policy implications. When consumers are found to be strongly rational, 
market mechanisms are effective and market crises are probably part of a solution rather than sign als of 
its absence. The costs and benefits of direct regulation should therefore be evaluated much more carefully. 
The paper also contributes to the audit literature at least in one important aspect: it is clear from 
the results of this study that there exist significant differences in perceived quality between big 4 and 
non-big 4 accountants as well as within the group of big 4 auditors. Therefore, the conventional quality 
classification in the literature (big 4- high, non-big 4- low) appear overly simplistic. Furthermore, I 
found no compelling evidence that riskier companies tend to choose non-big 4 auditors. 
85 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
CLIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
Variable Obs Alean Std. Dev. Alin Max 
Assets (MMS) 978 3259 22535 0 641100 
Revenue (MIS) 978 1622 4761 0 47948 
Market Value (MMS) 978 1901 8361 0 154112 
Inventory (MS) 942 136 495 0 6286 
Business Segments 849 2.19 1.53 1 9 
Loss 978 0.38 0.49 0 1 
ROA 956 -0.10 0.52 -5.60 4.06 
CATA 828 0.47 0.26 0.01 1 
Inventory/Revenue 934 0.11 0.29 0 5.65 
Quick Ratio 816 2.32 3.97 0.03 66 
Goingconcern 978 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Leverage 956 0.57 0.33 0.01 3.57 
Dec 978 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Industry dummies (NAICS code): 
Agriculture 978 0.00 0.05 0 
Natural Recources 978 0.06 0.24 0 
Utilities 978 0.05 0.21 0 
Manufacturing/Construction 978 0.36 0.48 0 
Trade (Retail, Wholesales) 978 0.07 0.26 0 
Services 978 0.21 0.41 0 
Information Technology 978 0.10 0.30 0 
Financial Sector 978 0.14 0.35 0 
Notes. ' AfAfS is 1000 million, AfS is million dollars. Variables in Italics are dummies. 
AUDITOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Arthur Andersen Clients ' Rest. Rest. Ind. Exp. 
Fees, Act. (8) Fees, Est. (S) Asset (MIS) N (A., AA) (A., GAO) (1, IS) 
Pwc 751065 580513 2544 119 0.055 0.015 0.285 
EY 783873 556035 1481 211 0.041 0.012 0.195 
DT 850840 507440 2665 180 0.031 0.010 0.177 
IMIC 798614 645523 1488 182 0.034 0.009 0.160 
NonBig 127995 260171 62 74 0,005 0.005 0.005 
Notes: First column is the average audit fee paid by former Andersen clients to their new auditor, the second is the 
estimated average fe6 generated by the regressions in Table 4, The third column is the average asset of, the fourth 
is the number of former Andersen clients by their new auditors. Restatement frequencies are calculated using 
two different databases: AuditAnalytics (Rest. (A., AA)) and GAO and Who Audits America (Rest. (A., GAO)). 
Industry Experience (Ind. Exp. (AfS)) is calculated based on market shares. 
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Table 2: Audit Fee regressions, all clients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Assets (log) 0.230*** 0.207*** 0.253*** 0.328*** 0.329*** 0.256*** 
(8.25) (7.57) (7.48) (8.49) (8.55) (5.88) 
Revenue (log) 0.157*** 0.201*** 0.166*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 
(6.70) (8.57) (6.68) (3.59) (3.43) (3.51) 
Revenue (zero) 2.380*** 2,929*** 2.536*** (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
(5.32) (6.68) (5.43) 
Market Value (log) 0.043** 0.060*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 
(2.57) (3.62) (2.85) (2.94) (3.52) (3,82) 
Afarket Value (zero) 0.957*** 1.277*** 1.049*** 1.060*** 1.264*** 1.368*** 
(2.93) (3.96) (3-07) (3.11) (3.64) (3.95) 
Inventory (log) 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.054*** 0.047** 0.052*** 
(3.73) (3.59) (3.74) (2.66) (2-31) (2.59) 
Inventory (zero) 1.159*** 1.068*** 1.210*** 0.940*** 0.823** 0.914*** 
(3.75) (3.57) (3.80) (2.89) (2.53) (2.82) 
Business Segments 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
(5.26) (5.22) (5.28) (5.12) (5.15) (5.18) 
Dee 0.123** 0.106** 0.118** 0.123** 0.119** -0.350** 
(2.33) (2.08) (2.31) (2.43) (2.37) (-2.45) 
Loss 0.225*** 0.171*** 0.165*** 0.153*** 0.156*** 
(4.33) (3.17) (3.07) (2.86) (2.93) 
ROA -0.195*** -0.188*** -0.161*** -0.127*** -0.137*** 
(-4.40) (-4.29) (-3.64) (-2.82) (-3.05) 
CATA 0.260** 0.525*** 0.557*** 0.557*** 
(2.29) (4.08) (4.34) (4.37) 
Inventory/Revenue 0.173 0.251 0.222 
(0.92) (1.33) (1.18) 
Quick Ratio -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.036*** 
(-4.83) (-3.98) (4.01) 
Goingconcern, 0.163 0.150 
(1.45) (1.35) 
Leverage 0.196** 0.166** 
(2,32) (1.98) 
Assets (log) - Dec 0.089*** 
(3.50) 
Constant -4.044*** -4.312*** -4.454*** -4.554*** -4.711*** -4.375*** 
(48-07) (47.62) (-34.47) (-34.08) (-33.15) (-25.68) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 836 836 767 759 759 759 
R2 0.704 0.723 0.731 0.736 0.739 0.743 
Adjusted R2 0.700 0.719 0.727 0.731 0.734 0.738 
F Statistics 196 179 158 148 131 126 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of Audit Fees. t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. 
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Table 3: Audit Fee regressions, big 4 auditor clients only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Assets (log) 0.221*** 0.196*** 0.246*** 0.332*** 0.328*** 0.237*** 
(7.50) (6.77) (6.67) (7.92) (7.85) (4.87) 
Revenue (log) 0.159*** 0.199*** 0.167*** 0.100*** 0.096*** 0.099*** 
(6.42) (7.96) (6.35) (3.20) (3.05) (3.18) 
Revenue (zero) 2.573*** 3.084*** 2.555*** (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
(5.00) (6.07) (4.88) 
Market Value (log) 0.039** 0.057*** 0.050** 0.052*** 0.063*** 0.072*** 
(2.11) (3.13) (2.55) (2.66) (3.16) (3-61) 
Afarket Value (zero) 0.885** 1.249*** 1.070*** 1.088*** 1.290*** 1.469*** 
(2.45) (3.47) (2-78) (2.84) (3.31) (3.77) 
Inventory (log) 0.099*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.073*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 
(4.94) (4.68) (4.56) (3.12) (2.80) (3,22) 
Inventory (zero) 1.693*** 1.554*** 1.656*** 1.272*** 1.160*** 1.319*** 
(5-03) (4.73) (4.66) (3.40) (3,09) (3.52) 
Business Segments 0.084*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 
(4.89) (4.90) (4.63) (4.56) (4.56) (4.50) 
Dec 0.127** 0.110** 0.114** 0.115** 0.109** -0,461*** 
(2.28) (2.02) (2.09) (2.15) (2.02) (-2.72) 
Loss 0.219*** 0.177*** 0.173*** 0.162*** 0.170*** 
(4.02) (3.12) (3.06) (2.85) (3.01) 
ROA -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.122** -0.097* -0-107** 
(-3.25) (-2.99) (-2.47) (-1.94) (-2.15) 
CATA 0.258** 0.547*** 0.570*** 0.565*** 
(2.10) (3.90) (4.07) (4.07) 
Inventory/Revenue 0.196 0.318 0.249 
(0.67) (1.08) (0.85) 
Quick Ratio -0.044*** -0.038*** -0.038*** 
(-4.78) (4.00) (-4.07) 
Goingconcern 0.078 0.104 
(0.55) (0.74) 
Leverage 0.221** 0.188* 
(2.19) (1.88) 
Assets (log) - Dec 0.103*** 
(3.55) 
Constant -4.074*** -4.313*** -4.480*** -4.594*** -4.732*** -4.314*** 
(43.24) (42-84) (-31.36) (-30.43) (-29.55) (-21.82) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 753 753 693 687 687 687 
R2 0.696 0.712 0.723 0.728 0.730 0.735 
Adjusted R2 0,692 0.707 0.718 0.722 0.724 0.729 
F Statistics 170 152 136 128 113 109 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of Audit Fees. t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. 
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Table 4: Audit Fee regressions for each auditor (pricing equations) 
PWO DT EY KPMG NonBig 
Assets (log) 0.072 0.297*** 0.164 0.257** 0.005 
(0.67) (3.79) (1.28) (2.40) (0.04) 
Revenue (log) 0.093 0.062 0.088 0.135* 0.169** 
(1.55) (1.33) (1.09) (1.78) J2.10) 
Revenue (zero) (dropped) 1.082 1.332 5.573*** 2.619** 
(1.21) (1.07) (3.57) (2.17) 
Market Value (log) 0.093*** 0.068* 0.077* 0.032 0.068 
(2.77) (1.69) (1.91) (0.68) (1.15) 
Market Value (zero) 1.947*** 1.323* 1.484* 0.843 1.118 
(3-00) (1.70) (1.84) (0-93) (1.12) 
Business Segments 0.064* 0.123*** 0.075** 0,022 0.023 
(1.90) (4.29) (2.21) (0-50) (0.45) 
Dec -0.827* -0.358 -0.587 -0.694** -0.559 
(-1.97) (-1.22) (-1.41) (-2.04) (-1.62) 
CATA 0.671** 0.540** 0.470 0,475 -0.244 
(2-49) (2.46) (1.32) (1.60) (-0.64) 
Leverage 0.314* 0.190 0.223 -0.011 0.187 
(1.70) (1.26) (0-98) (-0.05) (1.24) 
Inventory (log) 0.215*** 0.019 0.103** 0.077 -0.061 
(4-58) (0.52) (2.31) (1.47) (-1.05) 
Inventory (zero) 3.476*** 0.360 1.912** 1.211 -1.164 
(4-54) (0.59) (2.53) (1.41) (-1.37) 
Quick Ratio -0.028** -0.022 -0.067** -0.060*** -0.002 
(-2.10) (-1.33) (-2.17) (-2.67) (-0.08) 
Loss 0.244* 0.068 0.252** 0.061 0.349** 
(1.97) (0.71) (2.02) (0.48) (2.11) 
ROA -0.210 -0.082 -0.015 -0.247* -0.168* 
(-1.38) (-1.42) (-0.07) (-1.66) (-1.76) 
Assets (log) - Dec 0.175** 0.096* 0.133* 0.136** 0.178* 
(2.35) (1.97) (1.93) (2.20) (1.80) 
Constant -4.015*** -4.310*** -3.970*** -3.941*** -3.200*** 
(-8.60) (-13.75) (-8.23) (-10.74) (-6.65) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes- Yes Yes Yes 
N 119 211 180 182 74 
le 0.838 0.745 0.740 0.722 0.562 
Adi. R2 0.815 0.724 0.715 0.695 0.439 
F-Statistics 36 35 29 27 5 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of Audit Fees. t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. 
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Table 5: Multinomial logitt auditor characteristics, all clients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -0.822 0.843 
(-0.87) (1.14) 
Rest. (A. I. T. ) -0.863 0.599 
(-0.84) (0.74) 
Rest. (A., AA) -2.525 7.408** 
(-0.70) (2.54) 
Rest. (A., GAO) -27.146* 22.283 
(-1.66) (1.58) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 1.839*** 1.821*** 2.006*** 2.326*** 
(5.53) (5.56) (4.02) (4.84) 
Ind. Exp. (N) 0.001** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 
(2.56) (2.62) (0.70) (1.03) 
Audit Fees 0.233 0.232 0.242 0.247 0.288 0.293 0.230 0.268 
(1.31) (1.31) (1.34) (1.36) (1.51) (1.53) (1.26) (1.43) 
N 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 766 
Pseudo R2 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.008 
x2 40 40 40 42 18 18 24 20 
LogLikelihood -1213 -1213 -1213 -1212 -1224 -1224 -1221 -1223 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Non-parametric bootstrapped -standard errors with 1000 replications. 
t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Table 6: Multinomial logit, auditor characteristics, big 4 auditor clients only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -6.083*** -5.775*** 
(-3.76) 
Rest. (A. I. T. ) -4.992*** -4.923*** 
(-3.32) (-3.43) 
Rest. (A., AA) -23.544*** -24.688*** 
(4.70) (-4.34) 
Rest. (A., GAO) -85.983*** -101.430** 
(4.48) (4.44) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 0.563 0.458 1.564*** 1.533*** 
(1.33) (1.10) (3.41) (3.28) 
Ind. Exp. (N) 0.000 0.000 0,002*** 0.002*** 
(0.18) (0.09) (2.61) (2.96) 
Audit Fees -0.551** -0.540** -0.402** -0.494** -0.564** -0.553** -0.429** -0.530** 
(-2.53) (-2.51) (-2.05) (-2.37) (-2.54) (-2.53) (-2.15) (-2.49) 
N 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 692 
Pseudo R2 0.012 0.010 0.016 0.015 0.011 0.009 0.015 0.015 
x2 23 19 31 28 21 18 28 28 
LogLikelihood -948 -950 -944 -945 -949 -951 -945 -945 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. 
t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 7: Multinomial logit, auditor and client characteristics, all clients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -4.253*** -4,769*** -4.843*** -5.530*** -5.422*** -5.283*** -5.354*** 
(-2.70) (-2.94) (-2.97) (-3.26) (-3.22) (-3.15) (-3.20) 
Rest. (A. I. ) - NonBig 11.463 
(0.27) 
Ind. Exp. (NIS) 1.573*** 1.520*** 1.510*** 1,253** 1.280** 1.265** 1.258** 
(3,28) (3.07) (3.03) (2.38) (2.40) (2.34) (2.33) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) - NonBig -19.155 
(-0.30) 
Audit Fees -0.620* -0.595* -0.577* -0.537 -0.547 -0.541 -0.495 
(-1.91) (-1.83) (-1.68) (-1.35) (-1.37) (-1.33) (-1.22) 
Audit Fees - NonBig -10.180* 
(-1.71) 
PIVC 
Assets 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 
(1.47) (1.53) (1.52) (1,56) (1.27) (1.30) (0.91) 
Revenue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0,001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
(1.31) (1.07) (1-05) (0.65) (1.20) (1.23) (0.43) 
Market Value 0.001 0,001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (0.12) (0,05) 
Inventory 0.004 0.002 0,002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 
(0.29) (0.18) (0.16) (0.13) (0.26) J0.19) (0.31) 
Business Segments -0.271** -0.266** -0.270** -0.237* -0.222* -0.237* -0,294* (-2.13) (-2.10). (-2.13) (-1.77) (-1.69) (-1.80) (-1.90) 
Loss -0-328 -0.230 -0.285 -0.249 -0.277 -0.686 (-0.90) (-0.59) (-0.70) (-0.59) (-0.65) (-1.32) 
ROA 0.168 0.129 -0.138 -0-176 -0.194 
(0.59) (0.43) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.53) 
CATA 1.668** 1.188 1.264 1.763* 
(2.05) (1,23) (1.30) (1.66) 
Inventory/Revenue 
-0-756 -1.057 -1-178 -1.213 
(-0.53) (-0.73) (-0.81) (-0.83) 
Quick Ratio 0.098 0.057 0.084 
(0.82) (0.47) (0.64) 
Goingconcern 
-1.668 -1.487 -1.479 




Constant -0.778** -0.467 -0.458 -1.306* -1.155 -0.785 -1.549 (-1.97) (-0.94) (-0.92) (-1.67) (-1.48) (-0.87) (-1.25) 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DT (continued) 
Goingconcern -0.539 -0.472 -0.483 
(-0.93) (-0.79) (-0.75) 
Leverage -0.254 -0.465 
(-0.47) (-0.76) 
Constant -0.519 -0.029 '-0.023 -0.684 -0.576 -0.425 -1.204 
(-1.43) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.90) (-0.76) (-0.50) (-1.00) 
KPAIG 
Assets 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.005 
(1.47) (1.53) (1.52) (1,56) (1,27) (1.30) (0.91) 
Revenue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0,001 
(1.30) (1.05) (1.03) (0.64) (1.19) (1.22) (0.41) 
Market Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.26) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0-05) 
Inventory 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.003 0.005 
(0.32) (0.21) (0.19) (0.15) (0.28) (0,21) (0.34) 
Business Segments -0.357*** -0.352*** -0.357*** -0.302** -0.294** -0.308** -0.364** 
(-2.94) (-2.95) (-2.97) (-2.35) (-2-32) (-2.42) (-2.42) 
Loss -0.277 -0.167 -0.301 -0.237 -0.257 -0.662 
(-0.78) (-0.44) (-0.74)- (-0.57) (-0.61) (-1.28) 
ROA 0.193 0.178 -0.076 -0.119 -0.135 
(0.76) (0.64) (-0.25) (-0.38) (-0.39) 
CATA 2.380*** 2.042** 2.081** 2.590** 
(3.00) (2.17) (2.18) (2.47) 
Inventory/Revenue -0.716 -1.074 -1.279 -1.308 
(-0.64) (-0.96) (-1.15) (-1.20) 
Quick Ratio 0.071 0.018 0.045 
(0.60) (0.16) (0.36) 
Goingconcern -1.669 -1.374 -1.359 
(-1.14) (-1.02) (-0.98) 
Leverage -0.911 -1.130* 
(-1.48) (-1.68) 
Constant -0.009 0.260 0.263 -1.029 -0.861 -0.288 -1.068 
(-0.03) (0-55) (0-55) (-1.36) (-1.15) (-0.34) (-0.87) 
N 766 766 766 759 759 759 759 
Pseudo R2 0.108 0.112 0.113 0.121 0.128 0.130 0.132 
x2 266 277 279 295 313 317 323 
LogLikelihood -1100 -1095 -1094 -1074 -1065 -1063 -1060 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. 
t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. Base category 
is NonBig. 
93 
Table 8: Multinomial logitt auditor and client characteristics, big 4 auditor clients only 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -4.280*** -4.731*** -4.799*** -5.676*** -5-617*** -5-506*** 
(-2.80) (-3.01) (-3.04) (-3-36) (-3.35) (430) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 1.580*** 1.512*** 1.513*** 1.222** 1.231** 1.220** 
(3.13) (2.95) (2.93) (2.32) (2.32) (2.28) 
Audit Fees -0.673** -0.643* -0.628* -0.528 -0.540 -0.538 
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Assets -0,000 -0.000 -0-000 -0.000 -0-000 -0.000 (-0.12) (-0.06) (-0.06) (-0.15) (-0.12) (-0.15) 
Revenue -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.12) 
Market Value -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0-000 -0.000 -0.000 (-0.69) (-0.71) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.69) (-0.68) 
Inventory 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.44) (0.45) (0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.47) 
Business Segments 0.123 0.112 0.112 0.109 0.108 0.106 
(1.33) (1.21) (1.21) (1.16) (1.13) (1.11) 
Continued on the next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Loss -0.392 -0.380 -0.379 -0,446 -0.450 
(-1.52) (-1.36) (-1.33) (-1.50) (-1.51) 
ROA 0.031 0.118 0.201 0.211 
(0.10) (0.37) (0.56) (0.58) 
CATA -0.426 -0.293 -0.257 
(-0.73) (-0.48) (-0.42) 
Inventory/Revenue -0.126 -0.078 0.031 
(-0.09) (-0.05) (0.02) 
Quick Ratio -0.012 -0.002 
(-0.25) (-0.05) 




Constant 0.261 0.438 0.436 0.607 0.557 0.349 
(1.11) (1.64) (1.63) (1.52) (1.36) (0.63) 
KPAfG 
Assets 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0-07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0-13) (0.15) 
Revenue -0-000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.19) (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.19) 
Market Value -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0-000 -0.000 
(-0.35) (-0.32) (-0.32) (-0.39) (-0.37) (-0.38) 
Inventory 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.25) (0.25) (0,26) (0.27) (0,26) (0.27) 
Business Segments -0-088 -0.090 -0.090 -0.065 -0.072 -0.071 
(-0-90) (-0.92) (-0.92) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.71) 
Loss 0.045 0.060 -0.025 0.002 0.006 
(0.18) (0.22) (-0.09) (0.01) (0.02) 
ROA 0.029 0.059 0.069 0.059 
(0.11) (0.21) (0.24) (0.20) 
CATA 0.703 0.840 0.805 
(1.22) (1.37) (1.31) 
Inventory/Revenue 0.077 0.022 -0-088 
(0.06) (0.02) (-0.06) 
Quick Ratio -0.027 -0.039 
(-0.61) (-0.76) 




Constant 0.777*** 0.738*** 0.734*** 0.277 0.291 0.513 
(3.37) (2.77) (2.74) (0.68) (0.71) (0.95) 
N 692 692 692 687 687 687 
Pseudo R2 0.043 0.047 0.048 0.052 0.055 0.056 
x2 83 90 92 99 105 107 
LogLikelihood -918 -914 -913 -903 -900 -899 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. 
t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. Base category 
is PIM 
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Table 9: Multinornial logit, auditor characteristics interacted with client characteristics, all clients 
x= 
Assets Revenue Market Inventory Business Loss 
Value Segments 
Rest. (A. I. ) -2-880 -4-048** -4.021** -5.343*** -3.870 -5.429*** 
(-1.50) (-2.09) (-2.42) (-2-70) (-1.37) (-2.86) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -X -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 -0.492 1.952 
(-1.33) (-0.77) (-1.20) (0.18) (-0.64) (0.47) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 1.279** 1.171* 1.011* 0.819 0.801 1.585** 
(2.14) (1.88) (1.71) (1.30) (0-87) (2.47) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) X -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.167 -1.169 
(-0.16) (0.06) (0.49) (0.99) (0.56) (-1.08) 
Audit Fees -1.106** -1.186** -1.495*** -0.809* -0.900 -0.642 
(-2.23) (-2.34) (-2.82) (-1.70) (-1.43) (-1.22) 
Audit Fees -X 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.118 0.326 
(1.43) (1.49) (1.90) (0.60) (0.83) (0-57) 
N 759 759 759 759 759 759 
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.132 0.138 0.132 0.130 0.130 
x2 325 322 336 322 318 318 
LogLikelihood -1059 -1060 -1054 -1060 -1063 -1062 
x= 
ROA CATA Inventory/ Quick Ratio Goinyconcem Leverage 
Revenue 
Rest. (A. I. ) -5.066*** -7.423** -5.377** -3.584* -5.509*** -6.409 
(-2.98) (-2.42) (-2.46) (-1.77) (-3.20) (493) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -X -5.364 10.258 1.734 -1.472 13.845 1.718 
(-0,63) (1.23) (0.06) (-1.12) (0.68) (0.17) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 1.378** 2.416*** 0.782 1.084 1.243** 1.552 
(2.50) (2.58) (1.16) (1.60) (2.26) (1.20) 
Ind. Exp. (INIS) X 2.008 -3.658* 6.935 0.128 -0.042 -0.489 
(1.39) (-1.79) (1.26) (0.46) (-0.01) (-0.27), 
Audit Fees -0.538 -1.926*** -0.644 -0.753 -0.550 -0.088 
(-1.25) (-2.67) (-1.27) (-1.46) (-1.34) (-0.09) 
Audit Fees -X -0.077 4.393*** 1.120 0.227 0.848 -0.615 
(-0.08) (2.82) (0.24) (0.87) (0.38) (-0.44) 
N 759 759 759 759 759 759 
Pseudo R2 0.131 0,134 0.130 0.131 0.130 0.130 
x2 319 328 318 319 318 317 
LogLikelihood -1062 -1057 -1062 -1062 -1063 -1063 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. The heading of a column indicates the variable which auditor 
characteristics are interacted with. All equations are estimated with the full set of client characteristics with 
base category NonBig, just as in model (6) of Table 7. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 
replications. t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. 
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Table 10: Nested logit, auditor and client characteristics, all clients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -4.802*** -5.231*** -5.847*** -6.032*** -6-048*** -5.978*** 
(-3.28) (-3.45) (-3.55) (-3.67) (-3.70) (-3.67) 
Rest. (A, I. ) - NonBig -11-853 -25-763 5.754 5.274 -1.826 4.159 
(-0.24) (-0.51) (0.12) (0.10) (-0.03) (0.08) 
Ind. Exp. (NIS) 1.525*** 1.479*** 1.323*** 1.186** 1.189** 1.193** 
(3-25) (3.07) (2-61) (2.30) (2.28) (2.28) 
Ind. Exp. (NIS) - NonBig -53.570 -70,214 -27.986 -21.606 -31.710 -20.004 
(-0.67) (-0.85) (-0.38) (-0.27) (-0.37) (-0.24) 
Audi t Fees -0-628** -0-621** -0.469 -0.437 -0.454 -0.446 
. (-2.06) (-2.06) (-1.53) (-1.25) (-1.29) (-1.27) 
Audit Fees - NonBig -0-705 -5.102 -9.267* -9-943* -10.711* -10.590* 
(-0.19) 0.19) (-1.82) (-1.86) (-1.85) (-1.79) 
Upper Level. 
Assets -0-005 -0.005 -0-006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
(-1.09) (-1.00) 0.08) (-1.09) (-0.87) (-0.86) 
Leverage 0.977** 1.086** 1.111** 1.163** 0-974* 0.736 
(2.41) (2.58) (2-57) (2-51) (1.84) (1.27) 
Lower Level. 
E Y 
Revenue -0-000 -0-000 -0-000 -0-000 -0.000 0.000 
(-0.12) (-0.12) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.32) 
Market Value -0-000 -0-000 -0-000 -0-000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-1.41) (-1.48) (-1.51) (-1.55) (-1.55) (-1.54) 
Inventory 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.24) (0-17) (0-38) (0-63) (0.59) (0.61) 
Business Segments 0.182** 0.170** 0.172** 0.183** 0.182** 0.182** 
(2.20) (2.06) (2.05) (2.17) (2.14) (2.14) 
Loss -0.433* -0-532** -0-572** -0-566** -0.566** 
(-1.79) (-2.01) (-2.15) (-2.11) (-2.09) 
ROA -0.209 -0-187 -0.184 -0.177 
(-0.87) (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.73) 
CATA 0.043 0.241 0.276 0.278 
(0.09) (0.48) (0.52) (0-52) 
Inventory/Revenue -1.296 -1.301 -1.285 
(-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.05) 




Constant 0.323 0.527** 0.492 0.477 0.479 0.477 
(1-52) (2-17) (1.45) (1.39) (1.39) (1.38) 
























Continued on the next page 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
DT 
-0.000 -0.000 -0-000 -0.000 
(-0.42) (-0.46) (455) (-0.52) 
-0-000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
(-1.71) (-1.74) (-1.74) (-1.76) 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(1.25) (1.23) (1.46) (1.45) 
0.124 0.112 0.103 0.111 
(1.49) (1.34) (1.22) (1.30) 
-0.399 -0.383 -0.393 
(-1.59) (-1.39) (-1.42) 
0.015 0.112 
(0.05) (0.38) 
-0.387 -0.392 (-0.80) (-0.76) 
-0,092 
(-0.08) 
0.245 0.430* 0.605* 0,578* 
(I. 11) (1.73) (1.76) (1,66) 
KPAfG 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.37) (-0.35) 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.89) (-0.92) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.63) (0.62) (0-74) (0.73) 
-0.086 -0,088 -0.065 -0.060 
(-0.97) (-1.00) (-0.72) (-0.66) 
0.039 0.005 -0.020 







0.754*** 0.723*** 0.291 




























































































Revenue -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0-001 (-1.05) (-0.60) (-0.34) (-0.13) (-0.27) (-0.37) 
Market Value -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (-1.09) (-0.85) (-0.37) (-0.52) (-0.49) (-0.39) 
Inventory -0.004 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.005 
(429) (-0.21) (0.19) (-0.25) (-0.45) (-0.37) 
Business Segments 0.112 0.213 0.231 0.288* 0.239 0.278* 
(0.64) (1.42) (1.51) (1.66) (1.38) (1.67) 
Loss 0.916* 1.022* 0.785 0.958 0.743 
(1.69) (1.73) (1.23) (1.49) (1.19) 
RON 0.064 0.026 0.034 0.187 
(0.28) (0.12) (0.16) (0.83) 
CATA -1.984*** -2.090** -1.908** -1-774** 
(-2.68) (-2.56) (-2.10) (-2.00) 
Invent ory/Revenue 1.137 1.214 1.263 
(1-39) (1.39) (1.46) 




Constant -3.656 -2.486 -0.433 0.885 0,583 1,149 
(-1.07) (-0.78) (-0.15) (0.29) (0.19) (0.40) 
Inclusive Value Big -1.435 -0.674 -0.111 0.721 0.312 0.758 
(-0.69) (-0.36) (-0.06) (0-37) (0.15) (0.40) 
N 766 766 766 759 759 759 
LogLikelihood -1097 -1090 -1082 -1069 -1068 -1063 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. 
t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. Nesting 
structum: Big (PIVC, EY, DT, KPAfG), NonBig (NonBig). Base category is PIVC at the lower and Big at the 
upper level. The model is estimated sequentially (LIML). The Inclusive Value of the degenerate nest (NonBig) is 
not identified; its value is 1. The LogLikelihood value is the sum of the loglikelihoods of the upper and lower levels. 
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Table 11: Multinomial logit with Industry Dummies, auditor and client characteristics, all clients 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Rest. (A. I. ) -4.562** -4.647** -4.762** -4.594** -4.538** -4.544** -4.839** (-2.08) (-2.15) (-2.16) (-2.06) (-2.00) (-1.97) (-2.08) 
Rest. (A. I. ) - NonBig 55.609* 
(1.78) 
Ind. Exp. (MS) 1.962*** 1.893*** 1.876** 2.089*** 2.093*** 2.067*** 2.135*** 
(2-76) (2-58) (2.51) (2-77) (2.70) (2,58) (2.64) 
Ind. Exp. (NIS) - NonBig -30.606 
(-0.20) 
Audit Fees -0.231 -0.234 -0.206 -0.031 -0.013 -0.003 0.012 
(-0.89) (-0.87) (-0.73) (-0.10) (-0.04) (-0.01) (0.04) 
Audit Fees - NonBig -9-354 
(-1.40) 
PIVC 
Assets 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 
(1.48) (1-61) (1.53) (1.52) (1.40) (1.32) (0.89) 
Revenue 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0,000 
(1.22) (0.99) (0.94) (0,48) (0-85) (0.83) (0.16) 
Market Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0-18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07) 
Inventory -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.004 
(-0.43) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.17) (-0.03) (-0.06) (0.25) 
Business Segments -0.272** -0.277** -0.281** -0.256* -0.238* -0.247* -0.287* (-2.02) (-2-03) (-2.04) (-1.74) (-1.66) (-1.69) (-1.66) 
Loss -0.291 -0.213 -0.236 -0-184 -0.207 -0,613 
(-0.76) (-0.51) (-0.54) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-1.06) 
ROA 0,159 0.107 -0.136 -0.154 -0.173 
(0.52) (0.33) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-0.47) 
CATA 1.639* 1.280 1.344 1.910* 
(1.78) (1.20) (1.25) (1.65) 
Inventory/Revenue -0.463 -0.783 -0.840 -0.707 
(-0.33) (-0.53) (-0.56) (-0.44) 
Quick Ratio 0.087 0.058 0.064 
(0.73) (0.44) (0.48) 
Goingeoncern -1.761 -1.647 -1.690 
(-0.49) (-0.45) (-0.45) 
Leverage -0-382 -0.560 
(-0.55) (-0.74) 
Constant -0.930 -0.638 -0.623 -1.671 -1.491 -1.126 -2.167 (-0.32) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.60) (-0.53) (-0.36) (-0.55) 
Continued on the next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
EY 
Assets 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 
(1.47) (1.60) (1.52) (1.51) (1.39) (1.31) (0.89) 
Revenue 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(1.23) (1.00) (0.95) (0.48) (0.85) (0.83) (0.17) 
Market Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) 
Inventory -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.005 
(-0.40) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.13) (0.01) (-0.02) (0.28) 
Business Segments -0.089 -0.100 -0.100 -0.067 -0.053 -0.062 -0.101 
(-0.71) (-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.48) (-0.38) (-0.44) (-0.59) 
Loss -0.574 -0.603 -0.621 -0.545 -0.570 -0.976* 
(-1.59) (-1.56) (-1.54) (-1.27) (-1.25) (-1.78) 
ROA -0-085 -0.138 -0.370 -0.394 -0.415 
(-0.27) (-0.41) (-1.05) (-1.02) (-1.00) 
CATA 2.047** 1,752* 1.812* 2.399** 
(2.48) (1.79) (1.79) (2.20) 
InventOry/Revenue -2.099 -2.480* -2.555* -2.377 
(-1.51) (-1.77) (-1.85) (-1.50) 
Quick Ratio 0.074 0.045 0.050 
(0.62) (0.34) (0.38) 
Goingconcern -1.686* -1.547** -1.584 
(-1.70) (-1.98) (-1.44) 
Leverage -0.418 -0.593 
(-0.66) (-0.83) 
Constant -0.392 -0.023 -0.039 -1.294 -1.129 -0.733 -1.803 
(-0.19) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.58) (-0.50) (-0.28) (-0.49) 
DT 
Assets 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 
(1.48) (1.61) (1.53) (1.52) (1.40) (1.32) (0.89) 
Revenue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(1.21) (0.98) (0,92) (0.46) (0.83) (0.81) (0.15) 
Market Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.27) (0.24) (0,24) (0,17) (0.12) (0.11) (0,06) 
Inventory -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005 
(-0.36) (-0.34) (-0.34) (-0.10) (0.04) (0.00) (0.31) 
Business Segments -0.142 -0.153 -0.156 -0.133 -0.116 -0.126 -0.167 
(-1.10) (-1.20) (-1.18) (-0.93) (-0.83) (-0.88) (-0.98) 
Loss -0.677* -0.634 -0.663 -0.671 -0.708 -1.113* 
(-1.78) (-1.57) (-1.56) (-1.49) (-1.49) (-1.95) 
ROA 0.079 0.083 -0.052 -0-063 -0.079 
(0.27) (0.27) (-0.16) (-0.19) (-0.23) 
CATA 1.153 0.872 0.956 1.538 
(1.36) (0.86) (0.92) (1.41) 
Inventory/Revenue -1.050 -1.297 -1.285 -1.128 
(-0.76) (-0.96) (-0.93) (-0.72) 
Quick Ratio 0.081 0.059 0.064 
(0.69) (0.45) (0.49) 
Continued on the next page 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
DT (continued) 
Goingconcem -0.562 -0-515 -0.557 
(-0.88) (-0.78) (-0.77) 
Leverage -0.181 -0.358 
(430) (-0.. 51) 
Constant -0.710 -0.323 -0.328 -1.117 -1.004 -0.797 -1.863 
(-0.33) (-0.14) (-0.14) (-0.49) (445) (431) (450) 
KPAIG 
Assets 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.005 
(1.48) (1.61) (1.53) (1.52) (1.40) (1.32) (0.90) 
Revenue 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 
(1.20) (0.96) (0.91) (0.44) (0.81) (0.80) (0.14) 
Market Value 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.28) (0.25) (0.25) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11) (0.06) 
Inventory -0-005 -0.005 -0-005 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 0.005 
(-0.40) (-0.38) (-0.37) (412) (0.01) (402) (0.29) 
Business Segments -0.326** -0.333** -0.338* * -0.291** -0.278** -0.284** -0.321* 
(-2.50) (-2.55) (-2.54) (-1.99) (-1.97) (-1.97) (-1.85) 
Loss -0.396 -0.317 -0.324 -0.255 -0.258 -0.661 
(-1.06) (-0.79) (-0.76) (455) (-0.56) (-1.16) 
ROA 0.168 0.136 -0.095 -0.121 -0.140 
(0.56) (0.42) (428) (433) (-0.36) 
CATA 2.239*** 1.982** 1.984* 2.551** 
(2.64) (2.02) (1.92) (2.33) 
Inventory/Revenue -1.233 -1.648 -1.830 -1.669 
(-0.90) (-1.15) (-1.28) (-1.03) 
Quick Ratio 0.069 0.029 0.034 
(0.59) (0.22) (0.26) 
Goingconcern -1.662 -1.410 -1.423 
(-1.00) (-0.74) (-0.77) 
Leverage -0.783 -0.964 
(-1.17) (-1.29) 
Constant -2.556 -2.226 -2.212 -3.656 -3.498 -2.804 -3.865 
(434) (429) (-0.29) (-0648) (-0.45) (-0.35) (-0.46) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 766 766 766 759 759 759 759 
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.135 0.136 0.144 0.151 0.152 0.156 
x2 328 334 336 352 369 372 380 
LogLikelihood -1069 -1066 -1065 -1046 -1037 -1035 -1031 
Notes: Dependent variable is auditor choice. All equations are estimated with the full set of industry dummies. 
Non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 replications. t statistics are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Variables in Italics are dummies. Base category is NonBig. 
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Appendix Nested Logit, normalisation with LIML 
The usual procedure to estimate nested logit models is with full information maximum likelihood (FIML). 
FIML, as opposed to the limited information maximum likelihood, or sequential, estimation (LIML), has 
the distinct advantage that it is efficient, only one step and the standard errors are correct. However, the 
log likelihood function is not globally concave, which means that although there is a unique maximum, 
it can suffer from an abundance of local maxima. This can potentially complicate the numerical maximi- 
sation process to a great extent. Given the numerous variables in my model, the relatively small number 
of observations and the presence of a degenerate nest, FIML turned out to be difficult to estimate: it 
often failed to converge and when it did, it took 1500 or more iterations. Since the standard errors of the 
choice model have to be bootstrapped as a result of a generated regressor (Audit Fees), FINIL estimation 
is simply not feasible in my case. Therefore, I estimated the nested logit models sequentially. 
There is a delicate issue of normalizing the nested logit model in a sequential estimation procedure. As 
it has been pointed out by numerous studies (Koppelman and Wen 1998, Hunt 2000, Heiss 2002, Hensher 
and Greene 2002, Train 2003, Hensher et al 20Q5) some formulations (normalizations) are not consistent 
with the theory of random utility maximisation (RUM). Although, the issue has been addressed at 
length in a FINIL framework, there has been little said about the normalization problem in sequential 
estimations. 
The normalisation problem 
Suppressing the index for the individual, let the utility from choosing alternative k in nest B be 
Uk ý Wk + Ck ý (VB +VB) + (VkjB + VkjB) 
where the first bracket is the utility associated with choosing an alternative from B and the second is 
the utility associated with kth alternative in B. Each utility component is broken down into an observed 
and unobserved (random) part. If VB = 0, then errors within a nest do not share a common unobserved 
component and as a consequence there will be no correlation across the error terms within a nest. In 
nested Iogit models it is assumed that unobserved components at any given level and across levels are 




E(VBi + Vk[Bj)(VBi + VIJBJ = 
E(vBj'VBi) 
Var(vB, ) if j=i 
for k -7-1 1 0 otherwise 
Therefore, the common random components can only induce correlation between two errors if the 
corresponding observations share the same nest. Given that the error terms are assumed to follow a type 




That is, the variance of the error terms is inversely proportional to some scale parameter, AB (assumed 
to be common within a nest). Also, 
7r 2 
Var(CkEB) = Var(VkIB) + Var(VB) -A2 (, 
b) 
It has been shown that (e. g. Hensher and Greene 2002) 
VB ý Zl-fAb + F-B 
Ab 
JTVB where 
(A. 2) ýB 
IVB = InEAexp(VkIBAB) 
where -- is a vector of nest specific covariates with parameter vector -y. IVB is the Inclusive Value 
(IV) or Loasum, the expected utility of choosing an alternative in nest'B. In other words, it is a weighted 0 
average of the utilities associated with the alternatives within the nest, where the weights are probabilities 
of choosing each alternatives. The parameter of the inclusive value is the ratio between the two scale 
parameters, Au and Ab. Two observations are immediate. First, since variances are positive, the scale 
parameters must be positive. Second, since the total variation co ntains both the upper and lower level 
variation it must be that Ab :5 AB. This implies that the parameter of the inclusive values must lie 
between 0 and 1. If the value of the IV parameter is 1, this means Ab ý AB, which implies Var(7)B) ý 07 
that is, observations are not correlated within a nest (from (A. 1)) and the nested logit specification is 
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unnecessary, a simple multinomial logit is probably more appropriate. A value closer to 0 would imply 
strong correlation within nest. 
AB and Ab are not identified separately, only their ratio, therefore, a normalization is necessary. 
Naturally, there are two ways to normalize: either AB ý1 (RU1) or Ab ý1 (RU2). Some algebraic 
manipulation shows that RU'l normalization is not consistent with RUM in general as it was pointed out 
in many articles (e. g. Koppelman and Wen 1998, Hunt 2000, Heiss 2002, Hensher and Greene 2002). 
Normalisation with sequential estimation 
Consider a RU2 specification. Then the RUM consistent sequential (LIML) estimation procedure is 
as follows. Suppose VkJB = XT. In the first stage estimation ("choice within nest"), we estimate a simple 
multinomial logit. Note that the variance of the error term is not identified at this stage, therefore - as 
a result of the error variance being normalized to 7r'/G - we actually estimate: 
VkIBAB ý X1,8AB (A. 3) 
Therefore, without any explicit normalization, we can then calculate the inclusive values and estimate 
the model as in (A. 2). In other words, the normalization is implicitly done in a sequential framework as 
it is clear from (A. 3). Notice that this is quite different from a RUM consistent FIML estimation (RU2) 
where the "first stage" normalization must be explicitly carried out. In a sequential setting, therefore, 
we can obtain then ý by multiplying the first stage estimates 
FAB by 1ý/AB from the second stage. This 
is essentially the LIML equivalent of RU2 model. 
Degenerate nests with sequential estimation 
The presence of degenerate nest should not bring about any further complications in a sequential 
estimation in addition to the ones that emerge in FIML settings. In general, the IV parameter of the 
degenerate nest should be one but it's not identified if the model is RUM consistent since the IV parameter 
cancels out in the marginal probability. (e. g. Hunt 2000) If there is generic variable in the model, however, 
then the IV parameter will be identified even in RUM consistent models (RU2) but it will merely relax 
the restrictions imposed by the generic coefficient and as such will have little to do with the real IV 
parameter. (See, for instance, Heiss 2002) 
In a sequential setting, therefore, as long as all coefficients are allowed to vary across partitions, then 
excluding the degenerate IV variable will deliver RUM consistent estimates. Note that in this case the 
degenerate IV variable is perfectly collinear with the variables of the degenerate nest in the second stage, 
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therefore it cannot be included and/or constrained in any way. This is very intuitive and also algebraically 
obvious: since the inclusive value is basically a linear combination of the lower level variables, perfect 
collinearity will arise because the parameters of the lower level variables of the degenerate nest are 
estimated along with the IV variables in the second stage in a sequential framework. Observe that this 
is just another way of saying that the degenerate IV parameter plays no role whatsoever. 
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